

Security Information

**THE ADMINISTRATION OF INTELLIGENCE
IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
VOLUME II - REFERENCE AND INSTALLATION MANUAL**

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Prepared By
CRESAP, McCORMICK and PAGET
Management Engineers

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VOLUME II

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I. TECHNIQUES OF CONSUMER REACTION ANALYSIS

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I - TECHNIQUES OF CONSUMER REACTION ANALYSIS

Early in the planning of our field work, it was recognized that a study of demand and use through the "eyes of R's customers" would offer one of the most important sources of basic information regarding the intelligence operations of the Department of State. Since precedents in the form of previous fact finding efforts of this type were not available to us, this portion of the analysis was conducted on the basis of trial and error methods. The final result is thus imperfect, although its major conclusions, reported in Volume I, are sufficiently consistent to point clearly toward the principal steps which R should take to improve its relationships with consumers.

It is the purpose of this chapter to review the experience of our fact finding in order to outline suitable guides for future studies of this type by the Department itself. Our suggestions regarding the most fruitful approaches to evaluating consumer reaction, can best be stated as answers to the three questions;

- What are the purposes which can be served by consumer reaction studies?
- What methodology appears most productive?
- How can the findings of consumer reaction studies be put to practical use?

A - THE PURPOSES SERVED BY CONSUMER REACTION STUDIES

One of the interesting and refreshing characteristics found in the R Area is the use of concepts and terminology which are commonplace in

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business operations. One encounters frequently, terms such as "The Product," "The Consumer," "The Raw Material," etc. This is considered a beneficial tendency since it tends to clothe in understandable language the difficult and abstruse (to many laymen) operations of an intelligence organization. This usage of "commercial terminology" is particularly apropos when one discusses the need for, and the techniques of, consumer reaction studies. In business terms, the objective is that of conducting a "market analysis" of the intelligence audience. It is believed that three primary objectives of market analysis are fully applicable to studying the audiences which the R Area is endeavoring to reach. These are: (1) the identification of the market, (2) the development of the market, and (3) the merchandising of the product to stimulate and sustain market demand. Brief discussion of each of these elements of market analysis should prove valuable in considering the purposes to be served by consumer studies:

1. Identifying the Market

R has a many-sided mission. Among the components of this mission are:

- To procure and/or distribute intelligence materials within the R Area, to the Department, and among the intelligence agencies. These materials range from the more commonly-available printed books, serials, and reference works; to the highly classified and sensitive pieces of information garnered from reporting sources of the Department itself, and from other intelligence sources. Included also are the research products of others.
- To furnish conventional library research and reference services.
- To maintain and provide biographic data on foreign personalities.

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- To conduct factual research.
- To analyze and interpret facts and events.
- To draw conclusions and prepare long-range estimates.

These services may be rendered orally, visually, by simple memorandum, or by formally prepared research papers and reports. But throughout all of these activities there runs one common thread - the provision of information (whether factual or including interpretation and estimates) of actual or potential value to someone else who can make use of it, now or in the future, in taking decision actions. More simply stated, everything that R produces and disseminates must find an audience which will find this product of interest and value. If this is not true, R's continued existence will be jeopardized.

Thus the first purpose of consumer reaction analysis is to locate and classify R's various audiences. Our studies indicate that these audiences extend from the Secretary of State to the single desk officer within the Department, and to a very broad and much less readily identifiable audience in the field and among the agencies. The relative size and the varieties of interest found in each of these audiences are difficult to classify precisely. However, this is a study which must be made on a continuing basis if the most accurate servicing of the audiences is to be achieved. Among its initial purposes, consumer reaction analysis should endeavor to measure the numerical size, the dispersion, and the degrees of interest which each of the audiences has in R's products and services.

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2. The Development of the Market

It has been aptly cited to us that an important obligation of an intelligence organization is to self-initiate many of the products and services which it produces. This is to say that, in some measure, the intelligence organization must decide what its market should have, rather than "manufacturing" only those product lines (as does the typical business) which the market will consume. This characteristic places an unusual requirement upon the intelligence producer, since he must take active steps to assure that his market is "trained" to appreciate, accept and use the self-initiated products. Thus, another cardinal purpose of consumer reaction analysis is to induce, through personal contact and proper presentation, an understanding of the intelligence operations leading to an ability and desire to use its services. Consumer reaction studies must, therefore, discover the gaps and weaknesses which exist in this regard in order to plan and conduct such indoctrination as needed.

3. The Improvement of Service to the Market

The objective of the above factor is to develop the market by making the consumer want what he should have. The objective of the third factor is to give the consumer what he wants, in the way he wants it, and at the time that he will use it. This factor recognizes that a continuing portion of the intelligence production will be devoted to specific servicing of user-initiated demands. To the extent that this is a sound basis for R's production, continuing studies of individual desires and needs are essential to assure that the product pointedly answers these needs, and to present products in the form and style which will be most satisfying to the user.

B - THE METHODOLOGY OF CONSUMER REACTION ANALYSIS

At the outset of our interviews with consumers, brief contacts were made with top officials in each Bureau and Area of the Department. It was the purpose, at this time, to secure an estimate of the number of contacts which would be required to secure a proper cross-section of viewpoints and, likewise, to test the types of questions which would elicit useful reactions. The original interview guide was long and somewhat general in character. It endeavored to secure answers to questions such as "what is the meaning of intelligence information," "how are your needs for intelligence information defined and communicated to those who will supply these data," "what is your evaluation of R's part in supplying these needs," etc. After initial interviews in each Bureau and Area, it was discovered that two conditions should be established:

- The interview approach should be so organized that a series of brief conversations could be conducted with a large number of individuals. This was found desirable since it was realized that extensive coverage would be essential to the securing of viewpoints susceptible of meaningful analysis.
- The questions used should be phrased in simple but concrete terms. This was found to mean that a small number of questions should be used, whose purpose would be to elicit comments regarding: (1) Is R used? (2) Is R useful? (3) Is R's organizational status in the Department acceptable? (4) Are there opportunities for improving the use of R from your point of view?

Based upon these decisions a simple questionnaire form containing 14 questions, as illustrated in Appendix E, was devised. At the same time, a selection of desks to be interviewed in each Bureau was prepared with the

objective of reaching each segment in each Bureau, including a representative sampling of top staff officers. The resulting coverage, which reached 224 individuals, has provided a valuable background against which to suggest future modifications and methodology. These observations can be summarized under four headings as follows:

1. The Annual Survey of Target Users

The most important group whose opinions should be regularly and systematically canvassed are those who by reason of position, organization location, and proximity have the most direct influence (whether good or bad) on the standing of R and the use of its products. These are termed, in our conception, the "target users" and are found for the most part within the Department, although some are located in the field organization and in other IAC agencies.

With respect to this group, organized coverage should be obtained by personal interview. The difficulty of securing a thoughtfully prepared questionnaire from busy and important operating officials is so great that the "direct mail" basis of survey will yield results of doubtful value. Our experience indicates that only the face-to-face interview (which provides an opportunity to phrase questions in the most appropriate and understandable manner, to stimulate thoughtful consideration and to appraise the quality and objectivity of the responses given) will produce findings susceptible of meaningful analysis and use. It is, therefore, recommended that audits of target-user opinion be conducted by a well-qualified official of the R Area. As a supplement to this technique,

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which will permit a higher degree of objectivity, it is proposed that a representative of the A Area be invited to work with the representative of the R Area. This technique, utilized in our study, might consist of the following steps:

a. The R team member and the representative of the A Area should work together in the initial selection of names to be interviewed, having as their objective the selection of a suitable cross-section of the organizational subdivisions of each Bureau and functional area.

b. A standardized interview technique, using a questionnaire such as that in Appendix E, should be developed and pilot-tested by the team through a few joint interviews. This will assure that both team members have the same concept of questions to be asked.

c. The team members should then divide the interview task, but both should interview concurrently in the same organizational area in order to permit periodic comparison of findings and decisions with respect to the addition or deletion of names from the interview list.

With respect to the design of the interview program, three suggestions are offered:

a. The number of questions used should permit completion of an interview in approximately 30 minutes, but should likewise sustain an interview of one to two hours' duration in those situations where the interviewee proves unusually cooperative and worthwhile. Our experience indicates that the use of several factual questions at the outset (such

as, "With Whom Do You Work in R?") starts the interview on a highly concrete basis and avoids meaningless generalization. As the interview progresses, it is well for the interviewer to be prepared with specific materials as suggested below:

b. A sample kit of products, thought to be of value and interest to the officer being interviewed, provides an excellent basis for stimulating specific discussion. The kits used during our interviews were found to have one principal limitation; that is, they applied broadly to the particular Bureau, but with insufficient directness to each subdivision of the Bureau. It is felt advisable to construct kits after the list of names to be interviewed has been chosen, so that the kit displayed to a given individual will be as fully representative of his specific interests as possible. The use of the kit in a 30-minute interview must be highly flexible since some respondents prefer to talk more generally from total experience, and find their attention too narrowly limited when specific pieces of material are displayed.

c. A third useful tool was found to be a list of research projects in process. This list offers a concrete means of determining, (1) the extent to which the respondent is acquainted with work in process and has contributed suggestions regarding the scope of the project, and (2) the degree and immediacy of his interest in the project.

It is proposed that organized consumer reaction studies embodying the above principles be scheduled so that each major consumer area is covered approximately once each year. To this end, it would appear

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advisable to schedule the studies so that one area is covered each month, thus spreading the task of interviewing and analyzing throughout the 12-month period. Approximately one week out of each month would be required if the interview task is so scheduled.

2. The Survey of "By-Product Users"

A large portion of the distribution given to R's products reaches areas which may infrequently request projects, and whose interests may be mainly with material suitable for background reading. This appears to be particularly true among the IAC agencies, and it is assumed that the same is largely true throughout the field establishment. Due to the vast size of these audiences, and their geographic distribution, it is obviously impractical to reach them through the technique of personal interview by single representative of the R Area. It is our recommendation that a more opportunistic (and thus less well-organized approach) be pursued in these cases. The following suggestions may be worthy of consideration:

- a. Advise the foreign posts, by appropriate comment in manuals and other issuances, of R's continuing desire to receive comments on the content, utility and sufficiency of products reaching the field.
- b. Use the Foreign Service Inspectors to secure and relay comments to R. For these purposes, a simple questionnaire form should be devised and distributed, with appropriate instructional guides, to the Foreign Service Inspectors.
- c. Include an appropriate question or questions in debriefing sessions to glean knowledge of field use from those returning from the foreign posts.

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d. Make an appeal to those going into field assignments for a letter of comment. This is, of course, especially applicable in the case of members of the R Area assigned to field posts or making trips to foreign countries.

e. Explore with established liaison personnel in the Military Services the applicability of various techniques, including some form of personal contact.

3. Special Studies of the Use of Selected Products and Services

After the organized consumer studies proposed above are well established, use of spot analyses should be introduced. The methods which will prove useful in these cases must be perfected through experimentation. However, the following principles should be employed:

a. The EG and each division should be encouraged to suggest, from time to time, specific papers which they have a particular interest in following. The nature of this interest may be that a unique point of view has been taken and R should carefully observe the reaction of its audiences; or the subject may be of such importance that close follow-up of the coverage and reaction achieved should be made; or it may be that the division chief feels the paper selected provides a useful vehicle for reassessing consumer attitudes in an area which he has found it difficult to judge accurately, etc. In these and similar situations, the officer designated to conduct consumer analyses can make an important contribution by making pinpoint studies (through direct interview) of selected users to discuss the content of a particular document or category of products.

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b. From time to time, questionnaire coverage should be utilized where the less thoughtful responses ("yes," "no," or "no opinion") will be satisfactory. This approach may be found particularly useful for example, in reviewing the reaction toward more standardized services (LR, IAD, BI).

C - ANALYSIS OF AND ACTION UPON CONSUMER STUDIES

Needless to say, consumer studies of the scope described will require a heavy investment of valuable man-hours. Such an investment cannot be justified if useable results are not forthcoming, or if results secured are not put to practical use. Chapter II of this report discusses the organizational vehicles through which such utilization can be obtained. In summary, it is felt that three steps should occur, following each major survey of target users.

1. Analysis of the Findings

The interview team should, immediately upon completion of the interviews planned, prepare a statistical summary and abstract of those comments which lend authenticity and completeness to the reactions secured. If previous studies have been made of the same organizational area, comparisons should be drawn at this time. A conversation should then be held with the research personnel in R Area directly concerned with the audiences reached by the survey, in order to obtain the reactions of the "producer" to the comments of the consumer. (It is, of course, important that the source of comments received in confidence not be divulged.) This step is a continuance of the fact-finding part of the study since it brings to bear additional data for analysis in reaching final conclusions.

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2. Report of Findings to Management

Following the discussion with the producing branch, the team should draw its conclusions and propose actions to overcome negative findings, as well as to sustain and extend positive findings. This report should be released to those levels of management having an immediate interest in its findings and the immediate responsibility for acting upon them. This will include, in every case, the division chief concerned and the Director, OIR. In unusual situations, where the findings are of great magnitude on the negative side, top management should be informed immediately by forwarding a copy of the report to the Deputy Special Assistant.

a. It should be normal practice for the team to meet with those members of management concerned, after an appropriate time has elapsed, to assist in developing an agenda of steps to be undertaken, and to decide upon the timing of these actions and the delegation of responsibility for their accomplishment. Whether or not this agenda is prepared with the team's assistance, a copy should be furnished for their records, and in each case a copy should be forwarded to the Deputy Special Assistant.

b. Normal procedure should provide that one or more follow-up reports will be made by management to the Deputy Special Assistant, describing the progress which has been made in acting upon approved findings. A copy of each such follow-up report should likewise be forwarded to the consumer reaction analyst for his records.

c. In most cases, it would appear advantageous to have the consumer reaction analyst attend a meeting of the research branch concerned

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to make a report of findings to the individual research analysts. This practice can have very positive benefits in terms of giving individual analysts more concrete perspective of the extent to which their work is being utilized, and of the views (both positive and negative) which their customers are expressing.

Summary of Recommendations Concerning Techniques of
Consumer Reaction Analysis

1. "Market studies" of R Area products and services should be conducted for three main purposes:
 - a. To identify the composition and needs of its various audiences.
 - b. To determine practical ways in which to develop the understanding, interest, and acceptance of its self-initiated services by these audiences.
 - c. To assess, periodically, the specific interests and needs of its audiences, so that the portion of its work which should be based on audience interest is properly performed.
2. At least once each year an analysis of opinion should be made, by personal interview, with those who constitute target users. These interviews should be conducted by a team composed of a representative of the R Area and one from the A Area, based upon:
 - a. A well-chosen section.
 - b. A preplanned and tested questionnaire.
 - c. Supplementary devices including sample kits of products, and lists of projects in process.
3. On a more opportunistic basis, means should be developed to canvass the views of by-product users, particularly those at foreign posts and those in the IAC agencies.
4. Spot studies, based either upon questionnaire or direct interview, should be conducted from time to time to meet a particular need expressed by the EG or a division. These will be conducted to secure views regarding a specific product or category of products.

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5. The completion of the survey of target users should include a discussion with the producing branch, followed by the preparation of a full report of findings and conclusions.
6. Action upon the findings of consumer reaction studies should be the responsibility of management, rather than of the interviewer, but the latter should be kept informed of actions taken and assist in their implementation when appropriate.

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II. THE ORGANIZATION FOR CONSUMER RELATIONS

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II. THE ORGANIZATION FOR CONSUMER RELATIONS

R can take pride in our finding, based upon personal contact with a broad cross-section of Departmental customers, that its products and services are extensively used. It must be equally impressed, however, with the vast opportunities which exist for improving the intensity of use and for securing a higher degree of satisfaction among its customers. The same consumer reaction interviews produced strong evidence of these opportunities:

- Many customers, when questioned regarding the specific values derived from R's research products and services, characterized these values as supplementary rather than vital. While R's services are widely used in all Bureaus, those who consider these services most essential are the S/P, the IIA and a few Offices, such as EE. While R may be inclined at times to discount the views of its less enthusiastic customers, to do so may be an admission of weakness which could lead to undesirable and even disastrous curtailment of research staff.
- However, there should be no cause for pessimism if the conclusions of our interviews are indicative. In every Bureau, enthusiastic or otherwise in its present reaction to R, the majority feeling emphasizes the hope, and more often the conviction, that R can be more useful or more extensively used. In total, 76 percent of these expressing an opinion indicated these views - though all were not confident that R's philosophy of operation or its resources would be responsive to the need expressed. The greatest number (as reported on page 12 and 13 of Volume I) feel that improved utilization of R must be preceded or accompanied by the development of closer and more satisfactory "consumer - producer" relationships. This means to such officials a willingness on R's part to remove the "shroud of mystery" which appears at times to cloak its work, to show an interest in the individual desires of consumers, to give more overt attention to consumer desires in the work planning stage, and perhaps to be more clever and convincing in explaining why one project must be given priority over another, as well as why some projects cannot be undertaken at all.

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- The attitude of the analyst provides still another significant gauge of this need. With respect to an important percentage of their products, analysts are vague in assessing the contribution they are making to the decisions of policy and operating officials. Much of this feeling is attributable to the lack of proper communications between the producer and the consumer; some is certainly due to the absence of working relationship which gives assurance to both analysts and consumers that only useful, or potentially useful, work is undertaken.

The above observations have been lifted out of the context of findings which are on the whole more positive than negative. This has been done to dramatize the importance of more adequate relationships with those whose attitude may affect the ability of R to continue the heartening progress of the past 7 years. Before outlining those major steps which it is felt will contribute to this improvement, our analysis will be more understandable if a statement is made of the conditions which permit such important needs to exist unanswered.

A - CAUSES OF THE PROBLEM

A review of our findings indicates that four closely related factors contribute to the present desire of consumers for more adequate working relationships:

1. The Intelligence Adviser Has not Provided an Effective Channel or Representative for the R Area.

The basic concept of the Intelligence Adviser as described in current position classification is very plausible. His responsibilities read, in part, as follows:

"Under general direction of Assistant Secretary, primarily responsible for developing the fullest utilization of intelligence by Bureau.

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Principal consultant in the determination and coordination of Bureau's requirements from the intelligence area and from outside intelligence agencies. Also participate, as the Bureau's representative, in the initiation and development of broad and comprehensive intelligence programming policies and in the constant readjustment of the over-all intelligence activities of the Department in order to ensure that both immediate and long-term intelligence needs of the Bureau are realized. The Intelligence Adviser, in addition, is responsible for carrying out the Bureau's responsibility toward the intelligence area."

The point does not need to be labored that the eminently desirable objectives expressed in this description are not being fully realized in the Bureaus today.* We believe that this will continue to be the case because of weaknesses in this organizational concept, some of which appear inherent:

a. The Intelligence Adviser under the most favorable circumstances cannot be a representative of R, nor a "merchant" of its services. Psychologically the incumbent owes his allegiance to the parent Bureau.

b. This factor might not in itself restrict the value of the Adviser were R's services thoroughly understood and accepted among all of the customers in each Bureau. Not only is this not the case today, but it appears unlikely, due to the continuing turnover of desk personnel among other factors, that such a condition can be hoped for in the foreseeable future.

c. Added to this problem is the difficulty of achieving in all Bureaus adequate status for the role of Intelligence Adviser.

Being a "non-producer" in the eyes of desk officers, the Adviser tends

*The primary exceptions are ARA and FE, but fully satisfactory working relationships do not exist throughout any bureau.

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to acquire the label "marginal contributor," and some have difficulty in finding a sufficient range of constructive duties to occupy their time as Intelligence Adviser.

d. As a consequence of the above, the Intelligence Adviser position tends to create a vacuum into which are drawn regular operating responsibilities. In several Bureaus such "productive" duties now consume the Adviser's time and interests to the point where as little as 5 to 15 percent of his time remains for duties as Intelligence Adviser.

e. Apart from the exceptions which now exist and have existed to the above pattern, it is doubtful whether R's management can delegate its consumer relations to a middleman, without creating a detachment which reduces the personal status of the producer in the eyes of the consumer, and which impairs the ability of the producer to visualize and speak clearly, in the written word, to his audience.

Because of the above factors the degree of coverage now provided by Intelligence Advisers and Liaison Officers is incomplete. Three major areas having no coverage are NEA, IIA and TCA, and in five areas only half or less of the time of the incumbent is devoted to duties as Intelligence Adviser.

2. R's Channels to Departmental Customers Have Tended to be Concentrated at the Top and at the Operating Officer Levels.

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The single most favorable consumer relationship encountered is with the Policy Planning Staff and other "Fifth Floor" customers who are serviced directly by the Special Assistant and the Officer who acts in liaison with S/P. At the opposite extreme, but on a very spotty basis, there are highly satisfactory relationships at the operating officer levels. The best of these were found in NEA, FE and EE, although there are individual situations in every Bureau.

The gap which is left at the Assistant Secretary-Deputy Assistant Secretary level, and among many office directors, is most distinct. This can be explained by the fact that working level contacts between OIR and the Bureaus have been most successfully developed (again with exceptions such as DRS) by branch chiefs and senior analysts. In several cases the division chief has not found a regular, effective basis of relationships due undoubtedly to the fact that his "opposite number" is not a producer in the sense of the desk officer, and thus not as directly concerned with the production of research.

3. Organized Means Have not been Developed by Which Consumer Reaction Can be Gauged on a Regular and Systematic Basis.

While this is presumably a responsibility of the Intelligence Adviser, an operating procedure designed for this purpose was found only in EUR. This procedure, however, possesses the faults of a mechanical and impersonal routine which renders the significance of its findings of doubtful value. Consumer reaction in a sales or service enterprise is most reliable when gathered at firsthand, on a planned sampling basis,

to the end that strengths and weaknesses can be specifically identified as the basis for direct improvements in the producing organization. Within R's top management, provision is not made for conducting such studies, and initiative is thus lacking above the level of the branch chiefs who should not be expected to conduct an objective appraisal of his own services.

4. With Regard to Outside Customers, Regular Devices of Exchanging Plans and Ideas are Limited Primarily to the ONI, the IAC and its Watch Committee.

Our visits with officials of the IAC agencies were, in general, insufficient to assess the benefits to be derived from closer relationship with respect to program planning. It was found that the relationship provided by IAD and its counterparts in the intelligence agencies is satisfactory and effective with respect to acquisition and distribution matters. It was likewise found that, quantitatively at least, other intelligence agencies are important consumers of R's research products. However, other agencies indicated that their principal basis of contact and collaboration with OIR occurs through working committees, particularly in connection with the production of NIEs. It is noted in this connection that the NSC Directives indicate that the agencies should exchange plans and take steps to minimize independent intelligence production in the fields of dominant interest assigned to another. Active steps to comply with this requirement were not found in State's fields of dominant interests (political, cultural and sociological).

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B - RECOMMENDATIONS

In an area such as R's, organizational solutions to consumer relations are at best but one step, the primary purpose of which is to establish machinery which will provide a minimum basis of working relationships. More important than organization are (1) planned programs of user education (Chapter III); (2) a strong desire to achieve proper relationships on the part of individual members of management; (3) fortunate personality relationships; and (4) resourcefulness on the part of the producer in maintaining dignified relationships without compromising his intellectual integrity or reducing his status to one of subservience.

With these important qualifications in mind, it has been found that four steps of an organizational character should be considered for early adoption:

1. Create a New Vehicle of Substantive Liaison with Each Bureau.

Though exceptions now exist to the general weakness found in the Intelligence Adviser concept, they are so unusual that it appears unwise for R to continue its reliance upon this device as the primary vehicle of relationships with the Bureaus. It is recommended that these positions be continued only to the extent that individual Bureaus desire to designate an officer to serve as the representative of the Assistant Secretary in the acquisition and use of intelligence from R and other intelligence sources. To meet R's own requirements it is recommended that the following steps be taken:

- a. Create by directive of the Secretary of State (or other

Appropriate authority) the position of "Intelligence Consultant" to the Assistant Secretary of each Bureau, and the corresponding officer in charge of each functional area.

b. Specify that this position shall be filled in each case by a key executive of the R Area, who will assume this role as an additional duty. For this purpose, designate the chief of the corresponding OIR division in the case of Regional Bureaus, and a similar key executive from OIR in the case of functional areas (for example, the CPI would be the logical Intelligence Consultant to IIA, and it is assumed that DFI would furnish the Consultant to other functional areas). The present liaison arrangement with S/P is an excellent illustration of the Intelligence Consultant concept.

c. Define the duties of the Intelligence Consultant as those of (1) counselling with the Assistant Secretary, and such other principal Bureau officials as speak for him, on the program of major research and estimates undertaken by the R Area; (2) providing such briefings and other substantive services, including top liaison with other intelligence agencies, as required by the Assistant Secretary; and (3) attending, for these purposes, meetings of the Bureau's top command at which matters of policy are considered.

d. Include in the membership of the Estimates Group all of those who are designated to serve as Intelligence Consultants, so as

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to bring to this Group a maximum of current and authentic knowledge regarding top policy views and needs in all major areas of the Department.

e. Provide other channels of contact between R and the Executive Directors of the Bureaus to be responsible for those relationships concerned with the distribution and clearance of intelligence products. (Further reference to this function is made in Chapter IV, "Distribution Policies").

2. Reinforce This Revised Approach to Consumer Relations by a Clear Policy Regarding the Participation of Branch Chiefs and Senior Analysts.

There appears to exist today some uncertainty respecting the type and degree of relationships which branch chiefs and senior analysts should establish with their opposite numbers. At the one extreme is the philosophy and practice of intimate relationships, a condition approaching the relationships which might exist under decentralization. At the other extreme is the policy and practice of minimizing direct relationships to avoid the diversion of personnel to "unproductive" pursuits or the loss of objectivity which might occur; or to preserve a role of strong independence in the interpretation of facts and events. While it is apparent that neither extreme presents the proper solution, we believe that the latter extreme is overemphasized in respect to its dangers, and that any branch chief or senior analyst who lacks that mental "fiber" which can resist bias is probably not a suitable intelligence analyst in the first instance. In any event, we would urge a positive

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policy which permits and encourages the maintenance of frequent informal working relationships, and which construes as an indication of weakness on the part of the R Area any situation where a branch is unsuccessful in establishing such working relationships. (It is realized that there will always be situations beyond the control of an individual branch chief, but these should become a challenge to be met by higher line authority including, where necessary, the Special Assistant).

The regulation of consumer contacts by senior analysts should be the full responsibility of the branch chief. At a minimum, the device of a periodic branch meeting attended by a representative bureau customer should be encouraged, as part of the program of professional development discussed in Chapter XI.

When a branch chief finds that relationship will be enhanced, and a worthwhile service rendered, through regularly scheduled briefings, this should be freely encouraged.

3. Establish a Continuing Plan of Auditing R's Services and Relationships by a Qualified Staff Officer of the R Area.

We were impressed with the interest displayed by Bureau officials at all levels in the questions posed during our consumer reaction interviews. No matter how successful the substantive liaison at the Assistant Secretary level, R cannot secure a realistic view of the reaction at the desk level without a specifically designed plan of eliciting the opinions of this large audience. A discussion of the techniques which we consider

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worthy of continued use for this purpose has been presented in Chapter

I. The execution of these techniques will require the following steps:

a. An officer should be chosen from R's staff who possesses the personality and talent to secure, on a face-to-face basis, the frank opinions of customers who have both favorable and unfavorable reactions.

b. This officer should likewise possess the ability to interpret, objectively but imaginatively, the principal problems indicated by such comments in order to develop an appraisal of the sufficiency and utility of products and services provided to each target user.

c. This staff officer, whom we propose be known as the "Consumer Relations Coordinator," should be able to report his findings to any level of management which should be appraised of them in order that proper corrective action can be taken. This means that if the staff officer is attached to the Director, OIR, it should be his duty to report his findings independently to the Special Assistant when conditions warrant. It will be noted that this is, in effect, the privilege which intelligence officers must themselves insist upon in order to insure that knowledge of their interpretations and estimates reaches responsible levels of command. Normally, however, it is expected that the Consumer Relations Coordinator will first communicate his findings to the branch chief concerned, and work directly with the first level of management in devising improvements.

d. The duties proposed will, by themselves, not justify the full time of an officer of the caliber required to perform this function.

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There are described in succeeding Chapters (III, IV, V, VII) a number of important related efforts which should be lodged under his jurisdiction.

4. Renew Efforts to Secure More Interest in, and Systematic Guidance to, R's Major Program of Estimates and Research on the Part of Leaders in the Department.

While it has been reported that the "Fifth Floor" represents one of R's most satisfactory consumer relationships, it likewise appears that specific continuing guidance is received primarily from S/P. It is unrealistic to expect officials other than the Special Assistant to devote substantial time and thought to the State Department's role in the Intelligence Community, but it appears desirable that the major burden not be carried by the Special Assistant alone, inasmuch as the Department as an entity, rather than the R Area alone, has been delegated responsibilities for intelligence acquisition and production in designated fields.

The scope of this responsibility is indicated not only by the specific content of R's research program at any given time, but also by the resources (primarily in terms of trained manpower) which the Department is willing to invest in intelligence operations. This is a determination of such potential importance, in our view, that it should not be left solely to R through negotiation with budget officials, but should have periodic assessment by other top officials who are in a position to comprehend the role of intelligence both in the context of the Department and the Community at large. Thus, it may be found

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that the creation of a body similar to the Program Review Board, even though the frequency of its meetings are limited to one or two per year, will prove a stronger means of meeting this need than presently exists.

5. Take Steps to Secure Similar Improvement in Interdepartmental Relationships.

Perhaps more immediate and tangible benefits to R's program planning can be achieved through collaboration with IAC executives, since the counterparts of the Special Assistant and the Director, OIR, have a more immediate community of understanding. It would thus seem appropriate to explore with the CIA and other members of the IAC the feasibility of creating a "junior IAC" in State Department's fields of dominant interest. It may be found that such a body should have responsibilities similar to those of the EIC in the exercise of leadership in the community. The current importance of such a step is underscored, we believe, by the transfer of responsibilities from the CIA to the Department of State in January 1951 for functions formerly performed by the CIA in the fields of political, sociological and cultural research, including responsibilities for intelligence in support of psychological programs.

Summary of Recommendations Concerning the
Organization for Consumer Relations.

1. Create a new vehicle of substantive liaison with each Bureau, in the form of an "Intelligence Consultant" to each Assistant Secretary and the corresponding officer in charge of each functional area.
2. Reinforce this revised approach to consumer relations by a clear policy regarding the participation of branch chiefs and senior analysts.

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3. Establish a continuing plan of auditing R's services and relationships by a qualified staff officer of the R Area.
4. Review efforts to secure more interest in, and systematic guidance to, R's major program of estimates and research on the part of leaders in the Department.
5. Take similar steps to secure improvements in interdepartmental relationships.

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III. USER EDUCATION AT THE DESK LEVEL

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III - USER EDUCATION AT THE DESK LEVEL

The importance of a clear understanding of R's responsibilities and capacities on the part of desk officers in all bureaus of the Department of State cannot be minimized. Desk officers make up the largest single group of those who request intelligence support from the R organization. They represent the largest group of action addressees for R's products.

A - EVIDENCES OF THE NEED FOR PLANNED PROGRAMS OF USER EDUCATION

1. The Attitude of a Majority of R's Professional Staff

It has been recognized by many individuals in the R organization that R has the responsibility for taking the initiative in developing harmonious working relationships. R is interested in developing good relationships for the following reasons:

- a. To assist in the production of a better and more timely product.
- b. To minimize misunderstandings regarding obligations, responsibilities, and allegiances.
- c. To permit the R Area and the bureau desks to properly complement each other in the planning of research and in the production of intelligence reports of substantial value in policy determinations.
- d. For administrative purposes in respect to budgeting, space, and over-all program planning and review.

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2. The Attitude of Bureau Officials

Although, in general, R is widely known and used, a relatively high percentage of users (54%) were not aware of any current research project of interest to them. As further amplified in the Summary Report, this unawareness of current R work varies widely between bureaus.

Opinions concerning the usefulness of R's products vary considerably both within and between bureaus. The pattern of unfavorable response is strikingly similar to the response by bureaus to the question raised in the paragraph above.

There would appear to be a sufficiently large percentage of unfavorable response to warrant R's attention in respect to:

Timeliness,
Quality, and
Readability.

Although response on the part of R's customers in the Department of State to the usefulness of specific reports was generally good, the variation in response seems significant. Again, the specific bureau response conformed to previous findings. An over-all average rating of 52 percent favorable comment was noted. The range of favorable comment, however, was from 64 percent for Intelligence Reports (IR's) to 37 percent for the DIC series.

The users of R's products suggest several significant things when asked about ways in which R's services could be improved:

- 38 percent advocate closer working relationships—"cementing relationships."

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- 27 percent feel that OIR staffing should be improved—"over-worked and understaffed."
- 15 percent stress more timely service—"a requisite of improved use."
- 20 percent suggest other service factors—"distribution and declassification problems," "a more helpful attitude," "suggest a formal advance planning and scheduling procedure," etc.

3. The Varied and Changing Composition of the Bureau Audience

Desk officers come to their tasks with varied backgrounds. These do not necessarily include a knowledge or appreciation of the current application or usefulness of the intelligence service provided by the R organization.

There is a relatively high turnover of desk personnel in the bureaus occasioned by the policy of foreign service officer rotation. This would indicate that a continuing program of indoctrination of desk personnel must be inaugurated and maintained in order to establish and keep a uniform and mutually helpful degree of understanding and appreciation.

Desk personnel are busy individuals. It will be necessary for R to take the initiative to seek out the new personnel assigned. It is questionable whether good production on the part of R, in and of itself, will be sufficient to maintain proper relationships.

4. The Scope and Complexity of R's Services

The R organization is a relatively large one and the intelligence output is correspondingly large. Desk officers need guidance as to services available and how to secure them, projects and reports of current interest, personalities in the R organization—their location and special talents,

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the importance of mutual planning, etc. All of these factors are important to the Desk Officer to help him do his job better.

B - PLAN OF IMPROVEMENT

Five suggestions are offered to meet the conditions cited above.

1. Develop a Dignified, Highly Concrete, and Vivid Story of the Intelligence Operations of the Department, Designed for Visual-Oral Presentation

This visual-oral presentation would provide the device on which a program of individualized indoctrination would be conducted for new or uniformed desk officers and other bureau officials.

The visual-oral presentation in "demonstrator" or "easel-type" form might consist of the following elements:

- a. The Role of the Intelligence Organization.
- b. R Organization Outline.
- c. The Research Process—a picturization. (Graphics now used in the R Orientation Program could serve as a basis for a, b, and c.)
- d. The Division Organization (specifically included in the visual-oral presentation to match the interests of the particular desk officer being addressed).
- e. Principal Intelligence Products (Samples, objectives, frequency, distribution, etc.).

Section A - General
Section B - Serial Publications
Section C - Biographic
Section D - Bibliographic.

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f. How to Secure Intelligence Services. (What services available, who to call, etc.)

g. Samples of recent products (to be left, if requested by the person being addressed). These would be products specifically selected and considered to be of current interest to him.

h. A list of names, room numbers, phone numbers, countries or specialities covered by each individual, and a list of current projects of the specific OIR branch the desk officer is concerned with. (This list to be left with the desk officer.)

The visual-oral presentation would be made by the Intelligence Consultant with the particular branch chief concerned in attendance. Depending upon the interests of the person being addressed, the presentation might be made by a branch chief with a senior analyst in attendance, or simply by the senior analyst concerned with the country of interest.

2. Organize the Plan of Indoctrination on a Continuing Basis so That All New Desk Personnel Are Properly Introduced to the Intelligence Function in the Department of State Shortly After They are Assigned

As visual-oral presentations are made to office directors, additional meetings should be established in the form of follow-up and planning meetings and additional visual-oral presentation should be scheduled for other desk personnel. These subsequent presentations can be accomplished by branch chiefs and/or senior analysts. Selection of the R representative to make the presentation should be conditioned by the ability to make the presentation effectively as well as country or substantive knowledge.

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3. Compile and Maintain An "Intelligence Bibliography" Specifically Tailored to the Interests of Principal Bureau Officials

The Intelligence Bibliography should encompass the following elements:

- a. Loose-leaf form—so that additions and modifications may be easily made.
- b. The material contained should be indexed by subject (within the country) in order to lend maximum assistance to the user.
- c. The intelligence reports (R produced) listed should not include number, title, preparing division, and date but, in addition, should include a brief of two or three sentences permitting an understanding of the scope and objectives of the report.
- d. The Intelligence Bibliography should include, in addition to the still-pertinent R intelligence reports, the most significant IR holdings on the country as well.
- e. The Intelligence Bibliography should be organized as follows (by country):

- Cover
- Introduction
- Table of Contents (with names of person to contact for material or information)
- Part I - Intelligence Research Projects in Process
- Part II - Index - by subject
- Part III - Intelligence Reports
- Part IV - Reference Materials.

IR should have the responsibility for the compilation of the original Intelligence Bibliography for each country or area. This should be referred to the OIR branch responsible for the country for the addition of projects in process, the expansion of the bibliography to add the brief of each OIR

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report listed, and for the removal of those reports which are no longer of current interest. The maintenance of the bibliography should operate in the same manner; i.e., IR responsible for the preparation of the periodic additions (monthly in most cases but no less frequently than quarterly) to Parts II, III, and IV. The responsible OIR research branch should then be responsible for review, addition, providing Part I, and the brief of intelligence reports listed; and for final preparation and delivery to the desk officer.

Appendix C illustrates a sample bibliography (Ethiopia) prepared in cooperation with DRN and IR during the course of our survey. Time did not permit the refinement of this bibliography in accordance with the specifications outlined above but it illustrates the basic principles intended.

4. Inaugurate a Program of Individual Study by IR of the Reference Needs of Each Bureau at the "Officer-in-Charge" Level

The objectives should be to determine the reference materials required and, secondly, to establish a regular procedure for the systematic maintenance of such reference tools. This should be done on the basis of individual study of needs and should permit the identification of opportunities to provide an expanded spot factual information service through the reference service of IR.

This function should be the responsibility of the chief of IR and should be based upon individual study of desk needs for:

- a. Organized reference materials.
- b. A system of maintenance of these reference materials.

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c. Arrangements for the speedy handling of spot factual information requests.

5. Lodge Responsibility for Development and Coordination of the Program Outlined in the Consumer Relations Coordinator

It is considered that the proposed Consumer Relations Coordinator should assume major responsibility for program development, indoctrination scheduling, and continual follow-up and guidance. The program as outlined in the visual-oral presentation should be under continuous review and study so as to present the best possible and most current view concerning R's capabilities, responsibilities, and objectives. The assignment of program development and coordination to the Consumer Relations Coordinator does not relieve the Intelligence Consultant or branch chiefs of the responsibility for conducting the presentations, for arranging for additional presentations, or for the continued aggressive maintenance of the proposed Intelligence Bibliography.

Summary of Recommendations

1. Develop a visual-oral presentation designed to introduce the intelligence organization to new bureau officials.
2. Plan a continuing indoctrination program.
3. Develop and maintain an Intelligence Bibliography for active use by bureau desk officials.
4. Provide a personalized reference service for bureau officials based upon a survey of reference needs.
5. Lodge responsibility for program development, coordination, and guidance in the Consumer Relations Coordinator.

IV. DISTRIBUTION POLICIES

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IV - DISTRIBUTION POLICIES

A trite observation (but one worth repeating at this point) is that the best intelligence research may be of little value unless it reaches the right person at the right time. We would add an additional factor - that the recipient be in a receptive frame of mind.

Despite its importance to the successful utilization of intelligence research, distribution presents many problems which have not received sufficient conscious attention by R's top management. Successful distribution policies and procedures are believed to require (1) an attitude of service (but not of subservience), (2) procedures designed to serve highest utilization of products, not simply widest dissemination; and (3) steps to assure proper application of these procedures.

A - OPPOSING ATTITUDES EXIST CONCERNING DISTRIBUTION POLICIES AND PRACTICES

1. R Has Adopted a Policy of Wide Distribution.

The dominant philosophy of distribution found in OIR's Production Control Staff (PCS), is to effect distribution to the widest audience having direct or peripheral interest in written products. It is reported that distribution is increased on 50 percent of the products reviewed by PCS, and seldom if ever decreased.

This philosophy is also reflected in those parts of the OIR Analysts' Manual, and the OIR memorandum of February 20, 1952, which deals with the preparation of "Requestor Only IR's" and Special Papers.

The analyst is required to justify the preparation of a "Requestor Only IR," and less than 1 percent of the products now produced carry

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this classification. As a consequence there is a tendency among analysts to use special papers to avoid the requirement of numbering the paper and preparing a reproducible master.

Another evidence of the philosophy of wide distribution is the fact that the standard Intelligence Brief (IB) distribution, regardless of subject, is 174 copies, of which 131 are to the State Department and the remaining 43 outside of the State Department.

2. Departmental Customers for R's Products Indicate a Preference for Faster and More Accurate Distribution.

In contrast to the philosophy of wide distribution found in OIR management, and particularly in its Production Control Staff, strong evidence of an opposite point of view among customers has been found:

a. Several of the analysts interviewed reported that irritation has been encountered when a report produced for a specific requestor is given wide general distribution.

b. Our interviews with 224 bureau customers confirm this report and establish a number of sound reasons for it. It is felt in the Bureaus, for example, that a policy of wide distribution -

- Causes the author to go beyond the needs of the target user in completing his research and composition, and
- Causes OIR to devote more time to "finishing up" the paper (editing, reproduction) than justified.

Some of OIR's most appreciative customers report that by the time a paper has reached the rough draft stage, it has served the needs of the target user and need not be placed in final, edited form.

c. Another and more serious observation was made during interviews with customers. A number of the products now reaching desk officers are of indirect or peripheral interest. The endless flow of reading matter to the typical operating official is in such volume that few can afford the time for peripheral reading. Thus, the receipt of papers which are not of direct interest creates in the minds of some the impression that R is a producer of marginal products, produced because they interest R rather than R's audience. This impression is most apt to occur to the reader who has been refused a requested research project or who is awaiting a paper whose promised deadline has been passed.

d. It is also of interest that despite OIR's desire to reach the maximum audience, some customers are not receiving papers which would be of direct interest to them. In displaying sample kits to Bureau officials, a few in each Bureau noted titles that appeared of interest which had not been seen.

3. Distribution Lists for Serial Products Show a Constant Tendency to Grow.

The problem of distribution lists was reviewed and reported upon by the "Ad Hoc Committee on Internal Information Publications" in their report dated July 19, 1948. One statement is considered to be pertinent, "A considerable part of the growth of distribution lists can be attributed to infrequent critical review of distribution lists to insure that they are revised currently to include only those recipients having a justifiable need for materials. The need for frequent review relates to the turnover of personnel, organizational and functional changes, and the atrophy or cessation of a previously bona fide need." The growing

distribution lists for R's principal serial products suggests that this observation may still be pertinent.

<u>Title</u>	<u>Original Distribution</u>	<u>Distribution 6 Months Later</u>	<u>Present Distribution</u>
Soviet Affairs Notes	310	585	1,089 (3 years later)
Countering Soviet Propaganda	69	506	808 (2 years later)
Soviet Affairs	371	401	450 (3 years later)
Chronology of Principal Events Relating to USSR	163	194	429 (3 years later)

B - RECOMMENDATIONS

R's desire to secure a maximum readership for its products is believed attributable to three commendable objectives: (1) to preserve a plan of communication which will assure the availability of important intelligence to all who might benefit from this knowledge, (2) to honor the obligation of the State Department to share its production generously with other intelligence agencies, and (3) to demonstrate to the Departmental audience that R is in fact a prolific producer of important papers. These objectives are worthy of attainment, but it is our conclusion that a more important service can be rendered to R's basic audience - the Department of State - without undue sacrifice in its obligation to the Intelligence Community. To this end four steps are proposed:

1. Base Initial Distribution on a Proper Evaluation of the "Audience Factor" and the "Need-to-Know" Factor for Each Report.

We believe that more harmonious consumer relations and more constructive use of R's products will result from a conscious policy of cultivating the

attention of those most likely to profit from the information contained in each paper. If this premise is sound, each paper should be evaluated prior to distribution and placed in one of three categories defined in Exhibit IV-1.

a. Limited distribution - means that the paper is intended primarily for the use of a known user or group of users to whom limited disclosure is important; or that in the judgment of R limited distribution will not jeopardize the essential value of the information to the Intelligence Community. This decision should be made by the research branch and should not be changed by the distribution staff in OIR without the approval of the branch chief or other higher line authority. Products falling into this category should be one of two types:

SPECIAL PAPER (SP): This type of paper, in signed memorandum form addressed to a specific recipient outside of R, provides the vehicle by which a senior analyst may express informal opinions or present facts on an informal basis. Special Papers do not represent the official views of the R organization.

SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT (SIR): This type of paper, in typed standard IR format and with an IR number, provides the vehicle by which the R organization provides special and personal intelligence research service to a requestor (usually in the State Department). An SIR may later be given "normal distribution," as defined below, after it has served its original purpose. In such instances, it would appear desirable to circulate an abstract which indicates that one copy of the manuscript is available in IR for loan upon application.

It should be the policy of OIR to adopt a liberal policy toward the production of SP's and SIR's in the interests of economy and service. (Under ideal conditions such papers might represent 10 to 20 percent of total analyst production.)

b. Normal distribution - means that the paper probably has interest and value beyond the target audience, but that this fact should

be verified by the advance distribution of an abstract; or that R should advertise the availability of the product and be prepared to furnish copies upon request in order to meet its obligation to the Community and ensure proper attention by the target audience. This should become the principal basis of distributing IR's and many IB's, and should be the treatment accorded a paper by the distribution staff in the absence of a specific recommendation to the contrary by the research branch. Procedurally, "normal distribution" products should receive the following handling:

- A mimeograph stencil should be cut of the full text, but a carbon copy produced for immediate hand delivery to the requestor or target user.
- An abstract should be prepared and given immediate distribution to the full list of addressees considered appropriate.
- The stencils should be held until demand from the abstract distribution has been established (one to two weeks) after which full reproduction and distribution should occur.

c. General distribution - means that the scope of the subject matter or its importance to the Intelligence Community transcends the specific audience factor, and that maximum distribution based upon R's judgment should occur immediately. It is assumed that NIE's, IE's and SE's will uniformly fall in this category. The research branch should designate IR's or IB's worthy of this treatment, and no IR should be raised to this category or removed from it without the approval of the branch chief or higher line authority. It should be the conscious purpose of R to reserve this category for papers of manifest importance so that no recipient will consider them of marginal importance to his area. Maximum attention to style, format and appearance should be accorded these

SUGGESTED CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING PRODUCT DISTRIBUTION

DISTRIBUTION CATEGORIES	THE AUDIENCE FACTOR		THE "NEED TO KNOW" FACTOR	
	TARGET CUSTOMER'S DESIRE	Rs APPRAISAL	TO INFORM	TO FOCUS ATTENTION
A. LIMITED DISTRIBUTION Informal - Special Paper Formal - Special IR (SIR)	-or- Customer desires limited disclosure or maximum of informality in transmission of information.	Content is of such specialized character - or form of presentation so informal - that "normal distribution" not warranted.	Material probably of negligible value beyond target user.	-or- Acceptance or use by target audience would be jeopardized by wider disclosure at this time.
B. NORMAL DISTRIBUTION Full text to target audience; abstract to broader audience as basis for ultimate distribution	-or- Requester feels that broader audience may be interested.	Content is of probable interest and value to wider audiences.	State Department's obligation to other agencies requires that they be informed of availability.	-or- Target audience will not give (or has not given) adequate attention to product unless the possibility of broader distribution exists.
C. GENERAL DISTRIBUTION Concurrent distribution to all who might find of interest and value	-or- Product of such scope or importance that no single audience reaction can or should be recognized.	Content is known to have interest and value beyond the target audience.	Material should be given maximum circulation due to the uniqueness of its content.	-or- The subject matter is so urgent or vital to current considerations that it must be given dramatic emphasis.

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papers. Abstracts should accompany them, and in some cases be given separate distribution as an advance announcement of the full paper which is coming.

2. Charge the Consumer Relations Coordinator with Supervising Distribution Policies and Assuring the Most Suitable Basis of Distribution Within Each Bureau.

In the proposed organization (Chapter XIV), the Consumer Relations Coordinator and his staff should assume responsibilities for distribution control now lodged in PCS. These responsibilities should include:

- a. Review of the distribution list accompanying each product to evaluate the propriety of the distribution determination made by the research branch and to add or delete names in the case of "normal" and "general" distribution papers, as defined above.

- b. Review the suitability of the abstract being issued and make suggestions for improvement.

- c. Identify inadequacies in distribution policies through his periodic contacts with users, and propose revisions to the Director of Intelligence Research.

- d. Review with the Executive Director's staff in each Bureau the procedures followed in the Bureau's Message Center in the receipt and routing of R's products.

- e. Explore in each Bureau and Office the desirability of maintaining a master file of R's products of interest to the area, as a means of providing faster service to Bureau officials.

It should be noted that these responsibilities are directly allied with securing the most effective "merchandising" of R's products and services, and are a natural component of the other responsibilities

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assigned to the Consumer Relations Coordinator; namely, classification control, style and format standards, and consumer reaction studies. In connection with all of these matters, the Consumer Relations Coordinator should maintain close contact with the "Intelligence Consultants" and the Assistant Division Chiefs (Production) in order to follow through promptly on problems disclosed through their contacts with the Bureaus.

As distribution policies and criteria are made known to analysts and branch chiefs and as compliance by review is observed, the review of distribution lists should be accomplished on a post-audit rather than pre-audit basis.

3. Supplant the Weekly and Monthly Lists of Projects in Process and Completed, Through the Use of "Tailored Bibliographies" and Abstracts.

Chapter III of this report proposes that IR develop a system of tailored bibliographies in loose-leaf form to be kept up to date by monthly accessions lists and revisions. This scheme, when fully developed, should eliminate the need for the present weekly and monthly product lists, insofar as Bureau users are concerned, since a more serviceable reference bibliography will thus be furnished. It is recommended that the principles of this scheme be applied to general users including the IIA, the S/P, and the IAC agencies so that they, too, will have a "perpetual inventory" of R products available to them, supplemented by a monthly accessions list and periodic revisions. Current knowledge of specific papers available for "normal distribution" will be called to the attention of eligible users through the issuance of abstracts.

The semiannual catalogs of R products should likewise become unnecessary for List I and II addresses as these "tailored bibliographies"

are developed, although their continuance for Lists III and IV will remain necessary.

4. Conduct a Periodic Audit of Mailing Lists for Serial Publications.

The rapid rise in circulation of serial publications has been noted previously and indicates the need for periodic culling in order to maintain active and useful mailing lists.

It is recommended that the mailing list review be accomplished by the "subscription renewal" principle, whereunder periodic issues of the serials contain tear-out blanks which must be returned to assure continued receipt of the publication.

Renewal audits should take place annually for monthly publications or those issued more frequently, and at least every two years for those serial publications issued less frequently than monthly.

Summary of Recommendations

Four recommendations are offered to develop more accurate, timely, and flexible distribution policies:

1. Base initial distribution on a proper evaluation of the "audience factor" and the "need-to-know factor" for each report. In this connection, establish three principal distribution categories: limited, normal, and general.
2. Charge the Consumer Relations Coordinator with supervising distribution policies and assuring the most suitable basis of distribution within each Bureau.
3. Supplant the weekly and monthly lists of projects in process and completed through the use of "tailored bibliographies" and abstracts.
4. Conduct a periodic audit of mailing lists for serial publications.

V. CLASSIFICATION CONTROL

V - CLASSIFICATION CONTROL

A large percentage of R's reports bear a high security classification. A sample of about 100 recent reports indicates the following distribution by security classification:

Secret	37 percent
Confidential	33 percent
Restricted	20 percent
Unclassified	8 percent

There are opposing pressures in existence regarding the classification that should be applied to R's reports. On the one hand, there is the human tendency to assign a high classification in order to be "safe." On the other hand, there is continually increasing pressure to assign a low classification - preferably none - in order to permit wider distribution and use. This pressure is particularly strong from personnel connected with information programs. Occasional remarks from other bureau officials were noted during our interviews concerning overly-classified R reports.

A significant portion of the time of CPI analysts in the R organization is now spent trying to find unclassified sources for some of the classified products R produces. Or, valuable time is spent securing permission to use certain extracts for propaganda purposes.

Much of the high classification for R reports is accounted for by the fact that source material bears a classification higher than necessary - at least in the opinion of many observers.

Since classification regulations are complex, the analysts have re-

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duced them to two factors:

- Classify the report as high as the highest source material used.
- Use judgment if the subject matter of the report appears to warrant a classification higher than any of the source material used.

A - THE PROBLEMS

Our studies have shown that the high classification assigned to R products have highlighted certain significant aspects of the problem which are enumerated in the paragraphs that follow.

There is a growing pressure for the declassification of intelligence reports by personnel connected with information programs. One official of the R organization estimated a 300 percent increase in usefulness of R products for propaganda purposes if classifications could be eliminated or substantially reduced.

The major responsibility for the determination of report classification rests upon the regular program analyst. His branch chief reviews but seldom questions the security classification applied. The regulations regarding report classification are not easy to apply and thus the "safe" and therefore highest classification is used. There is room for judgment but consistent guidance in the application of judgment is lacking.

There is recognition of the widespread tendency to overclassify intelligence reports. The analysts themselves consider reports overclassified. In the analyst interviews, 27 percent of the analysts considered that reports were classified too high, none considered them to be classified too low, and the remainder thought that the classification applied was correct.

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The Committee on Declassification was established November 9, 1949 in order to develop procedures and standards for declassification action. The Committee has not met since July 1951. A review of the files of this Committee indicates that the declassification procedure planned to date is extremely cumbersome and possibly unpromising.

The predominant reason, by far, for the relatively high classification assigned to R reports is the classification of the source materials used. This factor is consistently cited by the analysts. The problem of defining and securing uniform and accurate classification on source documents is a difficult one.

B - PLAN OF IMPROVEMENT

These factors pointed to the establishment of a systematic program of classification review and led us to the identification of several fields of improvement.

Previous experience in the R Area with a systematic program of downgrading and declassification has been very good. In a 3-month period during the summer of 1949, the Projects Control and Distribution Section accomplished the following through the activity of a half-time declassification clerk:

<u>Action</u>	<u>No. of Reports</u>	<u>Percentage to Total</u>
Downgraded	65	27%
Declassified	115	49%
Classification retained	55	24%
Classification upgraded	<u>1</u>	<u>x</u>
	<u>236</u>	<u>100%</u>

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Six specific actions are suggested for consideration:

1. Establish the position of "Classification Control Officer" on the Staff of the Proposed Consumer Relations Coordinator.

The Classification Control Officer should have sufficient authority to exert strong influence upon the classification of reports, including, when occasion demands, authority in his own name to establish security classifications.

The establishment of this position would supplant the Committee on Declassification. The relative inactivity of this Committee, the complexity of the problem, and the necessity for speedy handling in many cases underscore the importance of establishing a position and designating one person who will have responsibility and authority for performance. Positive, direct action is a requirement for success in this work. This applies not only to the development and application of classification regulations and procedures but also in the conception and implementation of steps and agreements which will expedite action and achieve the desired goal of maximum research usefulness.

2. Establish a Systematic Program of Classification Review and Revision to be Administered by This Officer.

The functions suggested are:

- a. Develop and publish specific security classification regulations as they apply to R's products. These regulations should be included in the Report Preparation Manual recommended in Chapter VII. They should amplify existing regulations and should enumerate the factors of judgment, the manner of utilizing footnotes, the question of excerpting and extracting, etc., in order to present the correct and desired

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frame of reference for use by the individual analyst and his immediate supervisor.

- b. Review the security classification assigned to each report (at least on a post-audit basis) and take steps to revise inappropriate report classification, especially for overclassified reports. For reports judged to have value to psychological and information programs, the review of the security classification should be performed as fully as practicable by the branch chief prior to the completion of the report in order to permit modifications in sources, project scope, etc., and prior to review by the Classification Control Officer.
- c. Advise analysts and their supervisors, upon request, regarding the proper classification of reports in process.
- d. Conduct a review of reports on their third or sixth month anniversary date to determine the possibility of revising the classification or declassifying entirely.
- e. Act as liaison with other agencies of the Federal Government and other parts of the State Department in classification and declassification matters.

3. Permit the Classification Control Officer to Work Directly With Control Officers in Other Agencies to Expedite Classification Revision Actions.

Where satisfactory relationships do not exist with other IAC agencies, the Classification Control Officer should take steps to improve such relationships.

To this end he should deal directly with other agencies, rather than through IAD liaison branches, to expedite action.

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4. Develop Field Instructions and Take Other Actions Which Will Maximize the Usefulness of Classified Field Reports As Source Materials.

The most important aspect of this recommendation lies in the continuity of effort rather than in the specific Foreign Service Instruction issued. Continuing guidance and instruction should be provided to the field (through regular non-directive publications of the State Department as well as Instructions) in order to develop awareness to the problems and to suggest procedures which will alleviate the problem. In this connection, the problem of field report classification can be reviewed in indoctrination programs at the Foreign Service Institute.

In view of the importance of classified source material in determining report classification, R/ES made several suggestions following their study of the problem. The memorandum of January 31, 1951, includes the following suggestion -

"For example, a Foreign Service Instruction could be issued requesting all posts to indicate, in the body of despatches, any material which could be extracted, declassified, and used for propaganda purposes. The posts could also be requested, in such cases, to specify whether or not the source of the material may be disclosed. Possibly other intelligence agencies would be willing to issue similar instructions to their representatives in the field."

5. Require That the Analyst Justify Report Security Classification on the Work Jacket.

The justification should include:

a. The reason(s) for the classification applied and the conditions under which the report may be declassified. This is suggested in order to permit classification review by the branch chief and to guide the Classification Control Officer in his work.

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b. The analyst's opinion as to the reasonableness of the classification applied to source materials used. This will permit action on the part of the Classification Control Officer in those cases where source material (in his judgment, as well) is overly classified.

c. The date when, in the opinion of the analyst, the classification should be reviewed. In those cases where timing or changing situations govern, this information will assist the Classification Control Officer in rapid revision action.

6. Train the Analyst in the Factors Governing the Proper Application of Security Classifications to His Reports.

A formal training program of seminar-type discussions - led by the Classification Control Officer -- will do much to highlight the problem, indoctrinate the analysts in desired procedures and standards of judgment, and reveal classification problems to management requiring attention and action.

This formal training is considered to be a necessary adjunct to the written instructions and the review procedures recommended earlier in this chapter. Such training should be incorporated into the analyst training program covered in Chapter VII of this volume.

Summary of Recommendations

The complexity of the classification problem permits no easy solution. The application of the following measures will permit a gradual but worthwhile improvement:

1. Establish a Classification Control Officer with individual authority (to be used when conditions warrant) to establish the security classification of a report.

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2. Establish a systematic program of classification review and revision to be administered by this Officer.
3. Permit the Classification Control Officer to work directly with control officers in other agencies to expedite classification revision actions.
4. Develop field instructions (and utilize other published media) to increase the usefulness of classified field reports as intelligence source materials.
5. Require that each analyst justify the security classification he assigns to his reports and to provide other information helpful in downgrading or declassification action.
6. Institute a seminar-type analysts' training program in the proper application of security classification.

VI. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT

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VI. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT

A previous study of the subject has identified current intelligence as being relevant comment on a "pin-pointed" current or coming event or situation, made against the background of the fullest available information and knowledge. It has been recognized, also, that such comment "may interpret, assess, and estimate or it may provide perspective or insight."

OIR produces current intelligence in both verbal and written forms. The verbal form includes (1) various briefings, the provision of which is largely on a regularized basis, and (2) the responses given to spot inquiries made by various consumers. OIR produces current intelligence in written form as (1) Intelligence Briefs (IB's) and Daily Intelligence Comments (DIC's), which are given broad distribution, and (2) Special Papers, or memoranda, which are usually directed to a specific consumer. In addition, there are Daily Development Briefs (DDB's) produced within one or two Divisions for internal utilization primarily.

The current intelligence produced by OIR is of fundamental value to the Special Assistant (R), who has a responsibility to keep the Office of the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary level of the Department properly informed. It is also of appreciable value within the R Area itself, as in keeping the EG fully apprised of the implications intelligence-wise of significant current events or situations.

The value of OIR's current intelligence to the other areas and Bureaus of the Department, although not wholly recognized by the latter, lies in the fact that OIR's interpretation or comment stems from a foundation of greater basic research and is less subject to influence by

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policy commitments. This emphasizes the essentiality of there being an adequate background of basic research as a prerequisite for the derivation of sound current intelligence in either written or verbal form.

A - FINDINGS WITH RESPECT TO CURRENT INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS AND THE METHODS OF PRODUCING THEM

1. The Products

As previously mentioned, the current intelligence of OIR is produced in oral and written forms, each of which is discussed briefly in the following paragraphs:

a. Servicing Spot Inquiries. This is the most informal and irregular, though ever recurring, current intelligence load on the R Area. All OIR branches handle spot inquiries from day to day, the volume depending largely on the degree of activity in the region concerned. Although many such inquiries call for simple reference data or information, there is often an implied if not expressed need for comment or interpretation with respect to a particular current event or situation. Most inquiries are from the desks and offices of the Bureaus. However, there is variance between branches in the degree to which their Bureau counterparts call upon them for current intelligence in this form.

b. Current Intelligence Briefings. The principal briefings have been those given on a daily basis to the Special Assistant (R), and those given by DRS to the Under Secretary's meeting weekly, to P/POL weekly, and to the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee on an irregular basis.

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All branches are subject to participation in giving briefings, depending on the degree of activity in their respective regions of the world. This means that a very few carry the major load, and others are contributors to the briefings only occasionally, if at all. The Current Intelligence Officer in OIR/PCS is responsible for planning and coordinating the afternoon briefings of Mr. Armstrong, and is occasionally referred to in connection with the morning briefings. The afternoon presentations are frequently derived as much from basic intelligence research as from current intelligence.

One OIR division has a short daily intradivisional briefing session to which each branch sends representation. Another stimulates the production and exchange of information through almost daily meetings on a less systematized basis.

c. Intelligence Briefs (IB's), including Daily Intelligence Comments (DIC's). These are the most formal current intelligence products of OIR. The DIC is a special (short) type of IB, encompassing one or more brief items relating to various topics and countries. All branches produce IB's and DIC items in varying measure in accordance with the opportunities presented. These products generally originate with an analyst who has identified the need or opportunity for an IB or DIC item. Sometimes, they are prepared after being suggested by the branch or division chief, or by the Current Intelligence Officer for the division. After preparation, they are cleared at the branch and division level.

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The division chief's responsibility in this regard is in some instances discharged by him personally, in other instances delegated to a member of his staff or to the branch chief concerned.

The "Daily Developments of Significance for Propaganda", prepared each afternoon under the direction of the Coordinator of Psychological Intelligence and transmitted via teletype to the IIA offices in New York and Washington, is a form of written current intelligence akin to the IB and DIC, but dealing exclusively with psychological warfare and prepared solely for the support of the IIA program.

d. Daily Development Briefs. One division (DRS) requires its analysts to produce, in a few lines daily, a digest of significant current events together with pertinent comments on each. These serve to alert the Division Chief and the Director of OIR, and to keep the Division Current Intelligence Officer informed with respect to items from which IB's or DIC's and briefing material may be developed. The DDB's are distributed only to the Division Chief and Director of OIR. It was a recommendation of a previous survey of OIR current intelligence activity and a decision of the EG that each OIR division establish the procedure of preparing DDB's. It was given a trial, but failed to establish itself. In DRW, for example, although 59 DDB's were written during the first two months, only 12 were issued in the next two; and by the end of the fifth month they had ceased to appear. DDB's proved of little use for increasing or improving current intelligence output. It appears significant that this procedure has proved practical only in DRS,

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the majority of whose output is current intelligence, and has not been retained in divisions which give substantial attention to basic intelligence research. In one branch of DRN, a GS-7 analyst prepares the DDB on a daily basis for the branch. In still another, a summarization of current developments is prepared by a junior analyst (GS-7 or 9). Those briefs, however, are for branch and division chief information rather than for the analyst.

e. Special Papers and Memoranda. All branches produce current intelligence in the form of Special Papers and memoranda arising out of working relationships with the Bureaus and other requestors in the Department, as well as within OIR itself.

2. The Organizational Elements

There is at the present time an analyst in each division designated as Current Intelligence Officer for that division. The duties of the Current Intelligence Officer relate primarily to the formal written products, IB's and DIC's, but also include assisting in the arrangements for and presentation of the daily briefings of R. The principal functions appear to be those of (1) stimulating analyst identification of and interest in current intelligence, (2) expediting IB and DIC preparation and clearance within the branch and division, and (3) as a member of the Current Intelligence Committee, sitting in review and consideration of IB's and DIC's brought before the Committee at its daily meeting. Each of the Current Intelligence Officers spends an average of from 4 to 5 hours a day on the above duties.

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The Current Intelligence Committee, consisting of the Current Intelligence Officers of each division and chaired by the OIR/PCS/CIO, audits IB's and DIC items with respect to substance, style, and classification. The DIC items being very short, are reviewed in committee and, after clearance, are typed by PCS, reproduced in PCS/IDR, and distributed promptly. An IB, which may cover a few pages, is normally circulated in draft form to the several Current Intelligence Officers in advance of the daily committee meeting at which review and clearance is sought. These must be typed in the divisions, and are less expeditiously processed for distribution. An exception is made to the IB pre-audit procedure of the Current Intelligence Committee as regards "Trends in Soviet Communist Tactics", which is produced weekly by DRS and post-audited by the Committee.

B - PROBLEMS OBSERVED

Our study of current intelligence production in OIR at the present time has indicated only minor problems with respect to the verbal product. Periodic and special briefings are being provided to meet the requirements of the Special Assistant (R), the P Area, the Bureaus, and others upon request. Spot inquiries requiring responses in the nature of current intelligence are being serviced by all OIR branches, the only difficulty being that they impose numerous interruptions on the key analysts in most of the branches. As regards the written products, however, there appear to be several significant problems, each of which is discussed in the following paragraphs:

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1. The Present Scheme of Organization and Procedures for Producing IB's and DIC's does not Provide an Aggressive Central Leadership to the Identification and Production of Current Intelligence

The Current Intelligence Officer in OIR/PCS is not in a position to exercise strong central leadership with respect to the identification and production of current intelligence. Nor are the divisional Current Intelligence Officers in such a position. In the first place, all are in staff positions without any authority over the analysts who might contribute to current intelligence production. Secondly, the Current Intelligence Officer in OIR/PCS holds a staff position within a staff activity which itself lacks a clear mandate as to its function. Thus, the Current Intelligence Officer in OIR/PCS is more a vehicle for coordinating and expediting effort within the Current Intelligence Committee, than a responsible and authoritative leader in bringing about identification and action on items worthy of current intelligence production. Furthermore, there is need for a clearly defined relationship of liaison and coordination with the current intelligence responsibilities of the Coordinator of Psychological Intelligence (CPI). Under present circumstances, there can be no assurance that items initiated as DIC's by regular program analysts and items contributed to "Daily Developments of Significance to Propaganda" by IIA support program analysts will be coordinated.

As a result of the circumstances described above, there is a tendency, identified by several analysts, for slack periods to breed current intelligence products of marginal value. In contrast, the "heavy" periods introduce a strong possibility of overlooking a topic of significance.

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2. It is Questionable Whether the Use of IB's and DIC's Justify the Relative Importance and Attention Given Their Production

In the first place, there is a lack of agreement among those within the R Area as to the objective and as to the "target" users of the IB's and DIC's. Each is given a rather broad and general distribution and without clear indication as to whether directed primarily to bureau desks, outside agencies, the general interests of the peripheral reader, or others. Distribution to those without need of the product has engendered irritation. An assumption on the part of many in OIR that the top levels in the Bureaus are primary users of IB's and DIC's was not borne out by this survey. The fact is that few such products get read beyond the working levels in the Department. Even at those levels, the DIC's, in particular, are subject to appreciable criticism as being of marginal value. The fact that a consumer must review each DIC in its entirety, before knowing whether there is an item in it of direct concern to him, is a disadvantage.

In the course of the demand and use survey conducted during this study, the so-called "target" users of the DIC's and IB's were found to have generally lower regard for these products than for other products of the R Area. Seventy-five percent of the IB's are returned to the distribution point in R after receipt by those to whom distributed. This is in accordance with standing instructions. However, only 40 percent of the IR's are returned. This may be due in part to the fact that the IB's are being read and dispensed with more promptly. On the other hand, the

disparity in percentages raises a question as to whether OIR is providing current intelligence "of information and interest" to operations and policy execution.

In weighing the value of the IB's and DIC's produced in the R Area, consideration must be given to the fact that these are in competition with other publications. The CIA produces a daily digest of current intelligence through its Office of Current Intelligence (OCI). This same activity holds a weekly meeting on Tuesday to consider current intelligence items that are to be brought before the IAC Watch Committee at the latter's Wednesday meeting. In the State Department itself, R's products of current intelligence compete for readership with summaries produced by the Bureaus and by the Secretary's Policy Reports Staff, as well as with the current intelligence material stemming from the CIA, Army, Navy and Air Force, including some of the field commands. We were also advised during the consumer reaction survey that the IB's and DIC's frequently add little to what the desk officers read in Embassy despatches or even in the NEW YORK TIMES.

3. Insufficient Effort has been made to Evaluate the Current Intelligence Produced by OIR

The current intelligence products, especially those in written form, lend themselves readily to evaluation on a "hindsight" basis. Systematic comparison of the comments, interpretations, and estimates set forth in IB's and DIC's with the facts revealed and knowledge developed in the course of subsequent history, can provide sound basis for appraisal of the analytical ability and judgment of OIR analysts and, to some extent,

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can aid in identifying shortcomings with respect to intelligence acquisition. To date very little has been done in the way of such evaluation. A recent OIR/PCS spot check, via the divisional Current Intelligence Officers, on the accuracy of the current intelligence output, provided some interesting information and was a start in the direction of worthwhile evaluation. However, it was neither planned nor represented as a thoroughgoing effort.

4. Actual and Implied Responsibility for Current Intelligence Unnecessarily Burdens All Analysts and Detracts from Their Ability to do Intelligence Research

Sixty-one percent of the test group of analysts interviewed in the course of this survey stated that current intelligence interfered with more important daily work. Twelve percent of the average analyst's written product time is expended in the production of IB's, DIC's, and DDB's. In particular, analysts expressed a substantial reluctance to produce DIC's. Most analysts resent the interference it causes to their other work, and furthermore question the validity and worthwhileness of the contribution that the average DIC makes.

Every analyst has a natural desire to keep abreast of current events, but resists having to translate rapidly into written DIC's or IB's his thinking with respect to these events. In some instances, analysts feel under compulsion to develop a certain number of DIC's and IB's over a given period of time. As a result, many are produced which are not justified from the standpoint of their adding something of significance that is new, or that contributes something different to the understanding which principal consumers already have.

Inclusion of current intelligence in the responsibilities of each analyst reinforces his natural tendency to spend more time than should be essential in reading the "daily take". Whereas it is true that research analysts must regularly add knowledge of current events to their reservoir of background information on a given country or region, their feeling of responsibility for alerting operating officials to the implications of current events provides a too ready rationalization for overzealousness in wanting to see everything that comes in, much of which is of peripheral or casual interest only. Furthermore, to the extent that the analyst must safeguard a responsibility for preventing any failure in the alerting of operating officials, his painstaking reading of the "daily take" assumes a defensive character. Our studies would indicate that as analysts turn their attention to the identification of current intelligence subjects, their reading load increases substantially, time is consumed out of proportion to the value derived, and a distraction is caused which is prejudicial to the timely accomplishment of intelligence research.

5. There is Need for Establishment of a Daily Working Relationship Between the Current Intelligence Function in OIR and that in the CIA

The Office of Current Intelligence in CIA produces a daily digest, the primary purpose of which is to inform the personnel of CIA and, particularly, its top directorate. The only distribution given in the State Department is that made to OIR. CIA/OCI relies heavily on State Department cables for its raw material, and supplements that information with further comment and interpretation solicited orally from the desk

officers in the Bureaus. This liaison with the State Department does not include coordination and liaison with the current intelligence function in the R Area. CIA/OCI officials indicate that OIR has been a slow source of judgment and appraisal with respect to current intelligence.

C - RECOMMENDATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE
PRODUCTION OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

It should be the purpose of the OIR current intelligence organization and procedures to effect:

- Prompt and accurate identification of subjects worthy of treatment as current intelligence, and of the target audiences for such products.
- A correct and timely presentation of each subject in the form of an oral or written current intelligence product.
- Accomplishment of the foregoing with minimum necessary pre-emption of analysts' time for reading of the "daily take", and minimum disturbance to the basic research efforts.

To these ends the following recommendations are made:

1. Establish a "Current Intelligence Coordinator" as a Member of the Estimates Group

It is recommended that the position of Current Intelligence Officer in the Production Control Staff be elevated to that of a Current Intelligence Coordinator reporting directly to the Director of Intelligence Research, and with responsibility for providing strong central leadership to the recognition and production of useful current intelligence throughout the organization. To give the position suitable stature, and to interlink current intelligence with basic research in an appropriate fashion, the proposed Current Intelligence Coordinator should be a member

of the Estimates Group. The close liaison thus provided between him and the "Intelligence Consultants" (division chiefs) would be beneficial both in identifying the current intelligence needs and interests of the principal consumers and in bringing pressure to bear in the branches to satisfy those needs. Liaison with the CPI at this level would provide opportunity for satisfactory coordination of that current intelligence which overlaps the regular and IIA support programs.

The proposed Current Intelligence Coordinator would exercise the authority of the Director of OIR in providing identification and instruction to the branches with respect to the subjects on which current intelligence should be developed, and the deadlines therefor. In addition, he would act for the Director of OIR in giving final content and style clearance to written current intelligence products, after initial clearance at the branch and division levels. Although normally the majority of IB's would be initiated from the branch level, the Current Intelligence Coordinator would request the production of an IB on a subject when in his judgment it was required.

2. Designate Current Intelligence Officers at the Branch Level, and Eliminate Such Officers at the Division Level

It is proposed that in lieu of the divisional Current Intelligence Officers there be designated in each branch a senior analyst as a Current Intelligence Officer with the following responsibilities (which would encompass a full-time job in the larger or more active branches and a part-time job in the smaller branches):

a. Close daily surveillance of incoming intelligence materials of a current nature, and the identification of subjects justifying treatment as current intelligence.

b. The production of necessary current intelligence in his branch, including the correct and timely preparation of current intelligence papers on subjects identified by him as well as those selected by the branch chief or division chief, or requested by the Current Intelligence Coordinator. As an objective, it would appear desirable for the Coordinator to prepare many of these papers, drawing upon specific analysts for essential background comment and interpretation.

c. Preparing or supervising the preparation of current intelligence requested by the Coordinator of Psychological Intelligence, or other support program coordinators. He would relieve analysts of some of the reaction and "roundup" reports required for the CPI.

d. Constantly staying abreast of current intelligence developments and keeping the branch chief and division chief (as desired) informed thereof; assisting the branch chief in providing or directing the provision of all current intelligence required of his branch in verbal form (briefings and spot inquiries).

e. Minimizing the "In-box" load on the other analysts by giving a high-grade substantive review and screening to the "daily take" of current documents in the course of his close daily surveillance of incoming current intelligence materials. Thus, in the course of carrying out his

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current intelligence responsibility, the branch Current Intelligence Officer would route each current document in accordance with its subject and significance and the respective assignments of the various analysts. In so doing, he might indicate, by a suitable mark, whether the particular piece seems to warrant (1) the analyst's direct attention, (2) review and summarization by a research aide, or (3) simply being cataloged for filing. Since many documents would fall in the last two categories and others would justify being destroyed without routing, the flow to the individual analysts would be measurably reduced, and without any disadvantage to him.

Delegation, to one senior analyst, of the responsibilities listed in paragraphs a through e above, would release appreciable time in the daily routine of the other analysts of the branch. In the first place, they would be relieved of primary responsibility for current intelligence identification and thus for devoting much of their time to careful perusal of the incoming material. Further, the volume of incoming material would be reduced by the routing procedure proposed. Secondly, since the branch Current Intelligence Officer would be responsible for the production of necessary current intelligence in his branch, and would personally prepare a major portion of it, the other analysts would be free to suggest and assist but would not be under compulsion to initiate intelligence of this type. These analysts would be able, therefore, to assume greater responsibility to produce on regular assignments in a timely manner. The well-qualified review performed by the Current Intelligence Officer would

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protect the analysts from much of the documents' flow and would wean them away from excessive reading time and much of the daily pressure to which they subject themselves by reason of feeling responsibility for current intelligence.

It can be recognized readily that the satisfactory discharge of the above-mentioned responsibilities necessitates the assignment of a well-qualified senior analyst at the Current Intelligence Officer in each branch. In effect, the position should be placed at the level of an assistant branch chief, and recognized as a development point for potential branch chiefs.

3. Give Consideration to Issuing Single-Topic IB's for Pinpointed Distribution, and to Discontinuing the Daily Intelligence Comment (DIC) Series.

The DIC's can be eliminated as a separate IB series, inasmuch as they are found to be of significant value at only a very limited number of the many points to which distributed. In lieu thereof, it is suggested that individual topics of importance be treated as IB's and given selective distribution to those known to be concerned. Likewise, it is recommended that IB's be confined to truly significant subjects on which there is comment that adds something new, or contributes something different to the understanding of the consumers to whom directed.

4. Discontinue the Current Intelligence Committee as a Formal Instrument for the Development and Processing of Written Current Intelligence Products.

In connection with the recommended establishment of a Current Intelligence Coordinator at the EG level and the proposed designation of branch Current Intelligence Officers in lieu of the existing positions at the

division level, it is suggested that the present current Intelligence Committee be dissolved.

Well-qualified attention to the selection and treatment of subjects, the elimination of DIC's, and the limitation of IB's to truly significant items with more selective distribution should reduce the necessity for formalized committee action in producing current intelligence within OIR. Under the proposed plan, IB's would receive branch and division clearance as at present and would be subject to final review and clearance by the Current Intelligence Coordinator in the name of the Director of OIR. The discontinuance of the Current Intelligence Committee as a formal institution would not preclude the Current Intelligence Coordinator availing himself on an ad hoc basis, of such group advice and counsel as he may find beneficial from the branch Current Intelligence Officer level, or even the EG.

5. Provide a Plan for the Periodic Evaluation of the Current Intelligence Production of OIR.

It is proposed that the comment, interpretation, and estimates produced by OIR as current intelligence be subjected periodically to review and appraisal in the light of knowledge subsequently gained. This review should include evaluation with respect to timeliness and coverage, so as to indicate oversights in recognition of significant topics, as well as errors in treatment of the topics covered.

It is recommended that responsibility for this evaluation be a function of the proposed "Intelligence Evaluation Officer", discussed in Chapter XIV.

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6. Eliminate the Requirement for Production of DDB's Except Where Pronounced Benefit Can Be Derived.

In recognition of the experience to date with respect to the utilization of the DDB system in OIR divisions, it is recommended that its use be wholly optional to the divisions (or branches), and not be undertaken except where the nature of the unit's activities permits substantial benefit to be derived.

7. Explore the Relative Roles of OIR and CIA/OCI with respect to the Production of Current Intelligence in State Department's Fields of Dominant Interest.

It is suggested that a study be made to establish more clearly the relative roles of OIR and OCI in regard to the production of current intelligence in State Department's fields of dominant interest, and to establish an appropriate daily working relationship between the current intelligence functions in the two agencies. If, for example, the CIA/OCI should assume "lead" responsibility for such current intelligence production, then State Department might be relieved of the burden of regular current intelligence production. While OIR would then act primarily as a current intelligence source for the State Department, it should retain the right and obligation to supplement, or to add additional or different interpretations, to the products of CIA/OCI. The feasibility of such a division of responsibility would depend upon the development of procedures and safeguards to assure that the views of each agency were known to the other, in order to avoid any by-passing of the State Department in the reporting of interpretations and estimates to the NSC on political sociological and cultural matters.

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With respect to daily liaison relationships, the feasibility of collaboration between OIR and OCI in the publication of a daily summary suitable for List II distribution should be explored. This could be accomplished through a close working relationship between the Current Intelligence Coordinator in OIR and the appropriate point in OCI, particularly as regards the identification of key topics of significance.

Summary of Recommendations Regarding Current Intelligence

Seven actions have been proposed in this connection:

1. Establish a "Current Intelligence Coordinator" as a member of the Estimates Group.
2. Designate Current Intelligence Officers at the branch level, and eliminate the part-time officers at the division level.
3. Give consideration to issuing single-topic IB's for "pinpointed" distribution, and to discontinuing the DIC series.
4. Discontinue the Current Intelligence Committee as a formal instrument for the development and processing of written current intelligence products.
5. Provide a plan for the periodic evaluation of the Current Intelligence production of OIR.
6. Eliminate the requirement for production of DDB's, except where pronounced benefit can be derived.
7. Explore the relative roles of OIR and CIA/OCI with respect to the production of current intelligence in State Department's fields of dominant interest.

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VII. STYLE AND FORMAT OF WRITTEN PRODUCTS

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VII - STYLE AND FORMAT OF WRITTEN PRODUCTS

The written report is the primary vehicle for the transmission of intelligence to R's total audience. The form of the report, its appearance, and other features which contribute to its readability are all important to the task of transmitting intelligence, because neglect of these features may discourage or fail to invite the desired readership. In short, it is not what the reader can read that counts; it is what he does read.

But there is another reason for laying greater stress upon the readability of R's products—the expenditure of man-hours required of the reading audience. By way of illustrating the substantial "cost" to Government, it is estimated that 4,875 man-hours per month are devoted by this audience to the reading of R's written output.* This calculation serves to highlight the obligation upon the producers to conserve the time of an audience which is already overburdened with the daily flow of materials to be read or scanned.

A - OBSERVATIONS INDICATING THE POSSIBILITIES FOR IMPROVED READABILITY OF R'S PRODUCTS

1. Comparison with Other Forms of Adult Reading

The very complexity of R's subject matter demands writing which will fall at a reasonably difficult level of readability. In addition, the educational level of its audience is unusually high. However, when the "reading ease" score of R's products is compared with other forms of adult reading including three highly technical magazines, graphic evidence of the present

* Based upon average monthly distribution of 234,000 pages requiring an estimated 2.5 minutes of reading time per page.

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level of difficulty is revealed.

<u>Magazine</u>	<u>Reading Ease Score*</u>	<u>Rating</u>
Chemical Engineering	37.1	Difficult
Machine Design	46.8	Fairly difficult
Mechanical Engineering	39.7	Difficult
AVERAGE	41.2	Difficult
Fortune Magazine	48.7	Fairly difficult
Average of 8 R reports	19.36	Very Difficult

2. Complexities in Structure, Vocabulary and Style

Our inspection of a large sampling of R's reports reveals some of the reasons why its writing scores at the "very difficult" level:

- Long words are used. An average of 184.8 syllables per 100 words as compared with 169 syllables per 100 words in the three engineering magazines mentioned above.
- Long sentences are used. An average of 30.8 words per sentence as compared with 22.6 words on an average for the 3 engineering magazines.
- Long paragraphs are used. One of 18 sentences containing 431 words was observed; another of 9 sentences containing 427 words was encountered.
- Unfamiliar words are used. A list of 20 words was selected from R reports and submitted to two customers. Many of the words were not readily understood. Examples are: coopt, jacquerie, pluripersonal, consanguinity.
- Topic outlines to guide the reader through the text are sparingly used in R's reports. In many cases, page after page revealed no break in the text through topic outlining.

* The Reading Ease rating system is described in "The Art of Readable Writing" by Rudolph F. Flesch, PhD., Harper & Brothers, New York. The Reading Ease score range is as follows: 0 - 30 Very difficult; 30 - 45 Difficult; 45 - 60 Fairly difficult; 60 - 70 Standard; 70 - 80 Fairly easy; 80 - 90 Easy; 90 - 100 Very easy.

3. Variations in Format

Considerable variation in report style and format was observed. Although rigid format (i.e., organization) is not a criterion of readability, the degree of variation observed appears excessive and is an indication of opportunities for improved presentation of R's products. As an example of these variations, a review of 11 pamphlet style IR's (all dated October 1951 or later) revealed that -

<u>Only</u>	<u>Had</u>
6	A Table of Contents
2	Statement of Problem
8	An Abstract
4	An Introduction
1	Basic Orientation
1	Assumptions
3	Conclusions
1	A Bibliography
1	Notes on Sources
1	Discussion following the Conclusion.

A review of 12 letterhead style IR's (all dated October 1951 or later) indicated that -

<u>Only</u>	<u>Had</u>
7	An Abstract
5	An Introduction
1	A Conclusion

4. Absence of Style Manual

A Style Manual is not in existence. Some elements of format and typing are covered in the OIR Analysts' Manual, but guidance or training is not provided for report organization, use of graphics, punctuation, spelling, capitalization, etc. Paragraphing instructions are not uniformly followed. A style manual was produced at one time which gave promise of some assistance.

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However, this was never completed or published. It is entitled "Style Handbook for Use in the Division of Europe, Near East, and Africa Intelligence - Preliminary Edition, 1 March 1946." PCS now has a draft copy.

5. Variations in Editorial Attention Applied by Divisions

The degree and quality of editorial guidance and review varies widely between research divisions.

a. The number and grades of divisional editors varies:

<u>Division</u>	<u>Reg. Prog. Grade</u>	<u>NIS Program Grade</u>
DRA	None	GS-9
DRF	GS-7	GS-9
DRN	GS-12 (part time)	GS-9, GS-7
DRS	GS-12	None
DRW	GS-9	GS-9, GS-9
DFI	None	None
BI	GS-11	None

b. Branch chiefs and division chiefs pay varying attention to format in their review of written products, a fact which was clearly brought out in our interviews with the analysts. Most indicated that the chain of review paid slight, if any, attention to format or text sequence. This was normally the responsibility of the division editor, if there was one. The division editor, of course, reviews only after the report is finished. This gives rise to considerable irritation if substantial report modifications are made.

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B - PLAN OF IMPROVEMENT

The elements of report writing discussed above are often incidental or trivial to the author who, properly, is most concerned with the thought content and the accuracy of expression. This fault is undoubtedly evident in the writing of the authors of this report. We hasten to add that we make no claim to mastery of the art of "readable writing" and are thus placing ourselves in the position of prescribing for others the application of skills which we are yet in the early stages of acquiring. With this apology in mind, we would like to illustrate some of the elementary techniques which produce more readable writing and to suggest steps whereby R analysts can achieve progressive improvement.

1. Identify at Once a Set of Simple Techniques Which Will Improve Textual Display, Pointedness of Presentation, and Ease of Reference to Reports.

Volume I of this report illustrates a series of experimental revisions made in IR5769, "Prospects of Japanese Trade with the Republic of Korea." These changes, while individually simple, effected measurable improvement in reading ease as reflected by the fact that

- Two users of the original report (one the requestor) independently estimated that readability had been improved 20%, and subsequent reference 40%.
- The "Reading Ease Score" of the revised version is 26.7 as compared to 10.0 in the original.

The full text of the original and revised versions appears as Appendix A to Volume II. In summary the following principles were found to be important in achieving improvement:

- a. "Headline style" abstract, consisting of several short paragraphs; abbreviated sentences; underscored lead sentences. The eye catches principal thoughts at a glance.

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- b. Concise enumeration of conclusions, in contrast to the long paragraph which lacks emphatic separation of main points.
 - c. More "finding aids" in the body of the text—achieved by the use of underlined captions bringing out the arrangement of the information.
 - d. More pleasing display of text in the body of the report—achieved by (1) shorter paragraphs, (2) more subparagraphs for subordinate or supporting points, (3) use of tabular presentation when applicable in lieu of line-for-line enumeration, (4) improved arrangement of tables to secure meaningful sequence and pleasing presentation.
 - e. Simpler writing—including fewer words, simpler or more commonplace words when appropriate, shorter phrases.
- These revisions are illustrative of the changes which may improve readability, rather than an exhaustive statement. Actually the number of possibilities in any given case is dependent upon the imagination of the reviser and the time available in which to perform the "polishing up." It is our conclusion, however, that a few "musts" can be agreed upon at once and uniformly adopted, allowing additional refinements to develop. The first four revisions described above are believed to fall in the category of "musts."

2. Publish These Techniques Immediately to All Analysts, Supervisors and Editors and Supplement them with Frequent Bulletins Illustrating Current Cases of Good as well as Undesirable Practices

While ultimately a thoroughly developed report preparation manual should be published, substantial immediate progress should be obtainable through a series of short-range steps, such as the following:

- a. Issue a brief memorandum of instructions to all who write or edit reports, outlining the techniques adopted as standard practice. Delegate this task to the proposed Consumer Relations Coordinator (Chapter II).

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b. Follow this bulletin with a series of bulletins (at weekly or biweekly intervals at the outset) citing good and poor examples drawn from current reports.

c. Delegate responsibility to division editors to assure the application of the standard techniques to all reports, including the authority to revise or rewrite abstracts and conclusion statements, and to insert topic headings in the text when the analyst fails to follow the standard technique, or would prefer to leave this step to the editor.

3. Appoint a Well-Qualified Editor in Each OIR Division

The third step in order of immediate importance is the creation of a corps of division editors through whom the application of approved techniques can be attained. Regular program editors are needed in two of the seven divisions (DRA, DFI). Positions of higher rank are believed desirable in two (DRF and DRW). The need in DFI is subject to check.

The continuing function of each editor should be to secure full application of approved standards of style and format. In addition, each should -

a. Participate in the development of the "Report Preparation Manual" (See recommendation 4 below) and prepare additional specifications peculiar to the products of the division.

b. Work with analysts from day to day as an advisor and assistant in planning format and style features of reports in process.

c. Participate in the conduct of training and laboratory clinics in report writing, directed at both analysts and report typists (See recommendation 5 below.)

d. Conduct similar on-the-job training in report typing standards for branch typists.

In those instances where the editor's substantive background permits, an even broader participation in quality control can be permitted, as is now the case in DRN.

4. Develop a Report Preparation Manual as a Long-Term Project (4 to 6 Months)

The publication of the Report Preparation Manual would supplant those portions of the present Analysts' Manual now devoted to report format, typing instructions, etc. The coverage of the proposed manual should be approximately as follows:

Part I - The Importance of Readable Writing.

Part II - The Standard Techniques of Readable Writing.

Part III - Types of Reports (with examples of each).

Part IV - Report Format

Cover	Conclusion
Table of Contents	Bibliography
Abstract	Appendices
Body of Report	Footnotes

Part V - Construction of Tabulations, Charts and other Graphics.

Part VI - Security Classification Regulations and Procedures.

Part VII - Text Specifications (margins, headings, page numbering, typing details, etc.).

Part VIII - Style Guides

Spelling and Capitalization
Numbers, Numerals, and Dates
Punctuation
Abbreviations

Part IX - Distribution Guides and Procedures.

The last three chapters would be of primary concern to typists and stenographers, but all analysts should have a complete copy of the Manual. The Report Preparation Manual should conform as closely as possible to the specifications contained in the NIS Editorial Instructions in the interest of uniform practice.

5. Conduct Systematic Training in Report Preparation Both for Analysts and Typists

As soon as the "Report Preparation Manual" is developed it should be presented to all interested personnel through a series of discussions and practice clinics:

a. Analysts--the proper selection of report media, the proper organization of material, the principles outlined in the Style Manual, the effective use of exhibits, etc. Attendance by junior analysts should be compulsory; optional for senior staff.

b. Typists and stenographers--training in how to set up and type reports, rules of punctuation, abbreviation, etc.

It is the experience of those who teach writing techniques that successful training not only improves the readability of the product but assists the author to perform better analysis through sharpening the clarity of thought. Thus the training sessions planned for the analysts should seek to stimulate interest in the importance of clear thinking as a prerequisite of clear expression. In this connection exploration is suggested to two current sources of training materials:

- The booklet "Effective State Department Correspondence," published by the Foreign Service Institute in collaboration with the Secretary's Correspondence Review Staff.

- G-2 where a writing course entitled "Report and Summary Writing" is now being conducted.

6. Improve the Readability and the Attention-Getting Value of R's Reports by Continuing Attention to Physical Appearance

Some specific suggestions are:

- a. Discontinue the hectograph process for formal reports prepared by R.
- b. Where schedules permit, use the multilith (offset) process for printing the cover for IR's. The schedule for a large proportion of the IR's produced permits sufficient time for the cover to be designed and printed by CS/R for delivery to IDR and later collation with the mimeographed pages of the report. The use of a printed IR cover will improve appearance, gain attention, and assist in future reference on the part of the user. CS/R indicates that they can absorb the additional workload without difficulty.
- c. Continuing attention should be paid to report typing. Periodic practice training in stencil and duplimat typing should be provided to typists. The use of electric typewriters should be extended as new and replacement equipment is purchased. In this connection immediate experimentation with new typewriter type faces is recommended to evaluate the potential improvement in appearance which may result. Two type faces are suggested for trial use and consumer reaction test:

Larger style - Code 26, Secretarial Type;
available on executive model typewriters.

Smaller style - Code 47, Text Type; available on
executive model typewriters.

Specimen pages prepared from each style are illustrated in Appendix B.

Summary of Recommendations

A six-step program designed to improve the readability of R products has been outlined in the foregoing. Administration of this program should be delegated to the Consumer Relations Coordinator since this officer has the most immediate and continuing interest in the "merchandising" of R's services:

1. Identify at once a set of simple techniques which will improve the textual display, pointedness of presentation, and ease of reference to reports. (See Appendix A for actual illustration).
2. Publish these techniques immediately to all analysts, supervisors and editors and supplement them with frequent bulletins illustrating current cases of good as well as undesirable practices.
3. Appoint a well-qualified editor in each OIR Division.
4. Develop a "Report Preparation Manual" as a long-term project.
5. When the Manual is completed, conduct systematic training in report preparation both for analysts and typists.
6. Improve the readability and attention-getting value of R's reports by continuing attention to physical appearance.

VIII. TECHNIQUES OF REVIEWING THE UTILIZATION
OF THE ANALYSTS

VIII - TECHNIQUES OF REVIEWING UTILIZATION OF THE ANALYSTS

In all productive efforts, whether they be research for the production of ideas or manufacturing for the production of things, the most precious asset lies in the skilled manpower available and in its proper utilization.

Several techniques and specific steps for improving the utilization of analysts are described in other chapters of this report. These include:

Chapter IX - which develops immediate steps to conserve the time of analysts through the proper introduction of research aides and the provision of more adequate facilities.

Chapter XI - which outlines a comprehensive program of professional development, including group training, inspiration guidance discussions with R's leaders, a revised plan of performance rating, and long range objectives with respect to field trips, Bureau assignments, and executive development.

Chapter XIII - which proposes a method of work planning which will provide an orderly scheduling of each analyst's time based on realistic man-hour allowances and completion-date schedules.

Supplementing these techniques should be still another device - the comprehensive appraisal of the analyst - through which management can inventory the ideals, attitudes, interests, and work habits of the analysts on a periodic basis.

The Comprehensive Appraisal of the Analyst

It is recommended that at least once every two years an outside consultant, preferably a recognized figure in the field of social science research, be retained by the Department to conduct a systematic

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appraisal of R's professional staff through direct interview with a cross-section of its staff. The procedure suggested is as follows:

1. The consultant should choose a panel of analysts representative of every part of the OIR organization and of the principal disciplines required in the performance of its tasks.

2. A personal, confidential interview should be arranged with each analyst selected, approximately one-half day being allowed for each.

3. A prepared interview outline should be used to elicit full information regarding

- The analyst's qualifications and suitability for his tasks.
- The method of his selection; job attractions and career plans.
- His opinion regarding training and training programs.
- The methods he follows in performing professional work.
- The principal obstacles he finds.
- The demands on his time and his comments on his current assignments.
- His knowledge of the degree to which his product is used; his morale.
- The extent and satisfactoriness of his relations with customers.
- His opinions and suggestions concerning supervision, report style, intelligence acquisition, supporting services, and R's over-all effectiveness.

An outline, based upon our experience, is enclosed as Exhibit VIII-1.

4. The findings of the confidential interviews should be fully analyzed and compared with those of this and previous inquiries, in

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order to evaluate the trends found as well as to set forth findings warranting immediate attention. The questionnaires themselves should be filed, after all personal identification has been removed, for reference at the time of the next biennial appraisal of the professional staff.

5. The consultant should conclude his inquiry by a reassessment of the techniques currently employed in R to train its staff, provide incentives for high quality performance, and minimize restrictions on the use of the analysts' highest skills. To the extent feasible, the consultant should make comparisons with practices of other intelligence agencies.

It is estimated that 4-6 weeks will be required to complete such a study at biennial intervals.

EXHIBIT VIII - 1

Suggested Interview Outline for a Comprehensive
Appraisal of the Intelligence Analyst

ANALYST INTERVIEW OUTLINE

A. IDENTIFICATION DATA

Name		Date
Grade	Age	Sex
Place of birth		
Branch		Division
Country or area handled		
Discipline		Months on this job

B. PREVIOUS WORK EXPERIENCE

In R

Other government

Non-government

C. ACADEMIC AND PROFESSIONAL DATA

Degree(s) held

Academic history

Present study and study plans

Professional activities

Language ability

Read*

Speak*

Write*

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

* Rate as - poor, fair, good, or excellent.

D. JOB ATTRACTION AND CAREER PLANS

How were you recruited and what attracted you to the job?

When was your last promotion?

Do you consider promotions adequate?

If not, why not?

Do you personally see good career possibilities in R?

What are your own career plans?

What is the biggest single irritant in your job?

Do you feel that over-specialization is dangerous?

Why or why not?

E. TRAINING

Which of the several training courses offered by R or the Foreign Service Institute have you found of benefit?

What kind of training, if any, do you consider desirable?

Have you visited your area since coming to R?

How frequently and under what conditions are field trips desirable?

F. JOB FACTORS

What do you feel are the most important factors in your job? i.e. what elements "make or break" your job?

Do you get a feeling of satisfaction from your work? Why?

Do you have any comments regarding the performance rating system?

Do you feel that your time is being used to its best advantage?

G. ANALYST QUALIFICATIONS

What would you say were the five most important qualifications which an analyst must possess—in order of importance?

How well do you feel the analysts in R meet these qualifications?

H. KNOWLEDGE OF PRODUCT USE

Do you feel that your reports are used?
That they are helpful?

How much of your intelligence production do you believe makes an important and direct contribution to the target user or users? In terms of percentages of your total production, rate its contribution to target users as follows:

<u>Contribution Which Is -</u>	<u>% of Products</u>
1. Important and direct -	_____
2. Subsidiary, but real -	_____
3. Of some help -	_____
4. Relatively minor -	_____
5. Don't know -	_____
Total	100%

Remarks:

Did you have any specific reports or events in mind when you replied to the last question? Which?

I. DETERRENTS TO PRODUCTION

What are the most important deterrents you encounter in trying to do a complete and timely job of intelligence research?

Do you have any suggestions as to how these may be overcome?

J. CUSTOMER RELATIONS

Who are your principal target users?

Do you have frequent contacts with them?

How frequent?

Do you think you should have more? Or less?

Do you consider your relationships good?

Who is your most important contact?

Why do you think so?

K. SUPERVISION AND REPORT REVIEW

On major research projects, your supervisor should assist you in defining project scope and objectives and in planning the research. Do you feel that you need more assistance in this?

Are estimated project man-hours and deadline dates realistic?

Is guidance provided, when needed, to help you produce good intelligence research?

Is the review of your report, both for substance and format, accomplished quickly and effectively?

Do you concur in most of the revisions made?

L. THE REPORT STYLE; DISTRIBUTION

What is your opinion of the style, format, and organization standards specified for R's reports?

Are improvements possible in order to improve readability and to better convey research findings to the users?

Do your reports get to the right people?

Could report distribution be improved?

M. OPINION ON R'S OVER-ALL EFFECTIVENESS

Do you feel that the Intelligence organization, as a whole, is performing its mission and fulfilling its obligations effectively?

What changes, if any, would you suggest?

N. RAW INTELLIGENCE DATA

Are you able to do any advance planning in respect to your raw data needs?

Are these requirements fulfilled?

In general, is the quality and timeliness of incoming data adequate from your posts?

Do you have any suggestions for improvement?

O. ADEQUACY OF SUPPORTING SERVICES

Certain supporting services and conditions of work have been established to assist you in your job as an intelligence research analyst. Do you find them to be adequate? Do you have any ideas as to how they can be improved?

Typing

Clerical Assistance

Research Aide

Library and Reference Service

Incoming document routing

Desk Area

Files

Biographic information

Report duplicating

Research Services Unit

P. DISTRIBUTION OF TIME (Estimated by the analyst. Based on a typical month)		
% of Total Time	I T E M	
_____	ADMINISTRATIVE AND MISCELLANEOUS WORK Personnel and security details, clerical and filing work, etc.	
_____	BACKGROUND STUDY (Not for a specific project) Reading or screening despatches, telegrams, press, etc.; marking for file; basic data acquisition planning and liaison; i.e., reading the "daily take."	
_____	PRODUCTS (Substance output)	
100%	TOTAL TIME	
	% of Total Product Time	TYPES OF SUBSTANTIVE PRODUCT
	_____	ORAL PRODUCTS; briefings, calls, etc.
	_____	REVIEW OF WORK OF OTHERS
	_____	WRITTEN PRODUCTS
	100%	TOTAL PRODUCT TIME
	% of Total Written Product Time	KIND OF WRITTEN PRODUCT
_____	NIS	
_____	NIE	
_____	CURRENT INTELLIGENCE	
_____	IE, IR, SIR, SP	
100%	TOTAL WRITTEN PRODUCT TIME	
REMARKS:		

Q. DISTRIBUTION OF PROJECT TIME (Estimated by the analyst. Based upon a typical IR)	
% of Total Project Time	STEPS IN PROJECT PRODUCTION
_____	1. RESEARCH (PROJECT) PLANNING: Receiving assignment, determining project scope, objectives, man-hours required, and required deadline date; outlining.
_____	2. SEARCH FOR DATA: Checking files; identifying information gaps; ordering material; etc.
_____	3. ANALYSIS AND REPORT COMPOSITION: Reading, study, extracting, consultation, writing, checking own work, draft preparation, etc.
_____	4. OFFICIAL EDITING: Revisions, restudy, consultation, rewriting after official editing for report substance and format.
100%	TOTAL PROJECT TIME
REMARKS AND COMMENTS:	

R. RECORD OF WORK CURRENTLY IN PROCESS					
PROJECT NUMBER and REQUESTOR	T I T L E	PROJECT DATES 1. Due 2. Started 3. Expected	MAN-HOURS a. To Date b. To Finish	REMARKS REGARDING VALUE, PRODUCTION, DIFFICULTIES, ETC.	
		1. 2. 3.	a. b.		
		1. 2. 3.	a. b.		
		1. 2. 3.	a. b.		
		1. 2. 3.	a. b.		
		1. 2. 3.	a. b.		

S. OTHER SUGGESTIONS AND COMMENTS

IX. IMPROVED USE OF THE TIME OF ANALYSTS

IX - IMPROVED USE OF THE TIME OF ANALYSTS

The analysts, as a group, represent 60 percent of the total employment and \$3,148,875 in annual payroll costs. In the R organization, as in other organizations, the proper utilization of these cost elements represents the most challenging and potentially most rewarding aspect of the major administrative and human relations problems facing it.

A - EVIDENCES OF THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUING ATTENTION TO THE USE OF ANALYSTS' TIME.

The high level of skill possessed by the analysts can be gauged, in part at least, by their high academic attainment, their foreign language abilities, their actions for self-improvement, and their experience in intelligence research work.

Civil Service requirements are quite specific and require, for the beginning grade of GS-7 (\$4,205), completion of a 4-year course in an accredited university in international relations or related specialities plus one year of graduate study (5 years of progressively responsible experience may be substituted for the educational requirement).

In terms of "self-defined" qualification requirements, the analysts consider education and research experience, writing ability, and intellectual honesty (objectivity and perspective) as important in addition to a high general intelligence level, enthusiasm and drive, and an ability to work with others.

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These factors, plus others enumerated below, point up the importance of conserving professional time and directing it into the most productive channels.

1. Analyst Recruitment is Difficult and Selection and Placement is a Slow Process.

Many difficulties are encountered in recruiting qualified analyst personnel. This was reported to us on several occasions and emphasized by the special recruiting trips which have been found to be necessary.

The difficulty in employing new analyst personnel because of the delay in the security clearance process adds a serious problem. A period of from 3 to 6 months is generally required, after selection of the individual, to get the person on the payroll and at work.

This undesirable delay aggravates the recruitment and selection problem still further by discouraging many potentially good analysts who accept employment elsewhere.

2. The Task of the Analyst is a Complex One.

The analyst must divide his time between many responsibilities, tasks, and allegiances - some of which are indicated on pages 17 and 18 of the Summary Report. A composite of the many tasks facing the typical analyst may be outlined as follows:

- The Identification and Interpretation of Current Intelligence.
- Preparing Written Reports. This involves the defining of the scope and objectives of the problem; outlining the project; identifying and searching for necessary data; analyzing, writing, and editing his own work; and participating in the editing function after he has completed his draft.

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- Attending Conferences and Meetings.
- Providing Oral Information and Advice - either factual or evaluative to fellow analysts as well as customers and representatives of other agencies. This is accomplished by telephone or through oral briefings.
- Background Study. The analyst must keep abreast of current developments for his country or area of responsibility by reading despatches, telegrams, periodicals, newspapers, reports, etc.
- Reviewing the Work of Others. This involves collaborative effort with fellow analysts, the formal review of written products, the official review of NIS sections, etc.
- Administrative and Miscellaneous Functions. These cover security details, routing of documents incorrectly addressed, filling out time-use sheet, etc.

The result of this diversion of effort and time is that, for regular program analyst, less than 16 hours per week is available for the production of written products. Time available for analysis of data and report composition is only about 8 hours per week when time required for research planning, searching for data, and official editing is subtracted.

3. The Analyst's Attempt to Devote a Maximum Amount of Time to Productive Work is Complicated by the Fact that He Encounters Many Interruptions.

Page 17 of the Summary Report graphically illustrates the many starts and stops (50) encountered by a GS-13 political analyst in a typical week. The following table indicates the interruptions encountered by six analysts and was derived from 5-day daily diaries maintained by them.

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RESEARCH INTERRUPTION STUDY
NUMBER OF START AND STOP PERIODS PER WEEK

	<u>Economists</u>		<u>Political</u>		<u>Biographic</u>	
	<u>GS-9 (NIS)</u>	<u>GS-11</u>	<u>GS-11</u>	<u>GS-13</u>	<u>GS-9</u>	<u>GS-11</u>
Written Products	10	4	15	11	7	8
Oral Products	0	16	5	9	18	9
Background Study	4	11	11	18	10	16
Review Others' Work	0	1	2	4	1	0
Adm. and Other	<u>10</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>9</u>
Interruptions Per Week	24	41	35	50	46	42
Av. Inter. per day	5	8	7	10	9	8

In other terms, the average analyst can expect to spend less than 1 hour uninterrupted on any one phase of his work. This is strikingly out of keeping with the research atmosphere one might expect to find in the R organization and one which might be conceived to be the most conducive to the most productive research.

4. The Analysts Themselves Recognize the Need for Better Utilization of Their Time.

During our interviews, the analysts were asked how the quality and quantity of their research might be improved. The replies to this question were extremely revealing. The essence of the replies indicated that the analysts wanted:

First, fewer interruptions;

Second, more assistance on routine tasks, and

Third, better planning and supervision.

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This attitude and judgment on the part of the analyst is indicated by several of their specific comments:

"Too much time is required to read the daily take."

"Interruptions to my work hamper production and frequent project priority changes slow results."

"My production could be improved if I was able to reduce the diffusion of my time."

"I should be relieved of all administrative work."

"The application of analyst time can be made more productive by securing the proper allocation of time to the most important tasks."

Two out of three of the analysts stated that current intelligence interferes with basic research and their production in general.

Eighteen of the twenty-four analysts indicated that their time could be conserved by providing research assistants so that significant portions of their time could be delegated and performed by someone at a lesser rate of salary.

Others indicated that research production could be improved by improving supporting services of typing, reproduction, document flow, and library service.

In respect to over-all guidance and supervision, the analysts were explicit in indicating the need for a clearer picture of responsibilities and assignments; the danger in spreading professional talent too thinly; the production difficulties caused by split allegiances to line supervisors and program supervisors; the need, in many cases, for

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better immediate project supervision (particularly early in the project); and other similar comments.

Several of these items are discussed further in other chapters of this Volume and, in particular, Chapters VIII, X, XI, and XII suggest improvement actions regarding periodic reviews of analyst time and talent utilization, the problem of a heavy reading load, factors in professional development, and improved working facilities for the analysts.

B - PLAN OF IMPROVEMENT

The challenge presented to R's top management by the need for improved use of the analysts' time indicates that the solution or improvement lies in the imaginative application of principles of job analysis which will identify those elements of the job which justify the full application of the analyst's highest skills versus those which can be done for him or under his supervision.

Our studies indicate strongly that the analyst will welcome and cooperate in the type of action suggested. In general, he recognizes the importance of the problem and he wants to use his time to the best advantage of the R organization and thus, to the best advantage of himself.

Accordingly, six suggestions are offered which are designed to increase the productive use of professional time.

1. As a Continuing Objective, Provide Analysts With Research Aides (GS-7) to Permit Maximum Utilization of the Analysts' Special Skills

We have found that a significant portion of each analyst's time is spent performing tasks which do not require the full utilization of

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the talent and experience which he possesses. Thus, valuable professional time is being spent on work which less-qualified and less-experienced people could perform.

The following table indicates those tasks which can be delegated to Research Aides.

Function	Analysts' Time Now Required	Tasks Which Could Be Delegated to Research Aides	Estimated Analysts' Time Saved
Background Study	32.2%	Reading "daily take" and screening out significant items for the analyst; marking for file when required; reading and clipping foreign press; liaison work in data acquisition, etc.	18%
Searching for Data	10.0%	Searching branch or section files; marking pertinent items; searching IR catalog; visiting other libraries; etc.	6%
Administrative Tasks	9.0%	Daily security checks; instructing new clerical personnel in files, forms, and procedures; etc.	2%
Reviewing Work of Others	8.7%	Conduct preliminary review and list specific statements of fact or opinion for review by analyst; develop additional facts required for review; etc.	4%
Official Editing	5.5%	Following official editing, search for necessary data, develop tables or charts as necessary; revise draft for typist.	3%

Analysts' time
now required - 65.4%

Analysts' time
saved - 33% (est.)

The advantages which would accrue from the use of research aides are:

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- a. Professional time is freed for professional work;
- b. Active projects are dispersed over fewer senior analysts and are better controlled and supervised;
- c. A reservoir of new, vigorous analyst talent is built;
- d. The research aides, because of the variety of tasks and supervision assigned, receive excellent on-the-job training;
- e. The present allocations of Reference Officers to the research divisions could be eliminated; and
- f. The contemplated plan of establishing IAD liaison officers in the research divisions would not be necessary.

In terms of salary cost, approximately a 10 percent advantage accrues. Since there are 180 analysts at GS-11 through GS-13 and computing salaries at grade minimums:

- 60 analyst-equivalents saved (33% time saving)	= \$426,800
- 90 GS-7 research aides required (ratio 1:2)	= <u>\$378,450</u>
Potential annual salary advantage	\$ 48,350

The ratio of one research aide to two analysts is considered a maximum ratio. In actual practice, a ratio of one research aide to three analysts is probable. This is accounted for by country groupings and present analyst strength, existence of lower-graded analyst personnel in the branch at present, reluctance of some analysts to delegate duties, etc.

On the basis of a 1:3 ratio, the research aide could supplant a fourth analyst at an annual salary advantage of \$2,908 (difference between average GS-11-13, salary of \$7,113 and GS-7, salary of \$4,205)

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would occur on approximately 45 occasions. Thus, an annual maximum payroll saving of \$130,860 is possible, assuming that 1/3 of the time of a research aide can supplant 1/3 of the time of an analyst. Since analyst supervisory time would be required, the net annual payroll saving is probably more accurately half that amount, or about \$65,000.

It should be emphasized that it is not intended that research aides be assigned to branches purely on a ratio basis. This determination should be made as explained below. Implementation of this recommendation must be geared to an increase in personnel ceiling, or on a gradual basis, take place as vacancies occur.

2. Inaugurate a Program of "Personnel Requirements Analysis" to Develop Branch Staffing Patterns, and to Determine the Proper Placement of Research Aides

As stated earlier, a prime objective of R's Administrators must be to secure the maximum utilization of personnel in relation to workload and work quality. In order to determine the proper placement of research aides in the organization, it is recommended that a plan of "Personnel Requirements Analysis" be instituted as outlined in Exhibit IX-1 and as described below:

a. Purpose of the Personnel Requirements Analysis. The plan has two basic objectives: first, to determine the number of research aides required under existing workload in each segment of the research organization; and second, to establish a schedule for the periodic review of staffing in relation to workload.

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b. Responsibility for the Personnel Requirements Analysis.

Responsibility should be centered in the Division of Executive Services. However, surveys should be conducted as a joint effort by the following: A Management Analyst, Division of Executive Services; the Administrative Officer, branch being audited; An Analyst, branch being audited.

c. Method of Study. Survey techniques should be developed by the Division of Executive Services, and a uniform technique should be used in all surveys. Principal elements of a survey technique which is an adaptation of one used successfully in studies of other governmental activities consists of six steps (see Exhibit IX-1).

Step One - Inventory of Work Performed.


In Step One, the survey team becomes well informed with the work being performed by observation of work methods, organization, and work plans at firsthand. Specifically:

- (1) All analysts in the branch are requested to maintain a daily diary for five days. These diaries would show the time spent for all tasks performed by the analysts.
- (2) Personal interviews are conducted with at least 50 percent of the branch analysts concentrating on the senior analysts but including juniors. Selections of pertinent questions may be made from the Analyst Interview Outline included in Chapter VIII but it is not intended that this be as comprehensive an interview. Two principal objectives should be paramount in these interviews -
 - (a) What tasks now being performed by the analyst can be done through central service facilities; and
 - (b) What tasks now being done by the analyst can be done by research aides under the supervision of the analyst.

OUTLINE OF A "PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS"

PURPOSE: To determine the number of research aides required under existing workload conditions and to develop a schedule for periodic appraisal of staffing.

CONDUCTED BY: A three-man team consisting of a senior management analyst from the Division of Executive Services, the Administrative Officer of the Division being surveyed, and an analyst designated by the branch being surveyed.



- (3) Principal branch functions and responsibilities are recorded and special program participation measured. This line of inquiry should cover - authority for functions performed, staffing by program and country, effort devoted to serial publications, staffing for administrative, clerical, and other services, etc.
- (4) Planning and control records are examined to inventory projects in process and their status; information is secured regarding projects and programs contemplated and projects deferred.
- (5) Statistics are developed reflecting documents handled, number of and time consumed in briefings, typing volume, overtime work, editorial delays if any, etc.

Step Two - Appraisal of Work Methods and Workload.

During and following the above inventory of work performed, the survey team as a group appraises findings in three phases (in actual practice the management analyst will perform much of this work subject to the review and comments of the other team members):

- (1) Policy and methods appraisal: The purpose of this initial appraisal is to eliminate unnecessary work, improve necessary work, assess organization structure and program emphasis, and to set the stage for the more intensive analysis which follows.
- (2) Job analysis: Categories of analysts' tasks are devised (many would be standard for all branches) so that time allocations from the daily diaries may be compiled and studied. Initial findings are checked with the personal interview notes. Tentative conclusions are developed regarding the use of professional time.
- (3) Formulation of recommendations: Recommendations are developed and each is "priced" and cost comparisons prepared. Recommendations would concern themselves with -
 - (a) Procedural improvements;
 - (b) The advantages of using additional central research services;
 - (c) Use of research aides - their placement, functions, and qualifications;

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- (d) Elements of workload susceptible of accomplishment by adjusting personnel assignments; and
- (e) Any other observations of the survey team considered to warrant attention.

Step Three - Recommendations Cleared and Action Agreed Upon.

Recommendations developed by the survey team are discussed with the branch chief. All or selected recommendations, depending upon their nature, are discussed with selected analysts or distributed to all analysts for comment. Recommendations made by the survey team are adjusted, if necessary, and resulting agreements are carefully evaluated in terms of salary and other costs. Agreements and cost comparisons are made a matter of record.

Step Four - A Plan of Action is Developed.

Responsibility for action on the various recommendations is established by the branch chief and a schedule of action is prepared. In the course of the survey, problems affecting other offices (questions of document routing service, library service, planning and control records, distribution policies, etc.) would be the responsibility of the management analyst to define and schedule action for.

Step Five - Installation of the Staffing Plan.

The plan of action is submitted to the division chief for approval. Agreements are reached with respect to increase, decrease, reassignment of personnel, methods changes, and the establishment of research aide positions, other items requiring additional study or investigation are identified and responsibility for further action fixed. Specific actions are then taken.

Step Six - Scheduling Future Personnel Requirements Analyses.

A definite plan is made at the completion of each Personnel Requirements Analysis as to the date when a reappraisal of methods, workload, and staffing will be made. A re-audit, following the steps cited above, should be made annually for each branch, but a review in 3 - 6 months may be indicated.

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d. Time and Staff Required to Conduct the Personnel Requirements Analysis. It is estimated that the survey proposed above can be accomplished for the average branch in about three calendar weeks with full-time participation of the management analyst and half-time participation by the branch members. Accordingly, a schedule should be established for the Personnel Requirements Analyses based upon existing vacancies and immediate staffing needs. The employment of two senior full-time management analysts on the staff of the Division of Executive Services is recommended so that two surveys may be conducted simultaneously and so that "across-the-board" improvements may be properly handled.

NOTE: In this description of proposed survey procedure, emphasis in examples, description of review factors, etc., has been placed upon the research divisions. This is occasioned by the prime objective of the survey - which is to identify means whereby analyst time can be conserved and research aides properly employed.

However, the Personnel Requirements Analysis may be applied to all segments of the R organization. In the case of branches of the Office of Intelligence Services and the Office of Production Coordination, greater stress should be placed upon volume statistics (i.e., number of telegrams, despatches, circulation requests, airgram clearances, number of reports and report pages, etc.) in reviewing workload in relation to staffing requirements. Similarly, recommendations would place greater stress upon procedural improvements, timeliness and degree of service, clerical functions, and conformance to assigned responsibilities.

3. Concentrate Special Program Work in a Small Number of Specialists in Each Branch.

The interruptions to concentrated research work encountered by most analysts are serious elements in any consideration of the quality and

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quantity of research produced. The analysts themselves give more than passing comment to this factor in respect to their productivity. The Summary Report and paragraph 3 of the introduction to this Chapter reflects the degree to which interruptions take place.

Obviously, ideal conditions for the performance of intelligence research cannot be obtained. However, it is suggested that continuing attention be paid to the unproductive influences of interruptions to research and that certain remedies be constantly applied. The planning and control procedures recommended in Chapter XIII have, as one of their primary objectives, periodic assessment of workload and analyst time obligations in order to permit an assignment of work to each analyst which will be in balance with time available with a minimum of start and stop situations.

In addition, Chapter VI, "Current Intelligence Products," proposes the concentration of current intelligence work in one individual in each branch in order to relieve the other analysts in the branch of this important element of interruption and, secondly, to reduce the compulsion for detailed reading or scanning of the "daily take." This latter factor is an interruption to applied research time because the analyst feels he must devote part of each day to current intelligence reading.

Other interrupting factors as represented by special project or special program work should be similarly concentrated in one or two individuals in each branch in order to further relieve the analysts of this element of research interruption. Standard patterns for the

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application of this principle cannot be set forth here but one illustration of this principle is contained in Chapter VI where IIA functions are suggested for assignments to the branch Current Intelligence Officer.

It will be necessary to consider size of staff, nature of special program and special project work, capacities of individuals, personality requirements to satisfactorily handle this kind of work, etc. The individual designated might be able to assume additional urgent, short-term assignments on an "ad hoc" basis which tend to interrupt the regular intelligence research effort of the branch.

4. Establish Realistic Man-Hour Estimates and Project Deadlines.

Realistic man-hour estimates and project deadlines are an important aspect of the problem of analyst time use. The problem is pointed up by the report of several analysts to the effect that they had worked exceedingly hard to complete their projects on time and then found their completed drafts lying around awaiting supervisory review for weeks. The reaction, of course, is the determination never to take project deadlines seriously in the future.

Each analyst needs to know realistically how much of his time is to be allocated to the preparation of the project and by what time it must be completed. Otherwise, the tendency of research people to strive for perfection may seriously impair the final usefulness of the project and, perhaps, relegate other important projects to a secondary position in terms of time and effort.

Chapter XIII outlines planning and control procedures which will cause the branch chief to review workload by analyst and to consult regularly with the analyst in respect to the manner in which his

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effort should be applied. Thus, the analyst is introduced to a regular reassessment of his available time and his established demands. This regular review also permits the raising of the question as to which projects may be deferred or cancelled, thus relieving the mind of the analyst who may be trying to accomplish 4 or 5 projects simultaneously - each of them in difficulty and each destined to be late.

This kind of planning and the establishment of realistic man-hour estimates and project deadlines also emphasizes the importance of early data requirement planning and the institution of early steps for data acquisition. It is at this point that the kind of data searching and compiling assistance provided by the research aides will be valuable.

All producers will produce more effectively when extent of effort is defined and a delivery date is established. This does not imply an under-estimation of the difficulty in correctly assessing man-hour requirements for research production nor the difficulty in controlling the many factors working to obliterate the established delivery date. But man-hour estimates can be applied to research, estimates can be revised to correspond with realities, and analyst effort can be guided and limits set.

The realistic management of man-hour estimates and project deadlines promises much in increased production, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

5. Apply Clearly Defined Elements of Project Management.

An important element in the analysts' list of suggestions as to how their research can be improved, is the necessity for "better planning

and supervision." It is our interpretation, based upon the manner in which the suggestion was made, that the analyst was not attempting to avoid his true responsibilities. The principal need felt was for better project planning at the initiation of a project rather than at the end when many new avenues of research might have to be opened and many hours of research might have been wasted.

In the course of our analyst interviews, we found that 16 percent of the analysts received no supervision at the beginning of a project (some, however, were senior analysts) and that an additional 10 percent received branch chief review of the project only if they, the analysts, sought such guidance and advice, or if the project required 3 days or more of the analyst's time.

Our studies indicate that there are several key points in project management which may be set forth as vital to the proper direction of analyst's time as well as being vital to the production of quality intelligence research. These are depicted in Exhibit IX-2.

It is felt that the analysts can profit by the application of the elements of project management in several ways:

- a. New analysts can become more productive sooner by being more quickly indoctrinated in the kind of research performance expected.
- b. More experienced analysts (on large projects, urgent projects, or inter-branch or inter-division collaborative projects) can be more productive by securing guidance in respect to amount of effort that should be applied, extent to which collaborative projects should be

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scheduled in the branch, etc.

c. The Assistant Division Chief (Production) should discuss elements of project management with branch chiefs from time to time and relationship with planning and control established.

d. The Assistant Division Chief (Production) should audit, periodically, the consistency with which these elements of project management are applied.

NOTE: In both paragraphs c. and d. immediately above, it is stressed that the Assistant Chief (Production) is not in the position of the branch chief's superior but as the individual most concerned with the application of these elements to secure their imaginative use for planning and production.

The following elements of project management are outlined in further detail in Exhibit IX-2:

- a. Project Definition
 - b. Project Outline Review
 - c. Preliminary Abstract Review
 - d. Preliminary Draft Review
 - e. Review of Final Report Draft
 - f. Discuss Project Performance with the Analyst
6. Provide Adequate Supporting Services to Conserve the Time of the Analysts.

Thirty percent of the analysts consider IR service inadequate. Regular program analysts state that only 9 percent of the data used in their research is secured from IR.

The failure of IR to perform adequately - at least in the minds of the analysts - has an effect throughout the entire analyst organiza-

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PURPOSE: To provide optimum guidance and systematic research project supervision to the Analyst.

RESPONSIBILITY: (1) Primary; the Branch Chief or first-line Supervisor.
(2) Secondary; Assistant Division Chief (Production).

STEP ONE

PROJECT DEFINITION
1. Project scope and objectives; what is reason for the project; what project is designed to answer; what factors should be covered.
2. The audience; who will read; should factual data be in detail; should graphs, charts, maps, etc. be used; security classification desired.
3. The data sources; outline special data sources.
4. Responsibility; who is responsible for substance and timeliness; who should participate and to what degree; necessity for special final reviews; etc.
5. Effort and time limits; man-hour allocation estimate(s) and scheduled completion date established.
6. Follow-up; establish date for review of preliminary project outline.

Analyst makes survey of data available and required; prepares preliminary project outline.

STEP TWO

PROJECT OUTLINE REVIEW
1. Review; check completeness of intended project coverage versus project scope and objectives; check report organization as evidenced by preliminary outline; check necessity for and timeliness of special data acquisitions intended (if any).
2. Forward copy of revised project outline to division editor for review as to intended format and report organization.
3. Reconsider project deadline and estimated man-hours; adjust, if necessary, or revise project scope and objectives.
4. Follow-up; establish date for review of preliminary report abstract.

Analyst collects data, excerpts, analyzes, arrives at tentative conclusions, prepares rough draft preliminary abstract, i.e., develops the "solution in principle."

STEP THREE

PRELIMINARY ABSTRACT REVIEW
1. Review, with the analyst, the preliminary report abstract to determine the degree to which the Analyst will be able to satisfy project scope and objectives.
2. Consider, if necessary, special data acquisition to correct any deficiencies noted, or the application of additional manpower.
3. Follow-up; establish a date for the review of preliminary draft.

Analyst secures additional data (if required), completes research, and writes the preliminary draft.

STEP FOUR

PRELIMINARY DRAFT REVIEW
1. Review preliminary draft; discuss key points with Analyst; advise Analyst if any changes required to make report more readable; check security classification applied; establish desired means of reproduction and distribution list; establish typing priority.
2. Follow-up; establish date for review of final draft (this may not be required and depends upon acceptability of preliminary draft).

Analyst makes necessary corrections; retypes if necessary

STEP FIVE

REVIEW OF FINAL REPORT DRAFT
1. Review and revise final draft, as necessary; return to Analyst for typing; establish typing priority.
2. Review, with Analyst, status of other assignments.

Analyst completes report and secures distribution

STEP SIX

DISCUSS PROJECT PERFORMANCE WITH ANALYST
1. Complete the "Analyst Performance Rating Form" (illustrated on page 45 of the Summary Report), rating the Analyst's performance on this project in terms of - <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Planning the Study - Fact Finding - Analysis - Report Preparation - Consumer Relations (if applicable)
2. With a copy of the final draft of the report at hand, discuss the rating with the Analyst; present suggestions as to how performance may be improved; solicit suggestions for the better utilization of his time; discuss success of any collaborative research efforts; etc.

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tion in the form of individually accumulated reference books at the desk of the analyst, the accumulation of newspapers and periodicals on shelves, the seeking out by each analyst of contacts with other data sources such as the Library of Congress, etc.

In respect to typing support, 29 percent of the analysts consider typing support inadequate. In most cases, extremely urgent work is done on time, but the necessity for negotiating typing priorities and the general difficulty of being assured immediate typing support has an effect upon the analyst's attitude toward producing timely products. It likewise causes hand copying of excerpts from books, periodicals, documents, etc.

Although clerical support - primarily for filing purposes - is considered to be reasonably adequate, we found that the analysts, on the average, spent 1.3 percent of their time personally filing document material. This small percent, however, represents a salary cost of \$41,000 per year, or a potential waste of 250 analyst man-hours per week (the equivalent of 6.2 full-time analysts). Another study conducted in DRN showed that regular analyst personnel spend 12 percent of their time in filing, which indicates that our figure of 1.3 percent may be substantially understated.

We were also impressed with the amount of work which the analysts feel could be done by uncleared personnel; i.e., those who have been selected for employment but who are awaiting security clearance. The analysts report that a large amount of work can be done by such personnel in the reading and marking of foreign newspapers and

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periodicals; the analysis of propaganda trends through reading of the foreign press; the extracting and excerpting of information from unclassified sources; the proofreading and editorial review of unclassified reports; and similar matters. It would be necessary, of course, to have the unclassified personnel in one room under immediate supervision. This room should be in SA-1 in order to permit easy access by the analysts. This procedure is used by another IAC agency, and serious consideration should be given to its application by R.

Chapter XIV of this Volume enumerates the expanded functions and responsibilities envisioned for the division Administrative Officer. The Administrative Officer should take aggressive steps to assure the proper support of professional analyst personnel in order to conserve their time and to avoid wasteful "service-seeking" and "self-performing" time.

The technique which should be used for the determination of proper clerical and typing support is the "Personnel Requirements Analysis" described earlier in this Chapter. This technique will also provide an insight into the adequacy of other administrative and service activities.

The provision of adequate IR support to meet analysts' needs should be the personal concern of the top management of IR. Chapter XVIII provides additional details and makes several suggestions.

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Summary of Recommendations

1. Provide Research Aides (GS-7) to support the work of the analyst and to permit the most productive use of professional time.
2. Determine the proper placement of Research Aides in the organization by a regular program of "Personnel Requirements Analysis."
3. Concentrate special program and special project work in a small number of specialists in each branch. This suggestion is advanced in order to minimize interruptions to the regular production of timely research by the rest of the branch analysts.
4. Recognize the strong incentive provided by realistic man-hour estimates and project deadlines.
5. Apply clearly defined elements of project management (first line supervision).
6. Provide adequate supporting services to the analysts so as to eliminate the use of professional time for clerical or administrative functions, and improve IR service.

Why not
an RPS job
have it before
rather than after
entering gov't.

X. READING RATE IMPROVEMENT

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X - READING RATE IMPROVEMENT

Throughout government and industry, the demands upon professional and executive time because of the increased reading load is mounting steadily. In the R organization, the reading load upon both professional and supervisory personnel is extremely heavy. It exceeds the reading load imposed upon personnel of most other organizations which we have encountered.

Reading enters into most aspects of the analyst's daily work. An estimate of the time spent reading indicates that the average analyst spends 80.4 percent of his time in tasks which include a substantial amount of straight reading time. If time devoted to writing, conferences, oral briefings, "study-type" reading, etc., is removed, a net time spent reading for information of 37 percent of total time or 15 hours per week is apparent.

The magnitude and importance of this factor is emphasized when the percentage of time spent in straight reading is expressed in terms of full-time analyst equivalents---174 analysts engaged every day, all day in the process of reading.

A - EXPERIENCE WITH READING RATE
IMPROVEMENT TRAINING HAS BEEN GOOD

A solution to the problem of a heavy reading load has been found by many organizations and individuals in training called "Reading Rate Improvement." The increasing number of organizations, both government and private, with organized applications of this training attest to the

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growing success of this type of training.

In our efforts to determine the desirability of the application of this training to the reading time problem in the R organization, we encountered the following experiences:

- The U.S. Naval Intelligence School Reports - "results indicated that every person, whether a good or a poor reader, will benefit from this program. The result depends, also, upon the interest and effort put forth by the student. It is believed safe to assume that any willing student can increase his reading speed by 50 percent, and can concurrently attain improved comprehension and retention of subject matter."
- CIA Reports - "30 percent increase in reading speed with no loss in comprehension."
- Department of the Army, Adjutant General - "Program in operation since August, 1950. 155 students from GS-3 to Lt. Col. in an eight weeks course, one hour per day. Reading speed improved 100 percent with no loss in comprehension at lower grade levels and some improvement in comprehension at higher grade levels."
- Department of Agriculture, PMA - "60 people trained in 20 one hour sessions; students were GS-12 through GS-14. Reading speed increased 98 percent with no loss in comprehension in any group and some increased comprehension."

In one group at the Department of Agriculture:

<u>Beginning Rate</u>	<u>After-Training Rate</u>
211 words per minute	420 words per minute
82.6% comprehension	91.4% comprehension

They also found that age (50-60 years old) did not adversely affect the degree of improvement. Follow-up interviews and observations of production some months after training substantiated test scores as to the magnitude and benefit of the improvement.

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- Private Industry: Many companies have instituted Reading Rate Improvement training for their executives and middle management personnel because of the need to read fast. Training plans are aimed so as to increase reading speed by at least 100% with no loss in comprehension. Among these companies are:

Koppers Co.
U.S. Steel Export Co.
Motorola, Inc.
Acme Steel
Ryerson Steel Corp.
Chicago Title and Trust Co.
Mutual Life Insurance Co.

Average reading speed is about 250 words per minute. The goal is to improve this to 650-700 words per minute.

- National Institute of Technology, Washington, D. C. (Reading Improvement Clinic) estimates reading rate improvement at 80-150% with a 10% increase in comprehension.
- The Following Also Have Reading Rate Improvement Programs:

The Air Force
Marine Corps
Navy Department
Bureau of Ships
Bureau of Ordnance
George Washington University
Y.W.C.A. (Adult Education Program)

B. ELEMENTS OF A READING RATE
IMPROVEMENT TRAINING PROGRAM

Reading Rate Improvement training seeks to improve ability to perceive with speed, accuracy, comprehension, and retention. Studies on the subject of reading speed and comprehension and experience with several approaches to reading training indicate that the following elements are important in reading rate improvement training.

X-3

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1. Several Factors are Related to the Degree to Which Reading Rate Improvement Can Be Introduced.

These factors are:

- Mental capacity
- Previous training
- Present skills
- Visual capacity
- Difficulty of material
- Individual initiative
- Background of information

2. It Has Been Found That Ten Key Factors Account For Improved Reading Speed.

These factors are:

- Widened perceptual span
- Read phrases and thought units
- Develop visual discrimination
- Decrease duration of fixation pauses
- Eliminate inward speech
- Reduce regressions
- Improve powers of concentration
- Appraise material as to level of difficulty
- Develop flexibility in reading
- Continue developing a versatile vocabulary

3. The Training Method Which Has Proved Most Popular and Successful Revolves Around the Use of Mechanical Training Equipment.

The several items of equipment and training methods used with a brief description of their purpose are as follows:

a. Testing Equipment: The Ophthalmograph, which makes a film strip recording the movement of the eyes while reading, and the Telebinocular, which determines visual skills, are frequently used to test the student at the beginning of the training course in order to identify poor reading habits, to expose visual deficiencies, and to determine the existing level of visual

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skill. The purchase and use of this equipment is not an essential, however, and most Government installations have not included this type of testing equipment.

b. The Tachistoscope: This is a small projector which flashes digits, digit and letter combinations, and phrases in variable speeds of 1/100, 1/50, 1/25 and 1/10 of a second. The National Institute of Technology, 710 14th Street, N.W., Washington 5, D. C., sells the "Renshaw Tachistoscopic Trainer" at \$65.00 f.o.b. Chicago. Other types of similar equipment are available on the market.

c. The Reading Rate Controller: This is a pacing device which "paces" practice reading in order to automatically develop desirable reading habits and reading speed. Equipment is available at \$85.00 per unit from the above company.

d. Comprehension Examinations: Frequent examinations are given throughout the course to check the degree of comprehension for the reading undertaken at varying rates of speed. Examinations for comprehension also take place at the beginning and end of the course in order to check whether comprehension has been sacrificed for the increase in reading speed. Commercial tests for preliminary and final testing may be obtained from:

- (1) Education Test Bureau, 3334 Walnut Street, Philadelphia 4, Pa. - "VAN WAGENEN - Diagnostic Examination of Silent Reading Abilities, Senior Division"

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(2) Ohio State University Press, Columbus, Ohio -
"ROBINSON-HALL Test of Reading Ability"

(3) Cooperative Test Service, American Council on
Education, 15 Amsterdam Avenue, New York 23,
N. Y. - "COOPERATIVE ACHIEVEMENT TEST Reading
Comprehension (Higher Level, Forms S and T)"

e. Class Work and Instruction: Typical class room work
consists of:

- Introduction to Reading Rate Improvement; theory,
principles, methods of instruction and training,
introduction to equipment used, purpose of course,
normal reading speeds, etc.;
- Initial Testing; construction of reading "profile";
- Group or Individual Work with Tachistoscope; practice
in reading (and recording on test sheets) words, phrases,
and digits at increasing rates of speed;
- Practice Reading at Controlled Speeds; class reads
selected material within set time limit and rates
own speed;
- Study of Training Materials; articles on "skimming"
and other training materials on reading speed used;
- Lectures by Instructor on Faulty Reading Habits;
these are usually brief and spaced throughout the
course.

NOTE: Training officials of the Bureau of Ships, Navy
Department; CIA; Production Marketing Administra-
tion, Department of Agriculture; and the Adjutant
General, Department of the Army, will be willing
to provide details of their training program.

f. Laboratory Work: Excellent results have been experienced
in courses which have been organized so that a laboratory or "reading
rate clinic" is established in conjunction with the formal training

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sessions. Thus, students may practice individually using the tachistoscope and the reading rate controller.

4. A Training Course Organized on the Basis of 24 One-Hour Sessions Appears Most Desirable.

The 24 sessions of training are generally supplemented with about three hours of comprehension testing. The 24 one-hour sessions may be divided -

12 weeks with two one-hour sessions per week,

8 weeks with three one-hour sessions per week,

or

5 weeks with five one-hour sessions per week.

Maximum individual success will undoubtedly be experienced with the 12-week course but one of the faster courses will be necessary in order to accommodate the large number of analysts and executive personnel who could profitably use this training in the R organization.

The training program should also include a refresher course of two weeks training with three one-hour sessions per week about twelve months to eighteen months after each student has completed the initial course. In addition, the laboratory facilities should be available to students for additional optional practice after they have completed the initial course.

C - PLAN OF IMPROVEMENT

We found, in the course of our investigations of this subject, that the Foreign Service Institute already has some of the necessary training

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equipment and that it has been their intention for some time to inaugurate a reading rate improvement course in the Department of State. Accordingly, two simple steps are indicated in order to secure these benefits for the R organization.

1. Formally Request the Foreign Service Institute to Establish a Reading Rate Improvement Course as Quickly as Possible.

The Foreign Service Institute indicated that they would welcome such a request and that this would help to inaugurate the program in the near future. Further, the Foreign Service Institute will welcome assistance in the organization of the course.

The CIA has had several years experience with the course and will undoubtedly be glad to cooperate in establishment of the course at the State Department. The R organization may wish to participate with the CIA in one of the CIA training sessions in order to acquaint itself with training methods, training results, etc. This information can then be passed on to the Foreign Service Institute.

The National Institute of Technology in Washington, D. C., may be willing to assist the Department of State in establishing such training and could provide the experienced and trained instructor required initially to get the program off to a good start.

2. Organize R's Participation in the Reading Rate Improvement Course.

It is considered that the R organization should plan their participation in the training program as follows:

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R executives - optional.

Senior analysts (GS-13 and above) - optional.

Analysts (GS-12 and below) - mandatory on a scheduled basis.

Others where reading speed is important - mandatory on a scheduled basis.

Examples: Document clerks, Editors, Routers, Library reference personnel, some clerical personnel, etc.

It is suggested that the Foreign Service Institute be requested to accommodate 20 students from the R Organization at all times.

D - ASSESSMENT OF ADVANTAGES

The evidence from other users of this type of training indicates that a conservative estimate of improvement of 50 percent in reading rate could logically be expected. The existing high level of education and extensive research experience would indicate that R analyst personnel would be very apt students.

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The advantage to the R organization is indicated in the following analysis of reading time:

ANALYSIS OF READING TIME - REGULAR PROGRAM ANALYSTS

<u>TASKS WHICH INCLUDE</u> <u>READING TIME</u>	<u>TOTAL TIME SPENT</u> %	<u>Hrs/Week</u>	<u>ESTIMATED TIME SPENT</u> %	<u>READING</u> <u>Hrs/Week</u>
Background Study	32.2	12.8	25	10
Written Products	39.5	15.8	10	4
Reviewing Work of Others	<u>8.7</u>	<u>3.5</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0.8</u>
TOTALS	80.4%	32.1	37%	14.8*

Estimated reading rate improvement - 50%

Time saving - 7.4 Hrs/Week

The above tabulation and analysis has been based upon the time allocations of regular program analysts. NIS analysts spend 91.7 percent of their total time on the three tasks enumerated above of which approximately 34 percent of their total time or 13.6 hours per week is spent in reading. Thus, it can be assumed that the magnitude of time-saving applies about equally to NIS analysts.

If a reading rate improvement of 50 percent can be achieved, approximately 7.4 hours of analysts' time will be saved each week.

*The reading time estimated here is the relatively continuous information-seeking type of reading which is the type of reading most subject to improvement through reading rate training. The "study-type" of reading, although subject to similar reading rate improvement, has been excluded in the estimate in order to present a conservative reading time base. Time spent writing, conferring, etc., has also been excluded from the "Estimated Time Spent Reading."

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This is a saving of 18.5 percent of the total time spent by the analysts and represents an extremely significant gain. Thus, a substantial advantage accrues in the conservation of professional time for "producing" activities rather than "intake" activities. Or, it can permit a substantial increase in the amount of information which each analyst can handle within the same time.

A similar advantage applies to the many administrative and professional supervisors who are faced with a large reading problem although no attempt is made here to estimate the time advantage.

Summary of Recommendations

1. Formally request the Foreign Service Institute to establish a reading rate improvement course as quickly as possible. Assist the FSI in organizing the course.
2. Organize R's participation in the training program so that twenty people are undergoing training at all times.

XI. PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

XI - PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The title of this Chapter - Professional Development - is not intended to be synonymous with training in the rigid, classroom, lecture sense. Rather, professional development as envisioned for the R Area includes - establishing a climate of professional opportunity, developing means for providing adequate motivation, permitting and encouraging an interchange of professional doctrine, carrying out plans for personal consultation and individual guidance, organizing a systematic program of on-the-job training, and recognizing the varying needs and interests of different groups according to discipline, area, grade level, or intelligence research experience.

Recent studies in human relations have emphasized the importance of a feeling of participation as fundamental to motivation.

It is this concept of professional development for which we propose several specific actions. They are based, in the main, upon our studies and upon our analyst interviews.

A - SEVERAL FACTORS POINT TO THE NEED FOR A PROGRAM OF PROFESSIONAL DE- VELOPMENT.

We have already spoken of the high degree of professional zeal and career interest which exists among R's analysts and their supervisors. But other facts and opinions were called to our attention which we believe require consideration in connection with professional development and motivation.

1. Regular Program Analysts Feel that Only About 29 Percent of Their Products Make Contributions Which are Important and Direct.

Almost half (42%) of what the regular program analyst produces, in his mind at least, makes a relatively minor contribution to those who receive his work. But, more significantly, represented in this figure are one-third of the analysts who don't know how much of a contribution their work makes. The figures for NIS analysts are even higher. Page 19 of the Summary Report provides further details.

This can have nothing but an adverse effect upon morale and, perhaps, a long-term lessening of the drive and interest we have observed.

The analyst has relatively few contacts with the bureaus and some feel strongly that their work suffers from "insulation."

2. More than Half of the Analysts Feel That the Bureaus Get Better Data Than They Do, or Get it Faster.

This impression, linked with other time-using factors of processing and review, seems to account for much of the adverse feeling encountered regarding the production of current intelligence.

Although administrative action may be indicated to solve problems of processing time, speedy document routing and delivery, etc., there is also the problem of making certain that the analyst understands to what extent a delay does exist (if at all) and to what degree this does or does not affect the quality and timeliness of his research.

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3. The Great Majority of the Analysts (86%) Feel that Field Trips Are an Important Factor in Good Research Performance.

Our sampling among the analysts indicates that very few (less than 10%) have actually visited their area of research responsibility since being employed in the R organization. This is considered to be a very low average considering the nature of the responsibility and the fact that the average analyst has spent about 3 1/4 years in the R organization.

We recognize that an affirmative answer can be expected to the question, "Do you consider field trips to your area to be important to your research?" However, we encountered a very realistic set of answers which makes us believe that the response is based upon more than simply personal desire for travel abroad.

The analysts, as a composite, considered that a trip to their area each three to six years for a period two to three months would be adequate although more frequent field trips if a specific situation required it would be entirely acceptable and welcome.

4. Understanding of the Foreign Service - Civil Service Amalgamation Program is not General.

In our interviews with the analysts, one-third admitted that they do not understand the Foreign Service-Civil Service Amalgamation Program. Further, of the two-thirds who said that they did, at least 20 percent had to qualify their description of the program with "vaguely," "partially," etc.

The degree of misunderstanding concerning this program is indicated by the following quotations from the response of the analysts when asked his understanding of the program:

- "Go to the field and then return to OIR."
- "FP wants all positions under the Foreign Service."
- "I really wasn't informed."
- "The Department wants more billets in Washington, D.C., for the Foreign Service."
- "It will put the Civil Service under the Foreign Service."
- "The Civil Service would become the Foreign Service Reserve."

Only one-third of the analysts who had an opinion concerning the program considered that the program was a good one.

The potential impact upon the R organization by the Foreign Service-Civil Service Amalgamation Program would appear to be an important one. Accordingly, the analysts as a group should understand the program's objectives and the procedure intended to be followed - at least to the degree that the top management in R is informed concerning these factors. In any event, the analyst should understand what R's official position is in the matter. In addition, the analyst should have an opportunity to raise questions concerning any program of this sort which could have an important influence upon his career plans.

5. A Majority of the Analysts (54%) Consider a Formal Training Program Desirable.

This is considered to be a significant response: first, because no specific training plan was presented for comment; and, secondly, because the analysts corps has already completed a considerable amount of formal education. Thus, it would be expected that their experience

in research work and their active participation in outside study would condition their minds against a formal training program in the R organization.

Nevertheless, the majority considered that formal training of some sort was necessary and listed the following, in order of importance:

- a. Professional training.
- b. Seminars on research methods.
- c. How to write reports.
- d. Seminars on relationships problems (with the bureaus).
- e. Indoctrination in top policy determination (State Department).

Many of those who expressed the opinion that no formal training program was necessary also expressed the opinion that "on-the-job" training was the best kind and should be pursued more actively.

B - A PLAN FOR PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Other chapters of this Volume propose formal training programs which should be considered in connection with a program of professional development. These chapters are - Chapter VII, which proposes training in the writing of readable reports and Chapter X, which proposes a training program to increase reading rate.

By way of preface, several considerations apply to all of the specific proposals which will follow:

First, emphasis in any kind of a formal training program should be on the "seminar-type" rather than the "lecture-type" of training. An opportunity for the exchange of views and free discussion is an important consideration.

Second, full use of the advice, facilities, and existing and planned curriculum of the Foreign Service Institute should be made in order to speed program development, secure facilities and equipment readily, and to permit the interchange of ideas between those being trained for post duties and those from the Intelligence Organization. It should be noted that the Foreign Service Institute courses, although frequently announced as somewhat restricted in eligibility for attendance, are frequently not actually so restricted and that opportunities exist for many people of the R Organization to attend.

Third, R should secure a large conference-training room in order to conduct its own training sessions. The room should include blackboard, easel, and visual projection equipment in order to conduct well-organized sessions.

In order to organize, develop, and implement a productive program of professional development, nine program action steps are set forth for consideration.

1. Establish a Committee on Professional Development.

This Committee should be appointed immediately and should be responsible for organizing a program of professional development for the R Organization. It is proposed that this Chapter be provided to the Committee as the initial document upon which to base their deliberations and from which to develop a program.

It is proposed that the Committee consist of a member from each research division, one member from the Office of Production Coordination, two from the Office of Intelligence Services, and that the Secretary of the Committee be the Training Coordinator - organizationally on the staff of the Division of Executive Services.

The Committee membership should reflect the several disciplines represented in the R professional staff, the biographic analyst, the

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specialist in intelligence acquisition, and administrative management. Memberships should be for two years on a staggered basis. Subcommittees may be appointed to develop the several elements of the program.

A subcommittee should be established to organize a training program for junior analysts and research aides. Suggested elements of this program are -

- a. An organized plan of "on-the-job" training.
- b. Junior analyst seminars in research methodology and professional doctrine (each session led by a senior analyst of the R Organization).
- c. Carefully selected job rotation to broaden perspective of the junior analyst.
- d. Through the cooperation of local universities, the establishment of off-campus credit courses in State Department space.

It is recommended that the Committee be appointed in July, 1952, and that the major actions for professional development be organized, scheduled, and announced by September 1952 for the next six-months' period. Thereafter, schedules should be developed six months in advance.

2. Establish the Position of Training Coordinator on the Staff of the Division of Executive Services.

The individual selected as Training Coordinator should be an analyst chosen for his understanding of and evidence of effective leadership and enthusiasm for a program of professional development.

The responsibilities proposed for the Training Coordinator are as

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follows:

a. Conceive, organize, develop, and implement training programs for all employees of the R Organization, including organized "on-the-job" training programs.

b. Arrange for all necessary training materials, training facilities, and instructors for approved training programs.

c. Act as secretary for the Committee on Professional Development. In this connection, provide an agenda in advance of each meeting, record meeting decisions or arrange that they be recorded for the full committee or subcommittees, report periodically to top management on the status of committee actions, and maintain such committee records as shall be necessary.

d. Act as liaison for the R Organization with the Foreign Service Institute and with training officials of other agencies and organizations.

The Training Coordinator, a full-time job*, would provide the imaginative leadership required for the far-sighted planning and development of a successful professional development program. His responsibility includes not only professional training but the administration of training for administrative and management personnel, supervisory personnel, and clerical and support personnel.

* The professional development program we visualize requires, at a minimum, the full-time services of one individual. If departmental policy regarding the centralization of training administration in the FSI legislates against the establishment of this position, the responsibilities outlined should be assumed on a part-time basis with more active participation by the FSI.

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3. Institute Regular Branch Staff Meetings in Each of the Branches of the R Organization.

It is recommended that the R Organization adopt a policy of encouraging and assisting branch chiefs in conducting regular branch meetings on a weekly or biweekly basis. Each of these meetings should be preceded by an agenda so that all attending will be advised as to the subjects and intended coverage of each meeting. For most meetings, the time limit should be established as one hour.

The primary purposes of the branch staff meetings would be to inform, to train, to improve common understanding of branch objectives and procedures, to provide a device for the motivation of employees, and to improve relationships within the branch and division and with the users of branch research.

To these ends, topics suggested for branch staff meeting discussion are:

- Selected branch analysts present an important research project in terms of its origin, its planning, its current status, its expected impact upon policy and State Department action, the problems encountered in its performance, the techniques used in its development, etc. All branch personnel would discuss in the typical "case history" approach to training. Emphasis in the discussion would be placed upon consumer relationships, research techniques, data acquisition problems, and report organization and readability.
- Present evidences of the value of the branch's research output as garnered from conversations with bureau officials, written remarks concerning branch reports, evidences of use in State Department official actions, etc.

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- Discuss administrative matters of the branch and of the R Organization as they affect the individual. This would include a discussion of the Foreign Service - Civil Service Amalgamation Program, space, research support services, the research program for the branch, the branch "on-the-job" training program, etc.
- Discussion by a representative of one of the users of the branch's research concerning problems of his office, the current situation in his area, the needs visualized for intelligence research, specific illustrations of the use that has been made of the branch's research in the past, criticisms or suggestions that can be offered, etc. Relative adequacy and timeliness of data receipt should be discussed. This should be accomplished by inviting a representative of the geographic or functional bureau to participate in the meetings no less frequently than quarterly.
- Discussion by a representative of R's top management. These visits by R's top management, scheduled to occur at least quarterly, should be designed so as to present briefly the latest happenings and then permit questions and answers concerning the official's responsibilities, programs, etc. Representation should rotate between the Office Directors, and Division Directors of the Office of Intelligence Services and Office of Production Coordination.

4. Establish an Organized Program of Professional Seminars.

It is recommended that professional seminars of three types be organized, with sessions for each type held on a quarterly basis. The curriculum of the FSI should be used to a maximum extent but subjects of interest, if not covered by the FSI, should be arranged by R. The three types of seminars suggested are as follows:

The General Interest Seminar: This series is intended to be of benefit to all analysts regardless of discipline, area, or length of service in the R Organization. As contrasted to the following two types of professional seminars proposed, it is intended that, in general, the responsibility for subject matter presentation, panel organization and panel participation, etc., should be borne by personnel of the R Organization.

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The International Relations Seminar: These seminars should be organized for the political analyst in the R Organization although attendance should not be so restricted. The majority of the sessions should be led by an outstanding individual in the political science or sociological field who will command the respect and attention of the political analysts.

The Economic Seminar: These should be organized for the interests of the economists of the R Organization but attendance should not be restricted to economists alone. Outstanding individuals in the economic field should be invited to participate, particularly in panel-type seminar discussions.

As illustrations of the type of subject matter intended to be covered by these several types of seminars, the following lists are presented:

a. The General Interest Seminar.

- Principals of Research Techniques (several sessions followed by smaller groups for individual discussions; also, more detailed discussion during branch staff meetings.)
- The Organization for Intelligence Research in the United States.
- The Organization for Intelligence in G-2, A-2, and ONI.
- Intelligence Research as Practiced in Foreign Governments.
- Techniques of Conference Leadership.
- The Responsibilities of R Organization.
- The Responsibilities of Geographic Research Divisions.
- The Responsibilities of a Research Analyst.
- The Network for Intelligence Acquisition and its Organization in Support of Intelligence Research.

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b. The International Relations Seminar.

- Recent Advancements in the Political Science Discipline.
- Sociological Studies of Importance to Research in Foreign Areas.
- The Contribution of Universities to Political Science Research.
- Colonialism and Nationalism.
- Communism throughout the World - Strategy and Tactics.
- Buddhism in the World.
- The Political Science Programs of Various Foundations.

c. The Economic Seminar.

- Systems of Social Accounting.
- The International Monetary Fund.
- The Gold Problem.
- The Applications of Standard Economic Research Techniques.
- The Future of the Sterling Area.
- Economic Developments in Foreign Countries (a series).
- Methodology in Production Indexes.
- The Economic Problems of Under-Developed Countries.

5. Adopt a Scheduled Program of Personalized and Inspirational Guidance for Senior Analysts.

The professional seminars proposed immediately above provide, to some degree, exposure of the analysts at all grades to presentations and discussions concerning the responsibilities of the R Organization and other intelligence activities. However, as a factor of professional

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development for the senior analysts of the R Organization, it is felt that scheduled discussions by the top officials of the R Organization individually with senior analysts is necessary and highly desirable from several viewpoints.

First, top management of the R Organization can receive opinions and impressions directly from the producers of the R Organization which will be useful to condition their viewpoint in the administration of the organization.

Secondly, the analyst is exposed to the top administrative individuals in the organization who are, for the most part, distant bodies whose functions, personality, and plans he cannot visualize or appreciate.

Thirdly, it provides an opportunity for the senior analyst to make known his own personal hopes and plans in respect to his contribution to the mission and objective of the R Organization.

Fourthly, top management personnel can provide guidance and assurance to the analyst which, if properly presented, can be a real factor in encouraging him to maintain production.

This program must be organized in such a manner that the interviews are not conducted in an off-hand or perfunctory manner. Although experience with the interviews will best indicate the proper sequence and scope of subject matter, it would seem that a discussion concerning the senior analysts area of responsibility, his recent accomplishments and disappointments, his relationships with customers, his place in the R Organization, his personal career plans, his open questions concerning the usefulness or impact of his work, etc., would seem to be logical opening subjects. In general, about 30 to 45 minutes would be required in order to first permit R's top management official to understand the analyst and

his position and secondly to then express his own views and experiences as a guide to the analyst. Suggestions would be solicited from the analyst concerning ways in which his own and the organization's program and production could be improved.

It is proposed that the Special Assistant, Deputy Special Assistant, Director of Intelligence Research, Director of Intelligence Services, and Director of Production Coordination, each spend 30 to 45 minutes a week in consultation with one senior analyst. In this manner, all senior analyst would see a top official of the R Organization at least once each year.

The results of the interview should be made a matter of record through a "memorandum for file". This record should be closely held and provide first, a starting point for the next top management official who will see the senior analyst the following year, and secondly, a means whereby tabulations of opinions and comments from senior analysts may be secured.

6. Install a "Project Performance Rating System" to Rate Analyst Performance.

The great majority of the analysts recognize that the present performance rating system does not truly rate performance nor act as a device for the motivation of quality research work.

It is proposed that a more realistic and meaningful plan of performance evaluation be instituted whereby analysts are provided a performance rating following the completion of each major research

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project. This should, in normal circumstances, permit the rating of project performance of each analyst at least three times each year. These "project performance ratings" would serve as the basis for the annual or semiannual official performance ratings specified by the Department of State.

Page 45 of the Summary Report illustrates the Analyst Performance Rating form intended and the principal factors suggested in developing and discussion performance with analysts. Chapter IX proposes, in connection with project management, the use of the Analyst Performance Rating form at the end of each major project.

7. Develop a Program of Field Trips on a Scheduled Basis.

The importance of knowing a foreign area first-hand cannot be underestimated in the performance of quality and time intelligence research. We found the analysts quite conservative as to their estimates as to the amount of field travel which they considered desirable.

It is recommended that a schedule of trips abroad be adopted so that analysts in grade GS-12 and above can be expected to visit their area for a two to three months' period at least every five years. Although it may be necessary to assign a specific research project for development in the foreign country and under the supervision of the Post in that country, it is recommended that a large part of the time available to the analyst be left free for such investigation and study as he deems best in order to supplement his knowledge and under-

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standing of the country, its government, its economy, and its people. His program for this independent study should, of course, be reduced to writing and approved by the Division Chief and the Director of Intelligence Research prior to the start of the trip.

In addition, a full report should be required of the analyst upon his return.

8. Organize a Program of Bureau Assignments for Analysts of the R Organization.

One of the complaints which we encountered on the part of some of the analysts was the feeling that their work "suffered from isolation". In addition, other portions of this Volume and of the Summary Report have referred to the lack of knowledge on the part of the average analyst as to the extent to which his research contributes to operating problems and policy determinations.

We have found that relatively few of the analysts have the opportunity to work with and in the geographic or functional bureaus directly.

It is recommended that a program of bureau assignments be adopted so that senior analysts of the R Organization may assume and learn bureau operating duties and problems. These should be planned in consonance with bureau desires in the matter but, if possible, should be of 3 months' duration for each assignment. Shorter, specific work projects would be acceptable in many instances. During the course of our "consumer interviews" this thought was advanced in several instances and a favorable response received. Considerable improvement in "consumer

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relations" can be expected as a by-product of this program.

9. Institute a Long-Range Program of Executive Development for Senior Analysts who are Considered Potential Supervisory Personnel.

The problems of supervising research are many and complex. The principal difficulties encountered by research individuals in assuming supervisory positions is in questions of personnel administration, morale, motivation, budget compilation and justification, space, program planning, and other similar problems of administration.

It is necessary that the professional analyst recognize the importance of these factors and be able to deal with them once he has assumed a supervisory position. Accordingly, it is proposed that a "tailored" Executive Development Program be instituted.

Selected senior analysts (considered to be potential supervisory personnel) should be exposed, through actual practice or direct observation, to the major administrative problems that beset supervisory personnel. This can be accomplished by job rotation to the bureaus and to A/MS, CS, DP, DB, etc., and by observation and study in the R administrative organization itself with particular emphasis upon tours of duty in the Office of Intelligence Services and the Office of Production Coordination. Certain specialized courses are also available through the Foreign Service Institute.

Individual guidance should be provided each candidate in the program in respect to training necessary or desirable, scheduling assignments, developing work and training plans, and arranging for

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rotating assignments or direct observation of work operations. Each "training plan" would be specifically tailored to the requirements of the individual.

For branch chiefs, tours of duty as Assistant Division Chief (Production) will provide an important technique of executive development.

The development and administration of this plan should be the responsibility of the Training Coordinator. The program should operate on a highly selective basis.

Summary of Recommendations

In recognition of the high level of professional skill possessed by the analyst corps but in further recognition of the need for continuing attention and effort to personal development, nine action steps in a program of Professional Development are proposed.

1. Establish a permanent Committee on Professional Development.
2. Establish the position of Training Coordinator in the Division of Executive Services.
3. Institute regular branch staff meetings throughout the R Organization.
4. Establish an organized program of professional seminars, of three types:
 - General Interest
 - International Relations
 - Economic
5. Adopt a program of personalized and inspirational guidance for senior analysts. Do this on a scheduled basis.

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6. Adopt and use a "project performance rating" system for analysts to supplement the regular State Department performance rating. Use the proposed system to recognize and encourage good performance and to suggest specific performance factors subject to improvement by the analyst.
7. Develop a program of field trips for senior analysts to improve country and area knowledge and improve professional skill and research performance.
8. Organize a program of bureau assignments for analysts.
9. Institute a program of executive development specifically "tailored" to the needs of senior analysts selected as potential supervisory material.

XII. IMPROVED FACILITIES FOR RESEARCH ANALYSTS

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XII. IMPROVED FACILITIES FOR RESEARCH ANALYSTS

It is fortunate that the R area has cooperative personnel interested in their work, and willing to adjust themselves to the physical aspects of a working environment which leaves much to be desired. We believe, however, that there is an immediate and cumulative effect to inefficient working conditions which evidences itself in a lessening in quality of work, lowered morale, increased turnover, poor housekeeping, and the expenditure of time and effort beyond that which should be required.

Research work, in particular, requires a set of working conditions and attendant working facilities which are conducive to the application of concentrated mental effort.

It is recognized that office space conditions throughout Washington, D.C., are not good. It is our thought, however, that the problem requires a planned program of action so that each opportunity may be seized promptly and so that an atmosphere and set of working conditions which aid and supplement the research effort will be built up. We recognize that this cannot be done overnight but propose that several initial steps be taken towards this objective.

A - SEVERAL FACTS AND EXPRESSIONS OF OPINION BEAR UPON THE PROBLEM OF ADEQUATE RESEARCH FACILITIES.

1. Adequate Working Facilities are Important to the Analysts.

Thirty-eight percent of the analysts consider physical facilities inadequate to the proper conduct of their research. However, fifty

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percent had objections to their space and desk arrangements even though not willing to categorize them as completely "inadequate".

In our analyst interviews, one of the principal lines of inquiry concerned the obstacles which the analyst found in performing his research. One of the analysts listed "noise and interruptions" as the prime obstacle he found in planning the research project. Twenty percent of the analysts interviewed considered "noise and interruptions" as the prime obstacle to the conduct of analysis and the preparation of the report.

The inadequacy of space conditions for the conduct of research was also brought home to us during our analysts interviews by the fact that we were unable to talk to most of the analysts selected for our interviews at their desks because of the constant interruptions, the lack of privacy, and the general noise level that obtained.

2. There is a Wide Disparity in Space Allocations.

Considering total floor space and total employment in the R Area (SA-1 and SA-2 only), an average of 126 square feet per person is obtained.

There is, however, a wide disparity in the allocations of floor space to the research divisions as indicated in the table immediately below:

	<u>Sq. Ft. Space</u>	<u>Sq. Ft. Per Person</u>	<u>Sq. Ft. Per Person After Files Area Subtracted</u>
OIR/OD	10,408	165	152
DRA	4,430	130	107
DRF	10,445	119	101
DRN	7,735	103	89
DRW	10,985	122	108
DRS	7,330	90	76
DFI	5,815	121	105

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In addition, we observed, in our visits to the R office spaces and during our interviews with the analysts, a considerable disparity in the allocation of office space to individuals. It is recognized that the State Annex No. 1 building does not lend itself readily to efficient and equitable space allocations because of the lack of large open office areas. However, the extremes in accommodations are striking. One encounters either excellent office and desk arrangement because of privacy; or the complete lack of efficient working environment, with little in between.

3. The Present Space Condition and the Lack of Aggressive Space Management have Resulted in Several Safety Hazards.

We did not make a complete inspection of all office areas of the R organization. However, observations of many offices and several escorted inspections revealed safety conditions which should be corrected.

- Several instances of open file drawers projecting into main aisle areas were observed.
- Shelves and bins were observed not secured to the wall and not strong enough to hold weight applied safely. Some of these shelves were observed with material stored so high that a chair had to be used in order to reach the top shelves. One set of shelves could be made to sway at the touch of the hand (GTI Branch).
- Electric extension cords were observed running across aisle areas, or desk access spaces.
- Newspapers and periodicals, yellowed with age, were stored on open shelves. This would appear to be a fire hazard.
- Floor loading seems excessive in a number of localities.

4. The General Office Noise Level is High for Research Production.

In 9 noise level test readings in two office areas (Rooms 526 and 616) throughout 2 successive days, an average noise-level rating of 60.4 decibels was secured. These test readings were taken at approximately

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one minute intervals within each 15-minute test period. It should be noted that the 616 test area is carpeted and thus the general noise level readings understated in this sampling.

This survey places the general noise level in SA-1 above the noise level of an average office (rated at 55 to 60 decibels) and well above a private office (rated at 35 to 40 decibels).

These tests were not intended to be extensive or conclusive. Even though limited, however, they tend to prove our initial observation that the noise level exceeded that of the average office which, in our opinion, would be too noisy for the research type of work expected of R analysts. As a minimum, the average noise level in open office areas should not exceed 50 decibels.

More distracting than the general noise level is the more aggravating and work-destroying factor of interruptions - both oral and visual. These are very frequent and caused by file drawers closing, chairs being scraped, neighbor's phone ringing, neighbor's talking on the telephone, people walking past the desk, people getting up from adjacent desks, conference at next desk, etc.

Tests of the effect of noise on fatigue and production indicate that the more highly skilled subject is adversely affected by noise to a greater extent than the less efficient worker. Of particular interest to R because of the large reading load, are findings when tests were made on various subjects reading a paragraph. "On the introduction of

noise, there was an increased articulation on the part of the readers in an attempt to concentrate on their work. This occasioned an increase in respiration, and finally a decrease in the speed of reading due, in this case, both to physical effort and mental strain".

Other professional opinions based on long and exhaustive study of the effects of noise on the individual are -

- "Noise lowers all of our faculties. It slackens and dulls our mental processes. It clouds judgment, reduces the precision of our action, and decreases general efficiency". Dr. J. L. McCartney, Pennsylvania Medical Journal.
- "Noise exacts even a greater toll upon the nervous systems of mental workers and others who are noise sensitive". Dr. Vern O. Knudson, Dean of Graduate Division, U.C.L.A.
- "Noise is in the same class with bad ventilation and poor lighting in its effect on human efficiency". Dr. Paul E. Sabine, River Bank Laboratories.

5. Dictating Equipment Would Prove of Value for Many Analysts.

Noting the absence of dictating equipment in our early visits to the office areas, we inquired of all analysts interviewed during our analyst study whether or not they would consider a dictaphone a useful tool in their work. The replies indicate that 25 percent of the analysts will use dictating equipment without urging and would like to have it now. And that an additional 25 percent would make partial use or might find regular use for it with some experience in its proper application.

Those who replied affirmatively were usually quite enthusiastic and replied -

- "A good idea."
- "It would increase my output tremendously."

Those who were in doubt as to its value replied as follows:

- "I could use it perhaps for simple letters."
- "I can't say at the moment. I have never used one."
- "I can't say since I have never used one although it would help for rush cases and first drafts."

We observed, in discussing research methodology with the analysts, that much of their time was required to extract and excerpt from documents, periodicals, newspapers, etc. We also observed that many of the analysts laboriously prepared first drafts in long hand or by typewriting. It appeared to us that a large percentage of this work could be done much more rapidly and possibly much more completely (thereby improving research and analysis) if this were done by dictating equipment.

B - PLAN OF IMPROVEMENT

1. Install the "Unit Office Plan" of Office Layout for Research Areas.

A relatively recent trend in office layout, embodying new principles of furniture design and arrangement, is the unit office plan which we propose for installation in the research areas of the R organization. The Summary Report illustrates the principal features of the plan. The equipment illustrated, known as "Techniplan", is manufactured and installed by the Globe-Wernicke Company. This company assisted us by preparing the sample floor plan attached as Exhibit XII-1.*

*Other manufacturers are able to offer packaged office units. The model illustrated has been chosen to illustrate the features recommended and to test the probable cost of such furniture.

*Hand-drawn to describe (B-1)
Hand-drawn showing - below*

Exhibit XII-1




Illustration of Application of Unit Office Plan
Space pictured is Rooms 524 and 526, SA-1

Prepared by Globe-Wernicke Co., Washington, D.C.

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The advantages of the unit office plan is that it not only saves floor space but it also provides additional desk top area, a desirable degree of privacy and freedom from visual and oral interruptions, and conveniently located book shelves. These features, in all respects, are ideal for the research type of operation which we have observed in the R Area. Exhibit XII-1 on the next page presents an isometric view of one of the existing areas in one of the research divisions re-engineered in accordance with the unit office plan.

"Techniplan" equipment will cost about \$440 per analyst. Some savings on this figure are expected if Globe-Wernicke office layout engineers are permitted to make detailed surveys rather than work solely from blue prints of existing space. Thus, if approximately 300 analysts can be placed in the category of requiring improved desk and space arrangement, the cost would be \$132,000. This is not considered to be excessive in terms of the benefits that may be expected to be derived through increased production, improved morale, better quality research, and lower turnover. It should also be pointed out that the equipment permits maximum flexibility in adjusting office layouts and yet retains desirable elements of economical usage of floor space, maximum desk area, reasonable privacy, etc.

As an initial step, it is recommended that one branch or section be completely equipped with unit office plan furniture - specifically DRS space in Rooms numbered 518 through 526. This space condition is in urgent need of improvement and would subject the installation to a

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real test. This test installation, with equipment for both analysts and typists (27 people), would cost about \$12,000.

The unit office plan recommended above does not appear on the standard specifications for Government furniture at this time. However, the Federal Supply Service (responsible for the development and administration of Government standards for office furniture) has been experimenting with this kind of equipment, is interested in its application to Federal Government office layout problems, and indicated that they would welcome an opportunity to put it to practical use and subject it to test. To accomplish this, it will be necessary for the Department of State to write to the Commissioner of the Federal Supply Service, Department of the Treasury, outlining the intended installation and its relative advantages and request a decision whether or not such a plan would be in conflict with any existing or proposed standards for Federal Government office furniture.

2. Establish a Report Writing Room in Several Locations in SA-1 Equipped with Unit Office Plan Furniture.

As a minimum measure to improve facilities and as a further test of the advantages offered by the unit office plan, establish Report Writing Rooms in approximately 4 locations in SA-1. It is noted that DRW has plans under way for the establishment of such a room in order to overcome the problems enumerated throughout this Chapter.

The Report Writing Room, equipped with unit office plan furniture, should afford a maximum of privacy and should include, in each space a

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dictating machine so that the analyst may prepare rough drafts and organize his data and facts efficiently and expeditiously.

3. Provide Dictating Equipment for those Analysts Who Will Use such Equipment - and Encourage its Use.

The relatively high interest in the advantages offered by dictating equipment has been indicated earlier. Some of the analysts were under the impression that dictating equipment was reserved for the higher echelons of the R organization.

It is recommended that dictating equipment be secured, that analysts be indoctrinated in its use, and that it be made available to those who indicate a desire to use the equipment. One of the frequent objections to the use of dictating equipment is the lack of privacy that now exists. However, modern dictating equipment does not require more than a modulated speaking voice.

Branch typists should be provided with transcribing machines to service the analysts. However, as use and volume expands, consideration should be given to economies that might result from the establishment of a small Stenographic Pool in the Division of Executive Services to handle peak loads and lengthy, low priority dictation. This pool can start out small and expand as the use of dictating equipment expands.

A short training course for both the dictators and the transcribers should be instituted (the company manufacturing the equipment will assist) and specific problems of mechanical dictation involving the spelling of foreign names, etc., should be dealt with at that time.

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Consideration should also be given to establishing dictating equipment in LR so that the analysts using the ready reference service may dictate extracts and excerpts.

As an indication of equipment costs under full implementation of this proposal, and in accordance with our finding that about 25% of the analysts could make immediate use of dictating equipment -

- 100 dictating units (Edison Voicewriter) at \$397.50	\$ 39,750
- 25 transcribing units (Edison) at \$376.30	<u>9,407</u>
Full Implementation Cost	\$ 49,157

4. Develop a Space Management Plan for the R Organization.

In line with a previous observation concerning the need for a definitive plan of facilities improvement, it is recommended that an overall plan be developed which would incorporate the following elements:

- A statement concerning the objectives of the R Space Management Plan, i.e., to provide space, facilities, and equipment conducive to productive intelligence research. This should be supported by specific statements of actions. These might be:
 - a. The installation of the "Unit Office Plan" in one branch of DRS;
 - b. The establishment of 4 Report Writing Rooms;
 - c. The establishment of a training-conference room in SA-1;
 - d. The installation of dictating equipment in LR;
 - e. The reduction of the use of open shelving;
 - f. The improvement of lighting;
 - g. The improvement of ventilation;
 - h. A plan of periodic space surveys (in connection with the "Personal Requirements Analysis");
 - i. Etc., etc.

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- Schedule of action: the above specific actions should be scheduled in terms of the date by which initial action and final action should be taken.
- Institute a vigorous housekeeping program; this program, inaugurated by an R Office Instruction, and supplemented by periodic inspections, is aimed at improving appearance by reducing the cluttered appearance of tops of file cabinets, bookcases, tables, shelves and binning, etc. The problem of housekeeping cannot be solved except by continued effort on the part of the Space Officer.
- Provide floor plans and furniture templates: Maximum assistance should be provided to the administrative officers and branch chiefs in developing efficient office layouts by the ready availability of floor plans and furniture templates so that alternate space layouts may be developed on paper prior to space moves and building alterations. Floor plans and templates are available now but apparently the supply is not adequate. One administrative officer was observed using crudely-drawn floor plan and marking desk arrangements by pencil and not to scale.

The important element of the proposal enumerated above is the setting out of space objectives, actions, and schedules so that space management personnel of the Department of State may be continually appraised of the needs of the R organization and will incorporate these requirements in their budget estimates and in their program planning.

5. Expand the Responsibilities of the Space Officer (Division of Executive Services).

A program of space management, in consonance with other administrative programs, requires the establishment of responsibilities and authorities and the exercise of imagination and leadership. The Space Officer, proposed here as a member of the staff of the Division of

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Executive Services, should have authority to disapprove proposed space arrangements and to develop alternate layouts when, in his judgment, these layouts are more efficient and effective and more in keeping with the space policies of the organization.

The Space Officer should have the following responsibilities:

- a. The development and maintenance of the space management plan for the R organization.
- b. The scheduling of space and facility improvement actions.
- c. Maintaining liaison with and representing the R organization with space management personnel of Central Services, Department of State and the Public Buildings Administration.
- d. Advising and assisting operating officials in the development of office layouts.
- e. Reviewing and approving (or disapproving) office layout plans submitted by operating officials in the R organization; and the development of alternate and improved layouts.
- f. Establishing and maintaining, through inspection, a house-keeping program to enforce desirable standards of office appearance.
- g. Developing and providing, upon request, floor plans and furniture templates.
- h. The development of office layout standards as they apply to the R organization and the indoctrination of administrative officers in their application.

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Summary of Recommendations

1. Install the unit office plan of office layout in one branch of a research division as a test installation. Expand the use of this equipment following appraisal of the test installation.
2. Establish report writing rooms in several locations in SA-1 with unit office plan furniture and dictating equipment.
3. Provide dictating equipment for those analysts who will demonstrate effective use. Establish a short training course for dictators and transcribers to assure proper operation and maximum use. Establish a Stenographic Pool to provide transcription service when volume demonstrates need. Consider placing dictating equipment in LR for analyst use.
4. Develop a space management plan for the R organization including:
 - a. A statement of objectives and implementing actions.
 - b. A schedule of action
 - c. A vigorous housekeeping program.
 - d. Regular assistance in developing efficient office layouts.
5. Expand the responsibilities and authorities of the Space Officer (Division of Executive Services).

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XIII. TECHNIQUES OF PLANNING AND CONTROL

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XIII. TECHNIQUES OF PLANNING AND CONTROL

Planning and control are salient features of sound administration in any field of endeavor. The more suitable and effective the techniques employed for planning and control, the more efficient administration can be made. The administration of intelligence is no exception. In fact, it is our conclusion that the highest contribution which administrative skill can add to the professional standards and achievements of R is the invention of practical techniques of planning and control. By way of background to the presentation of the techniques developed during the course of this study, consideration should be given to (1) the meaning of these techniques in the context of R's work, and (2) evidences of the need for their application.

A - THE MEANING OF PLANNING AND CONTROL IN THE R AREA

The planning of R's work is concerned, in simple terms, with forecasting of the work to be accomplished, both self-initiated and user-requested, for a future period. In its full development, planning should encompass the identification of specific projects and services to be performed, both known and anticipated, and the estimation of requirements in terms of manpower and information needed to support these activities. Such forecasting and estimating must obviously occur in order for R to function at all, though its timing can vary from a day-to-day basis to projections into several months in the future; and its methodology may vary from informal, unrecorded thinking to clearly-written, well-documented statements.

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The control of R's work is concerned with scheduling of the plan regulating the rate and cost of production, and maintaining the quality and usefulness of the final product. Control is represented by those efforts applied by management in executing a work plan, which seek to maintain standards of timeliness, cost, quality and utility; and which search out failure in these respects in order that future improvements can be made.

Obviously, every supervisor of R now plans and now controls his work in some manner and in some degree. It is the purpose of this chapter to assess the results of the efforts found, and to suggest specific improvements in the most important area of R's work - the research programs conducted in OIR.

B - EVIDENCES OF THE NEED FOR IMPROVED
PLANNING AND CONTROL

The need for improvements of this type were expressed through every avenue of appraisal employed during this study:

- Through the eyes of R's consumers - In the Bureaus it was learned that timeliness was the principal criticism of OIR production generally. This reflects a weakness in scheduling output realistically, and in meeting deadlines once established. From another viewpoint, a majority of consumers strongly advocate closer working relationships so that the forward planning of OIR's work will be more directly related to consumer interest and needs. (See pages 9 and 13 of Volume I.) In the CIA, concern was expressed not with the quality of R's NIS product but with the continued difficulties experienced in securing these products at an agreed upon rate and man-hour cost.

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- Through the eyes of R's producers (the analysts) - Several strong indications of the need were found. The uncertainty of the analyst respecting the use made of his products would be materially alleviated if, as fully as appropriate, R's products were planned to meet user needs and delivered in time to contribute to operating and policy deliberations. The overwhelming desire for fewer interruptions is another indication of the need for work planning which will reduce the dispersion of tasks among the research force. Several of the analysts interviewed spoke of the importance of more precise definition of project scope and of more care in setting realistic deadlines (factors which are closely related).
- Through the eyes of R's administrators came a variety of indications of the problem. Those responsible for budgets are aware of the existence of unmet demands, well beyond the capacity of existing staff, but they have been unable to secure documented evidence to support this need, since branches have not developed recorded work plans and forecasts. The Special Assistant's Office has been pressing for the introduction of comprehensive program planning for two years. R/ES has been endeavoring to develop a control device in the form of the monthly Program Reporting Book, but has found its product of doubtful value because of the lack of a formulated plan for, and schedule of, work to be done against which to measure accomplishment. PCS has endeavored to maintain a central project control record but this record has not proved to be a useful tool of control because of the partial compliance of the research branches.
- Finally, among those who pass upon budgets, both in the Department and in the Bureau of the Budget, concern was found because there is a lack of precisely stated work plans which give clear evidence of full use of R's staff to meet valid requirements.

These expressions of dissatisfaction become significant when one scrutinizes factually the results of present planning and control efforts. It has been found that only one type of control is fully and properly applied; that is, control over quality of written products. In other respects planning is incomplete, and control is neglected. A detailed discussion of present techniques is presented in Appendix F from which the following observations are drawn:

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1. Program Planning of an Effective Type Is Now Performed for Only a Portion of the Over-All Research Program in OIR.

Although the estimates and major studies coming under the surveillance of the Estimates Group, and the production of the NIS program, are being planned for periods ahead, the remainder of the program of intelligence production in OIR is devoid of a formal or clear scheme of program planning and control. A substantial part of the research program in R is thus without central or coordinated guidance. The division and branch chiefs do a minimum of recorded planning. Most meetings and reports throughout OIR, and even to the R level, appear informational rather than action-getting in character. The Program Planning Guide does not substitute for specific advance planning on the part of the OIR branches and divisions. No effective effort is made to plan the allocation of OIR's resources against the myriad of requirements of varying nature: i. e., basic papers versus current intelligence, intake versus output of intelligence, written versus verbal product, etc. The same is true with respect to the absence of planning for the purpose of equitably allocating the resources of OIR against the requirements of its several consumers, both within the State Department and without. Except for the NIS activities, program planning at the division and branch level is done primarily on an ad hoc basis. Essentially, this means that it is carried in the head of the branch chief, that it is governed more by expediency than judgment,

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and that there is a strong tendency to assume an obligation to produce more than is possible with the resources at hand in terms of analysts' man-hours. Lastly, the progress reports now prepared at the branch and division levels have limited value as far as planning is concerned.

2. Production Control is the most Neglected Aspect of R's Management.

This condition is revealed by the lack of attention to accurate scheduling and vigorous expediting of OIR production, even with respect to the NIS.

- During January the records of all open projects shown on the records of PCS/IDR were examined. It was found that of 158 projects recorded: 55% were already behind schedule; 41% specified no scheduled completion date; only 4% were not yet due. It is recognized that some of the projects showing on these records may have been revised, deferred or cancelled, but the absence of a current record is itself an indication of a basic weakness in the functioning of R's project planning and control.
- During February a direct inventory of projects in process was taken by PCS at our request. One hundred twenty seven items were reported, but research divisions were able to report complete status data (man-hour estimate and target completion date) for only 42% of the projects (53 in total), again reflecting the lack of conscientiously and consistently maintained production controls.
- For these 53 projects the "cost" estimate at the outset of the work had been 186 man-hours (average for group). At the time of the inventory, percentage completion was checked and it was found that the present rate of production, the final expenditure will average almost 360 man-hours - indicating that original estimates were understated by 48%.
- The history of production under the NIS program reveals constant failure either to establish realistic production objectives or to meet objectives once established. The chart displayed on page 27 of Volume I shows that not once in 33 months has the production quota been met (despite downward adjustments in quotas), and that

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percent of accomplishment by year has ranged from a low of 36.5% in 1950 to a high of 68% in 1951. A decline to 41.5% occurred during the first nine months of fiscal year 1952. It is noteworthy that this performance has occurred in a part of the program which is, ostensibly, thoroughly planned and scheduled. The failure upon analysis is found in the absence of management follow-through. This is fully attested by the weak position in which the NIS Coordinator finds himself - lacking clear authority to take action to bolster production, and lacking participation along with other R executives in the weekly senior and divisional staff meetings with the Special Assistant.

- The fact that the planning and scheduling of R's complicated work program cannot be done by memory would appear self-evident from the simple statistics of units of work produced (1,200 OIR written products per year). The complexity of the task becomes even more apparent when more detailed analysis is made of the highly variable demands placed upon R's productive capacity. At the division level in OIR, and even more at the Director level, it becomes impractical to have precise knowledge of the capacity available in each branch or its ability to assume new projects or to produce those already in process. The illustration appearing on page 27 of Volume I compares the allocation of analyst man-hours among four branches where studies were made in collaboration with the branch chief. Variations of over 300% were found in the percent of capacity allocable to various functions (for example, the Northern and Western European Branch is currently allocating 17% of regular program hours to NIEs and IE's while the African Branch is allocating 4%, DRS Foreign Political 9%, and Northeast Asia 13%).

3. The Forward Planning of Raw Material Requirements is Similarly Incomplete Today.

The burden of responsibility for requirements planning must fall in the first instance upon those who have the requirements; namely, the OIR Divisions. But in the absence of adequate planning of end-products to be accomplished in the future, relatively little requirements planning is being done by OIR. Few needs are anticipated. There is no plan, scheme, or established technique by which OIR analysts

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are required (1) to think out their needs of the near or more distant future in terms of program objectives, and (2) to list these needs in order of relative importance. As a consequence, great reliance is placed upon the routine flow of foreign reporting and publications procurement from the field.

This statement is in no way a disparagement of the efforts being made by the IAD Requirements Staff, CAB, CLE, LR, R/ES, and ERS, but rather a clear indication of the basic handicaps under which all of these efforts are being conducted. (BI in general appears an exception to this condition.)

Other evidences of the problems found in requirements planning and the adequacy of acquisition results are:

- Deficiencies in foreign reporting (many not susceptible of ready solution), such as (1) insufficient and weak reporting on popular attitudes and reactions; (2) inconsistency and lack of continuity in reporting engendered by turnover of reporting officers; (3) inadequate reporting in depth due either to lack of interest or appreciation of its importance; (4) information too much from capital city sources and higher government and social levels.
- The limited coverage of the Periodic Reporting Guide Program. To date only 16 posts are being covered out of the approximately 70 to 80 which it would be advantageous to cover.
- Lack of definite or comprehensive evaluation programs for political and sociological reporting both as regards individual posts and reports.
- The fact that some information of significance received by Bureau officials in conversations or official informals does not reach OIR. This is recognized by bureau officials and personnel of the S/S-R.
- The present Sensitive Room procedure, which deprives analysts of some material.

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- The fact that publications procurement at various Foreign Service posts requires more specific representation and improved coordination of efforts, so as to provide better follow-up on standing procurement requirements and more diligent procurement of general publications (phone books, book lists, official gazettes, etc.) on a self-initiative basis.

C - RECOMMENDED PROGRAM FOR PLANNING
AND CONTROL

The direction and content of the research program must be governed by some form of advance planning if the R organization is to anticipate needs and respond adequately to valid demands. The tempo of research and production of intelligence must be stimulated by the application of realistic schedules. The progress of the research program must be identified through current control reports of a useful nature and performance reviews which can serve as the basis for corrective action by management. Attainment of these objectives is essential if R is to develop greater stature and maturity and demonstrate an ability to be as competent in "administrative" performance as it is now in professional performance.

With respect to planning and control, attainment of these objectives poses several basic requirements which are summarized below:

1. Devote Attention to Production Planning and Control which is as Vigorous and Competent as that Now Applied to the Professional Aspects of the Work.

From the point of view of sheer complexity, the building of work plans for research and which involve: pre-analysis of each project to

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define its scope and man-hour cost; the setting of an attainable completion schedule which is neither too tight nor too loose; and the continuing evaluation of production progress require as high a degree of creative imagination, of judgment, and of mental effort as does the management of the professional aspects of the research task. In fact, to the average professional mind these "necessary evils" of management may prove even more difficult, because they are foreign to his skills or because they must be developed by trial and error. Thus, unless R is willing to invest some of the time of its top executive talent, substantive as well as non-substantive, little hope can be held for improvement upon the incomplete or ineffective devices which now exist. Chapter XIV will complete in detail the organizational framework which we consider appropriate to R's needs in relation to the present size of the organization. At this point three of the elements of the organization plan should be stressed:

a. Most important to the long-range success of strengthened planning and control is the inclusion in each research division of a top official who is fully and continuously responsible for applying techniques of planning and control throughout his division. The position is designated Assistant Chief (Production) in Chapter XIV.

b. Next is the need to invent and test techniques, to train operating executives in their use, to inspect compliance with them, and to report to management those obstacles which impair timely and

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economical performance at the branch and division level. It is proposed in Chapter XIV that a substantively qualified officer be detached from research responsibilities for an extended period, and assigned to perform these creative tasks. This officer, occupying a top staff position, will be known as the "Program Planning Coordinator."

c. Third, is the need for a top staff officer to devote similar creative attention to devising the means by which more current and detailed planning of raw data requirements can be accomplished and to pioneer in the exploitation of new sources, including external research. This officer, whose position is described in Chapter XIV, is designated the "Requirements Planning Coordinator." Both he and his associate on program planning will work primarily with and through the Assistant Division Chiefs (Production).

Within the framework of organization established to provide this more vigorous attention to planning and control should be included the MIS Coordinators.

2. Install, as Quickly as Pilot Testing Has Been Conducted, a Complete Production Planning and Scheduling Procedure.

Substantial time has been directed by our survey staff to the final design of procedures and forms considered suitable to implement workable planning, scheduling, and progress reporting. Due to the detail involved in this presentation it is separately presented as Appendix G to this Volume. For ease of over-all understanding a description of the plan is cited below, following the master flow chart appearing after page 47 of Volume I.

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The full cycle of production planning and control has three distinct phases:

- Phase One - Development of the Work Plan. It is proposed that once every six months each branch chief be responsible for projecting (1) his anticipated resources in terms of net analyst man-hours and (2) the anticipated work load in man-hours. The work plan will be supported by detailed schedules of individual projects and work items to the fullest extent known and anticipated, and will include necessary contingency allowances for such work as cannot be accurately foreseen. In the development of the work plan, the branch chief will have as his guides: directions from the Special Assistant, the EG Program Planning Guide and other instructions, "support program" commitments, and established commitments to customers. To these will be added the branch chief's anticipations of both self-initiated and user-requested products and services.
- Phase Two - Review, Adjustment, and Approval of the Plan. Following initial compilation of the six-month branch plan, a regular scheme of reviews should occur leading to final approval by the Special Assistant or his designated representative. The review procedure should bring to bear three viewpoints. First, the consumer(s) should be consulted regarding the specific components of direct interest, and should be given a perspective of the total demands upon the branch's time - this should include "consumers" within R itself, including DFI, CPI, etc. Second, management should be presented the plan as finally recommended by the branch chief. For this purpose, it is suggested that a meeting of the Estimates Group be set aside to review the plan with the branch chief concerned. To this meeting should be invited the Deputy Special Assistant, the Chief of IAD, and one or more of the top staff officials concerned with production planning techniques. Finally, then, the plan as approved by the Director, OIR, should be submitted to top management for approval.
- Phase Three - Administration of the Plan. The first two phases will take place in the month immediately preceding the beginning of the period covered by the plan. In total time, it is anticipated that the branch chief will spend approximately one day in preparing the plan and one more in the approval stages. To stagger the work of management in approval stages, it is proposed that a schedule be established which will bring one plan up for approval each week.

The work plan (for which all forms are illustrated in Appendix G) provides the basis for focusing the thought of all interested people

on the work to which the branch should address itself during the coming six months, and for resolving in advance any anticipated priority conflicts, it will lead also to steps required to resolve staffing problems (surpluses or deficits) in advance. After approval by top management, the branch chief is provided a concrete basis for applying meaningful controls to his work output as explained below.

3. Develop From the Approved Work Plan a Specific Man-Hour Objective and Time Schedule for Each Project.

The approved work plan produced from the above efforts may fare no better than present NIS work plans, or become little more meaningful as a production control than the Program Planning Guide if, at this point, it is filed. Thus, an immediate translation of the plan into a form suitable for week-to-week production control should be accomplished by the end of the first week of the new 6-month period. To this end, the branch chief with the assistance and advice of the Assistant Division Chief (Production) should take the following steps:

- a. Prepare a project schedule showing for each identified project - (1) the approximate starting date and the target completion date for the project and (2) a reasonable estimate of man-hours to be expended, based (in so far as possible) upon the specific analyst(s) to be assigned. In this connection, Appendix G suggests the use of a scheduling guide from which the net man-hours available for written products, by analyst, may be determined.
- b. The above decisions, based upon realistic consideration of the scope of the project and the difficulties which may be encountered

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in its execution, should then be recorded on the OIR Work Jacket illustrated in Appendix G. This jacket should take the form of a simplified card record which can be filed for fast reference in a visible book-type file.

c. Each week the branch secretary or other clerical assistant designated should obtain from each analyst a report of man-hours expended against each project. These data will be posted immediately to the record sheet of the project work jacket, and the complete record of each project made available for review by the branch chief. In this manner, immediate knowledge will be obtained of the progress being made against the initial man-hour objective and target completion date. As quickly as it becomes apparent that either of these objectives cannot be met, the branch chief should act to revise the objectives in consultation with the analyst, or take other steps to recover the lost time.

d. At the end of each month, a simple summary of project status visualizing projects which are falling behind schedule, those which have been deferred, as well as those which have been added to the original plan, should be compiled and furnished to the Assistant Division Chief for study. In accordance with the plan described and illustrated in Appendix G, this report should likewise be furnished for information purposes to higher management levels.

e. Once each quarter, the branch chief should compile a summary report of performance against the approved work plan and compute

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ratios of effectiveness to reflect the extent to which both man-hour and completion date objectives are being met on an over-all basis. This report should likewise be furnished to higher management where one of its uses will be the preparation of consolidated branch comparisons for study by the Director, OIR, and the Special Assistant.

The above steps (b. through e.) will be continuing and will cause the branch chief to focus attention at least once each week, each month, and each quarter upon the accuracy and realism of his production planning. It should be stressed that while top management will be given new channels of meaningful communication with the producing organization, the most important benefits of the control will be achieved at the branch and division levels where prompt action should be taken to correct poor performance as well as to recognize good performance.

4. Utilize Work Planning and Control Data in Developing Budget Presentations and in Allocating R's Manpower and Financial Resources.

R's budget presentation has apparently been excellent, as the response in the Legislative Branch has demonstrated. We believe that this presentation can be bolstered still further following the introduction of production planning and control:

- The story of production planning and control can itself offer dramatic proof of the judicious use of funds. The long experience of business provides ample evidence of the effectiveness of planning and scheduling as a tool of cost control. This benefit arises from the same principle which Government had long applied in the setting of ceilings covering manpower and expenditures. The control plan adopts this principle by applying a time ceiling

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to R's production and recognizes the fact that any individual or group will achieve a higher standard of performance when a clearly established goal, capable of attainment, is set by management and strongly administered.

- Work load projection based upon the experience of work planning should provide a more exact basis of demonstrating the resources required to meet valid demands, as well as to reveal the extent of unmet demands.

It is therefore urged that the Program Planning Coordinator collaborate closely with those responsible for budget preparation and presentation, so that his knowledge of work load requirements and production capacity can be appropriately reflected in budget planning.

Similarly, it should be found that, at shorter range, top management decisions regarding the most logical division of R's resources within established ceilings can be developed from the more precise knowledge of work load. Such data will be divulged from approved work plans and current status reports. Here again the Program Planning Coordinator should be called upon to furnish top management with statements of known and projected work load, thus providing one important basis for reaching final determinations with respect to the allocation of resources. (It should be emphasized that the Program Planning Coordinator does not make such decisions as these, but simply contributes useful information for the guidance of management.)

5. Utilize the Approved Work Plan as a Primary Basis for the Forward Planning of Raw Intelligence Requirements in each Branch.

A significant problem in OIR is expressed by the opinion of one branch chief who stated to us, "The average OIR branch neglects the

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field posts on specific things with respect to projects anticipated, until it is too late to get the information needed." Another recommended that more emphasis be placed throughout OIR on advance planning of requirements in order that branches will know, "What they have and what they are asking for."

Our analysis demonstrates that these recognized weaknesses spring from the absence of simple procedures which require that a systematic approach be taken to anticipating requirements and initiating requests in specific terms, well in advance of the need. Our work with branch chiefs, in testing the work planning technique described earlier, indicates that the foundation for requirements planning will not exist in precise terms until a regular cycle of work planning in each branch has been inaugurated.

In concept, a workable scheme of raw intelligence requirements planning based upon approved work plans should proceed as follows:

- Within 30 days after approval of the six-month work plan, statements of foreseeable raw materials needs should be in the hands of IAD.
- To accomplish this objective, each analyst should be requested to develop in rough outline a statement of the basic material required for each future project tentatively assigned to him.
- Using this rough outline as a guide, the analyst or his research aide should conduct promptly a review of holdings to identify gaps or the need for bringing information up to date. This review would be directed primarily toward branch files but should not be restricted thereto, since LR, CAB, CLB and external research resources (as examples) may afford some of the data required,

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- Upon completion of this review, "desiderata lists" should be prepared and forwarded by the branch chief to IAD, with suggestions as to sources. (It should be noted that needs must be tailored to the source by framing requests in accordance with the capabilities of individual sources and the relative availability of data. In one location data may be easily obtainable, which in another requires extensive research. A program for the training of analysts in this aspect of acquisition might be an important responsibility of the Requirements Planning Coordinator.)

6. Delegate to the Requirements Planning Coordinator Responsibility for Continuing Study of New and More Productive Devices for Planning and Procuring Raw Material Requirements.

The introduction of procedures designed to produce specific lists of requirements, at intervals of at least 6 months, is the most important first step in overcoming present problems. In this step the Requirements Planning Coordinator is concerned only with perfecting procedures and issuing instructional material to the branches. He is not concerned with the direct procurement nor should he be in the flow of requirements requisitions between the branches and IAD.

However, a number of important efforts now under way in R should be integrated under the jurisdiction of this top staff officer and brought to a higher degree of usefulness. These include:

- Continuing study should be made of desiderata lists and the basic continuing requirements of each branch to identify types of needs which may be more economically or adequately satisfied from external research. While a policy has existed with respect to permitting the exploitation of external research for NIS production, we have not found a concerted effort to implement it. While our knowledge is insufficient to support a conclusion as to the fruitfulness of this resource, the fact of its small use by R, and the decided lack of interest encountered among the research branches, causes us to feel that a better organized exploration of its potentialities should be made.

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- An appraisal of the periodic reporting guides and the report evaluations now prepared by the branches and transmitted by IAD should be undertaken, with the view to extending their coverage and utility.
- A periodic appraisal of the adequacy of reporting by posts should be conducted by the branches under the sponsorship of the Requirements Planning Coordinator. These evaluations, similar in content to past excellent but limited efforts, should be transmitted to the cognizant Bureaus by the Coordinator, whose task it should be to work with appropriate Bureau officials in strengthening weaknesses revealed.
- The present program regarding Foreign Service relations, now lodged in R/ES, should be continued under the direction of the Requirements Planning Coordinator.
- An effort should be made to secure the designation at each major post of a person responsible for specific attention to, and coordination of, publications procurement.

Summary of Recommendations
Concerning Planning and Control

1. Devote attention to production planning and control which is as vigorous and competent as that now applied to the professional aspects of the work.
2. Install, as quickly as pilot testing has been conducted, a complete production planning and scheduling procedure, as outlined in detail in Appendix G.
3. Develop from the approved work plan a specific man-hour objective and time schedule for each project.
4. Utilize work planning and control data in developing budget presentations and in allocating R's manpower and financial resources.
5. Utilize the approved work plan as a primary basis for the forward planning of raw intelligence requirements in each branch.
6. Delegate to the requirements planning coordinator responsibility for continuing study of new and more productive devices for planning and procuring raw material requirements.

XIV. THREE APPROACHES TO STRONGER ORGANIZATION

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XIV - THREE APPROACHES TO STRONGER ORGANIZATION

The task of managing the R Area is among the most complex which has been encountered in studies of organizations of all types. This results not only from factors of physical size and the diversity of tasks performed, but from phenomena which are present in highly professional environments. These characteristics are worth noting as a preliminary to the discussion which follows:

- First, the R organization is staffed preponderantly by professional personnel - mature minds having a high level of individual competence. Such personnel does not require "management" in the conventional sense of highly structured organization, where the physical flow of work is the most important attribute.
- Second, by the very reason of the individuality of his work habits and the level of his professional competence, the professional naturally resists the regimentation of organization and of a highly routinized atmosphere. This is merely to say that the art of managing professional groups must first allow a maximum of initiative and autonomy to the individual and still find ways in which to regulate the administrative aspects of the work so that they will be conducive to timely and economical performance.
- Third, those who attain positions of management, being themselves professionals, are inclined to disdain the administrative paraphernalia due to the obviously secondary role of such devices in producing the end product.
- Fourth, the techniques of managing professional organizations are perhaps the least developed since the engineers and technicians of management have concentrated their efforts on the more obvious and solvable problems of large industrial and office-type operations.

With this background of understanding, it must be observed that the top management of the R Area has achieved remarkable results in maintaining an esprit de corps and a quality of production of which

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more readily managed enterprises, either in government or outside, would be justly proud.

A - EVIDENCES OF THE NEED FOR STRONGER ORGANIZATION

Revisions which have been found desirable in the R organization are concerned only in minor degree with questions of organization structure. The hard core of the organization - represented by its nine divisions and their component branches - is considered sound and logical. Shifting and regrouping of functions within this basic framework will take place from time to time, but these are adjustments of a routine character which internal management is usually more competent to prescribe than management analysts. They represent, with few exceptions, areas of small consequence in this inquiry. The locale of this discussion is thus in the upper reaches of the organization, where the issues to be resolved revolve around the objectives and functions of individual executives. In essence, then, we are concerned with the matters to which the executives devote their time, and with the relative priority which has been attached to the individual duties performed. The basic findings of this report reveal a series of needs to which insufficient priority is now attached:

- The need to improve consumer relations. This is revealed dramatically through our interviews with 224 departmental customers, and through more limited contacts in outside agencies which are users of R's products (CIA, Military, PSB, etc.). The opportunities for improved service are impressive in every Bureau.

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R's management team currently provides no central executive to devote continuing attention to this vital aspect of top management.

- The need to improve the "presentation" and distribution of R's products. Closely related to the first need is that for more firsthand study of techniques through which the readability of the product can be increased, and its utilization improved through more accurate distribution and security classification practices.
- The need to improve the use of the time and skills of professional staff. The branch level, as the basic producing organization, requires an intensity of current scrutiny by top management comparable to that which production management in an industrial concern maintains over its plant and key production facilities. This means frequent contacts by firsthand observation of operations and the "operators." Due to the absence of such participation by top management, conditions now exist which unnecessarily dissipate the time and energies of the professional staff. In view of the scarcity of trained analytical skill, such conditions should not be tolerated. It must be constantly recalled by top management that were it not for its professional staff, R itself could not exist.
- The need for workable techniques of work planning, production scheduling and control. With the exception of the top priority program and the NIS (where strong compulsion of an external nature exists) formal procedures of planning, scheduling, and controlling output have not been devised. In this sphere of management there has been an obvious restraint, due perhaps to an unwillingness to "interfere" in the operations of the branches, or to impose controls which might cause irritation or which might result in meaningless and time-consuming routines. Controls in the professional atmosphere are necessarily dependent upon unusual judgment, imagination, and versatility of administration. They require time and exceptional ingenuity to apply. The present management organization does not make such time available. The absence of production controls is the principal contributing factor in the tardiness of R's work, and underlies many of the complaints voiced by consumers, analysts, management officials in R and budget executives.

These points are developed at length and with documentation in Volume I of this report and in the applicable chapters of Volume II (especially Chapters II, III, IV, V, VII, VIII, IX, XII and XIII).

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B - THE CAUSES OF THE PROBLEM

Before attempting to prescribe the steps believed necessary to satisfy the foregoing needs, it is advisable to inquire more deeply into the conditions which permit these needs to go unanswered in the present organization. The specific conditions cited are obviously symptoms of basic weaknesses in R's present approach to, and philosophy of, top management. Fundamentally, we believe that there are three root causes of the problem.

1. The Role of Staff Executives Has Not Been Given Full Recognition in the Top Management Organization.

Upon analysis it has been found that the tasks of top management in the R Area are of four types, two of which must be exercised by line command, and two of which are staff in nature:

- Policy Management (line) is that direction which must flow from the Special Assistant based upon his continuing personal contacts with the principal policy officials of the Department of State and the IAC agencies. It is the prerogative and responsibility of those responsible for policy direction to specify, in broad terms, what is to be done, for whom, and in what general order of priority, thus setting the objectives and defining the mission of the organization.
- Professional Management (line) is that direction which dictates the specific content of work to be undertaken, decides when, how, and by whom it shall be accomplished, and apprises how well the professional task is performed. It must be the prerogative of professional management to govern completely the selection of professional staff and their assignments. It is only this level of management which can exercise final approval over the specific nature, and priority of performance, of individual products and services.

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- Control Management (staff) means the planning and introduction of techniques required to develop meaningful work plans; estimates of man-hours required for the completion of individual projects; calendar date completion schedules; standards for the presentation and distribution of products; procedures for the forward planning of raw material requirements; and constructive plans for the exploitation and cultivation of raw material sources (including foreign posts and external research). Control Management is generally concerned with how useful is the product, and how adequately are R's resources being employed in relation to the demand for and use of its products and services. It must be the prerogative of Control Management to develop and test techniques and procedures, and, after their approval by policy and professional management, to conduct continuing study of their use, to ascertain their workability and evaluate the adequacy of compliance of working level supervisors. It must also be the responsibility of Control Management to ascertain, by appropriate survey, the usefulness of R's products, and to search out means of improving their usefulness. It is not, however, within the prerogative of Control Management to make or control decisions regarding the content of the work program or to appraise the quality of workmanship beyond its form and style.
- Services Management (staff) means the administration of all of those functions which support the research function, as well as those which support policy and operating officials elsewhere in the Department and outside of the Department. It is not only the obligation of Services Management to administer the service operations themselves in the full line sense, but also to take leadership in identifying ways in which support services can render more valuable and time-conserving support to the research divisions. These services include those concerned with (1) intelligence acquisition and distribution, including publications, (2) library and reference services, (3) executive-type services including budget, personnel, reproduction, and general housekeeping.

A study of R's top structure reveals that Policy Management and Professional Management are the most strongly implemented, although there are opportunities for stronger relationships with top policy officials, and leaders in the Community, with respect to planning and assessing the major program of research and estimates.

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It is in the area of functions performed by the so-called staff executives that weakness is encountered,

a. Control Management in the regular program area is not formally applied. The staff which is presumably responsible (PCS) lacks stature, support, and acceptance. As a consequence there does not exist a current record of all research work in progress, nor do the branches themselves have up-to-date facts available regarding the status of individual projects, or the time required to complete them. Forward planning is accomplished primarily through the informal device of the "branch chief's memory."

In the case of the NIS program the machinery of control has been highly developed under the compulsion of an external agency, however, follow-through suffers from lack of line management support and the inability of the NIS Coordinator to insist upon compliance with schedules.

b. Services Management, while completely covered in the top structure, suffers from two handicaps: (1) responsibility is divided among three staff executives (R/ES, OLI and PCS), (2) since these efforts do not receive complete support and acceptance at the level of the research branch, they tend to function (in varying degrees) more as "ends in themselves" rather than in intimate support of the end-producers. Our intensive interviews with research analysts divulged the fact that contacts with the services area are remote, and that

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there is insufficient recognition of their mission as providers of direct support. Similarly, the administrative officers within the divisions tend to move in a very restricted management sphere being identified more with the "red-tape" aspects of governmental administration than with their role as contributors to the essential work program of the branches.

In summary, then, it has been found that line management (policy and professional) has not recognized sufficiently the vital part which staff management (control and services) should play, and has placed those responsible for control and service in positions which deprive them of proper standing and acceptance. This results in an underutilization of the capacity of those occupying top staff positions and reduces their contribution to the full utilization of the professional staff. If this situation is allowed to continue, it may cause a progressive deterioration in the vigor of these functions.

2. The Impact of Both Line and Staff Management is Weakened by the Loose-Knit Structure of Top Management, and by the Excessive Demands of Duties Other Than Those Concerned with Supervision of Subordinates.

Our analysis of the daily diaries kept by key executives for one week* reveals the paucity of time available for the conventional management task of working directly with subordinates. It was found that on an average no more than 20 percent of total executive effort is assignable to this participation. In the case of the two top

*While one week represents a brief test period, the principal finding cited has been confirmed with the executives concerned as being an important lack in the present organization.

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executives, even this time must be spread thinly over special management matters in the "front office" not directly associated with the administration of the three office Directors. It was next found that the most important Office Director (OIR) is overburdened with 14 direct reporting relationships, all of which are producing functions, and that his calendar currently leaves little time available for that phase of management described above as Control Management. It was found that the demands which consume his time are largely in the phase described as Professional Management.

The Director of R/ES exercises his impact largely at the Office level except as his line of communication with administrative officers gives him an entre into the divisions. Since, however, the administrative officer tends to operate in a circumscribed sphere, this line of communication becomes rather tenuous at the branch level.

The Director of OLI finds himself in a somewhat more fortunate position in top management in that he has three manageable and well-supervised divisions reporting to him, none of whose work programs approaches the complexity of those found in OIR. However, his impact at the "end-production level" - the research branch - is also less than desirable because his divisions do not enjoy uniform acceptance among the research branches.

The reality of the above comments can only be appreciated by an outsider who has enjoyed the unique opportunity afforded us of

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developing an intimate acquaintanceship with the key personnel of the branch organizations.

3. The Channels of Communication Among R's Top Management Do Not Stimulate a Collective Awareness of Current Problems or Compel Attention and Action.

As indicated in Volume I (pages 28 and 29) every component of the top management structure can make a broader or more effective contribution to R's basic work program. Particular attention is called in Volume I to nine components:

- The Special Assistant's Office
- The Director, R/ES and Staff
- The Director, OIR
- The Director, OLI
- The Estimates Group
- The NIS Coordinator
- The Coordinator of Psychological Intelligence
- The External Research Staff
- The Production Control Staff.

None of the comments cited in this inventory are new since each was called to our attention by one or more members of the top management team. However, a long-range program of actions to take advantage of these opportunities was not found. The reasons for this seeming omission became apparent when the top management structure is observed at close range:

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- There is missing in the top echelon a "firm hand" with time and opportunity to keep intimately but objectively informed of the strengths and weaknesses at the Office level and below. The physical separation of the Special Assistant and his Deputy from SA-1 creates a break in the channel of communications which weakens the intensity of Policy Management and in large measure places the "front office" on a rather remote pinnacle. To a lesser but none the less distinct degree, the sixth floor of SA-1, where the Office Directors are concentrated, has a similar aura in the eyes of the divisions and branches.
- Devices of communication have not been perfected to overcome the factors of distance and separateness. The two weekly staff meetings and the reports to R appear to serve more to inform the Special Assistant, and perhaps to reassure him that "all is well," than to cast up problems of which top management should have knowledge in order to plan and direct corrective action.
- Despite the harmony and democratic "partnership atmosphere" in R top management, there is too little challenging of policies and practices, too little of the sharp "intramural" debate over better methods of management which fosters improvement in the successful business partnership. The avoidance of the possible conflicts which a forthright policy of self-improvement might engender is an incongruity in the philosophy which the R Area brings to its substantive tasks. Here there is no lack of articulation in challenging the validity of facts and in taking sharp issue with conclusions which appear incomplete or inaccurate.

Thus, as fundamental as any of the causes of R's organizational problems is the absence of a philosophy which compels continuing self-appraisal, designed to give forceful recognition to current problems and to seek out sound and sufficient correctives. These observations can be made in greater or lesser degree of the majority of organized groups. One is caused to make them with greater emphasis regarding R because this organization has so abundantly, within itself, the competence to achieve and maintain a superiority of performance not expected of the average.

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In reviewing the steps which can be taken to strengthen the organization of R to overcome the problems presented, three types of improvement have been found worthy of consideration: First, strengthened Control Management; second, strengthened Services Management; third, maximum participation of all management elements. Each of these approaches is considered separately in the following:

FIRST APPROACH:
STEPS TO STRENGTHEN CONTROL MANAGEMENT

The greatest immediate benefits to the R Area, and its customers, will result from a series of simple steps leading to the introduction of the machinery of control and to its diligent application by the best-qualified members of management who can be made available for these tasks. At the outset, and for a period of one to two years, it will be necessary to apply top substantive talent to these tasks, because they will involve acts of creativeness beyond the ken of those who have not demonstrated their prowess as substantive producers, and because there is a deep-seated skepticism, and resulting inertia, due to past failures in the application of controls.

Five principal steps are recommended:

1. Strengthen the Estimates Group as the Top Program and Quality Control Arm of the Director of Intelligence Research.

The Professional Management side of R's structure has been found strong and effective, with no dearth of attention to quality control from the Office Director himself to the branch chief level. Several refinements have been identified which, it is felt, will contribute

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still greater strength to the excellent performance of the Estimates Group:

a. Appoint all of those who serve in the capacity of "Intelligence Consultants" to membership on the Estimates Group, as discussed in Chapter II. This will include all present division chiefs, plus the consultants designated for the functional areas, (S/P, E, P, IIA, TCA). This additional function of the substantive leaders of the R Area should bring to the Estimates Group much more direct, current, and authentic knowledge of top policy views and intelligence needs.

b. Devote one meeting period of the Estimates Group each week to review and discussion of a branch work plan as described in Chapter XIII. We agree wholeheartedly with the view of the Director, OIR, that "planning is a live thing that must feed continuously on operation, and distill continuously from the minds of active staff practitioners, not from sideline staff observers." We thus urge that each work plan, as developed by the branch and division chiefs immediately concerned, be brought before the full EG - which for this purpose will convert itself into a "Program Review Group" - so that the experience of the complete corps of "active staff practitioners" can be applied with intensity to the formulation of the work program of each branch. This additional use of the EG should involve

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little if any more effort by the division chiefs as participants on the EG, and it should in no way approach the establishment of a "think-box" remote from operations.

c. Assign the Current Intelligence Coordinator to the Estimates Group, for the reasons discussed in Chapter VI. Since this is a substantive control which should exercise stronger, rather than less, leadership and coordination of current intelligence production, its stature should be substantially enhanced by inclusion as a component function of the EG. This does not mean that current intelligence products should individually be reviewed and discussed by the assembled staff of the EG, but rather that the EG now will become a staff with more than one vehicle of action: the assembled group for program review and estimates production; the Current Intelligence Coordinator as an individual coordinator of this particular phase of production. It would appear logical and desirable for the Coordinator to participate with the assembled group during its review of the branch work plans.

d. Consider the establishment of a new staff function on the Estimates Group to be performed by an "Intelligence Evaluation Officer." This Officer would devote his principal efforts* to testing the accuracy of R's estimates, projections and major interpretations

*It is difficult to foretell the time required to perform this function. However, it is not considered to require a full-time incumbent on a continuing basis. This might be an additional responsibility of the EG Secretary and the Current Intelligence Coordinator.

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from a "hindsight" point of view, and to reporting his findings to the assembled EG from time to time. In this manner R can constantly look for errors of interpretation and judgment in its most important products and profit by the lessons of experience.

e. As a final step in strengthening participation of the EG, consideration is suggested to creating the post of "Vice Chairman" whose duties would include those of Deputy Director, OIR, and Intelligence Consultant to the S/P. This combination of duties would, it is believed, achieve a more realistic and productive assignment of responsibilities than that which now prevails.

2. Establish a New Staff, Supplanting PCS, to Develop Techniques and Procedures for Work Planning and Scheduling, and to Keep Their Functioning Under Continuing Scrutiny.

Control Management in an organization such as R is weak because practical mechanics of planning, scheduling, and progress reporting have not been perfected in professional organizations generally, nor in many industrial operations where the end-product is custom-made (job shop operations often suffer from this same weakness). There is one simple explanation for these failures. The assumption has been made by professional and craft groups that because their skills are unique and personalized, and because so many work variables are present, the adaptation of planning and control techniques, such as those used in production-line operations, is impractical. With the qualification expressed in this assumption (production-line techniques) there can

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be no disagreement, in our experience. However, experience has proved that the assumption in other respects is incorrect, and that the very existence of variables makes a planned approach to research production all the more essential, in order (1) to minimize the impact of these variables on meeting deadlines and on performing the admittedly difficult act of research with a minimum of wasted effort, and (2) to assure that manpower resources are uniformly applied to the important aspects of the program.

The starting point in R for developing a successful plan of Control Management is the creation of mechanics which will make possible the preparation of meaningful plans and schedules by line management. A discussion of the principles and the format of planning mechanics has been presented in Chapter XIII. This chapter (Chapter XIV) is concerned with the contribution that organization can make to this goal. In summary, it is proposed that an integrated staff be created, as illustrated in the accompanying exhibit (XIV-1), consisting of

- The Director of Production Coordination (a position partially represented by the Chief, PCS).
- The Program Planning Coordinator (a position partially represented by the Program Planning Officer of PCS).
- The NIS Coordinator (an existing position).
- The Requirements Planning Coordinator (a function which is present today in partial form in IAD, ERS, and the R/ES Foreign Service Relations Program).

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- The Consumer Relations Coordinator (a position presumably provided among the responsibilities of the Intelligence Advisers).

In more detail, the functions of these top-level staff officers should be as follows:

a. The Program Planning Coordinator working directly with research divisions, will (1) prepare the final formulation of the work-planning procedures outlined in Chapter XIII; (2) maintain a consolidated file of approved work plans in order to prepare comparisons and analyses of the distribution of analyst man-hours by branches and composite statements of surplus and deficit man-hours by branch; (3) receive information copies of the prescribed monthly and quarterly branch performance reports in order to draw observations regarding recurring cases of missed deadlines and inaccurate man-hour estimates; and also to produce consolidated summaries in a form resembling the "Program Reporting Book;" (4) develop yardsticks for the guidance of branches in establishing meaningful man-hour estimates and completion date schedules; (5) devote continuing attention to the mechanics (forms, files, reports) used in planning and scheduling in order to maintain simplicity but assure utility; (6) collaborate with budget officials in planning budget presentations and assist top management in developing plans for the allocation of manpower and financial resources. This Officer should have assistance at least equivalent to that now assigned for the preparation of the Program Reporting Book. It is desirable


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THE STAFF OF THE PRODUCTION COORDINATOR

DEPUTY SPECIAL ASSISTANT

CHANGES PROPOSED IN PRESENT STAFFS

1. Disband PCS and
 - A. Transfer Current Intelligence Coordinator to EG
 - B. Transfer IDR to RIES
 - C. Transfer ticker room to IAD
 - D. Transfer Distribution and Classification Control to Consumer Relations Coordinator.
 - E. Supplant Program Planning Officer by Program Planning Coordinator
2. Disband ERS and
 - A. Transfer Contract Coordination to IAD
 - B. Transfer Index Record to LR
 - C. Transfer promotional work and Development of research projects to Requirements Planning Coordinator.
3. Transfer foreign service relations program from RIES to Requirements Planning Coordinator



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that he be a professionally trained research analyst selected for imagination in the administrative aspects of research production.

b. The NIS Coordinator is the present staff in its entirety. Its present functions, including those of a substantive review and production character, are included as part of the Control Management for two reasons: (1) The primary problem found in the administration of NIS has been continued weakness in production control - missed deadlines, inaccurate man-hour scheduling, and unrealistic completion dates, (2) The substantive aspects of the program appear of minor concern to the Director, OIR, today. If it is concluded by the Special Assistant that the NIS coordination function should remain under line management, it is then proposed that the staff be treated as a production organization and subjected to the same techniques of planning, scheduling, and progress reporting as those developed by the Program Planning Coordinator for other production efforts.

c. The Requirements Planning Coordinator. As discussed in Chapter XIII, the missing element in the present efforts of IAD and ERS is not lack of recognition of the need for planned procurement or failure to assign qualified specialists to the planning task. Rather there does not exist a practical methodology for accomplishing this planning regularly, systematically, and imaginatively. Neither IAD nor R/ES can actually do the planning of requirements in a complete and systematic sense because requirements must flow from the

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research people themselves - the consumers of raw intelligence. But the research people today lack a method of planning and communicating their plans to IAD and ERS. It is the task of the Requirements Planning Coordinator and his staff, working with the research divisions, to devise the methods for filling this gap and seeing that these methods are employed with good results. To accomplish this objective, the Coordinator with the three assistants shown in Exhibit XIV-1 should

- (1) Perfect the procedures explained and issue instructional material to the branches;
- (2) Establish realistic schedules for the preparation of periodic "desiderata lists;"
- (3) Receive information copies of all such lists and study them from the viewpoint of finding new or more adequate sources;
- (4) Study the periodic reporting guides and report evaluations (prepared by the branches and transmitted by IAD) to develop improved guidance techniques;
- (5) Have annual appraisals of the adequacy of reporting by posts developed by the branches, and counsel with Bureaus with respect to action upon these evaluations;
- (6) Continue in its entirety the present Foreign Service Relations Program now lodged in R/ES;
- (7) Assume that portion of the responsibility of ERS (the function of the Chief himself) which is concerned with cultivating sources, giving guidance to external sources and (most important potentially) finding ways of exploiting external research for direct use in the research program of the R Area. The remaining functions of ERS

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should be assigned to IAD (contract coordination) and LR (index of research projects and correspondence related thereto).*

d. The Consumer Relations Coordinator is a new staff officer whose various functions have been suggested in Chapters I, II, III, IV, V and VII. This officer, supported by a Classification Control Officer, a Distribution Review Officer, and an Editorial Standards Officer would perform the following essential functions:

- (1) Conduct periodic interviews with a cross-section of R's customers to secure their reactions to the quality, timeliness, and sufficiency of R's products and services;
- (2) Prepare reports of findings from these studies, and work with line management at all levels in taking steps to overcome complaints or improve the use of services;
- (3) Plan programs of user indoctrination and assist in their administration;
- (4) Develop style and format standards and conduct training to improve the "reading ease" factor, appearance, and reference utility of R's written products;
- (5) Promulgate instructions stating standards for the security classification of reports; review, at least by post audit, the security classification of reports; and conduct a periodic review and revision audit of report classification;
- (6) Work with outside agencies on security classification matters;

*During this study it was found that a current conflict in the cultivation of outside research sources has been encountered between ERS and the Division of Historical Policy Research (RE). The tasks of R and RE are so distinct as to present no worthwhile basis of integrating them organizationally. However, careful correlation of their mutual contacts with universities, foundations, etc., must be maintained to avoid confusion on the part of such outside organizations, and embarrassment to the Department.

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- (7) Maintain continuing inspection of distribution policies (limited, normal, and general) and distribution lists, including a periodic audit of the lists established for serial publications;
- (8) Work with Bureau Executive Directors in assuring accurate and timely distribution of R's products.

The Consumer Relations Coordinator should be a thoroughly trained R executive with a talent for consumer relations contacts and a keen sense of "merchandising" as applied to research products.

e. The Director of Production Coordination should be a top executive of Office Director calibre who will bring comprehensive and creative leadership to the full range of staff functions described above. He must also be a respected graduate of the OIR organization with unquestioned acceptance among division and branch chiefs. His time should be apportioned equally among the four Coordinators at the outset, but should include two regular additional duties:

- (1) Attendance at the weekly EG meeting which considers the branch work plan, to act as an auditor (not as a producer or approver of the plan) in order that he may secure continuing insight into the adequacy of the techniques and the methodology developed by the four Coordinators, as well as to report to the EG the findings and recommendations which grow out of the continuing studies of the four Coordinators;
- (2) Regular meetings with each Assistant Division Chief for Production (discussed later) and the four Coordinators, to examine in detail the application of planning, scheduling, and progress reporting techniques in each branch for which the Assistant Chief is responsible. (BI should be treated as one of the research divisions)

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for this purpose after the control program is in successful operation in the present OIR divisions).

3. Establish in Each Division An Assistant Chief (Production) to Concentrate Upon All Aspects of Control Management.

The Directors of OIR and R/ES have for some time recognized the importance of appointing in each division an Assistant Chief for "planning and control." Lack of funds is reported to have prevented the establishment of these posts at an earlier date. There is no reservation in our thinking regarding the importance of filling these positions. However, to create these openings in the absence of methodology based on tested techniques - such as those to be developed by the staff described above - would create a vacuum to which would doubtless flow an assortment of duties of a quality control and production nature. Furthermore, it has been found that the requirements in each division differ at this time, some requiring an additional position, others having the position already available and filled. It is therefore proposed that these positions be activated concurrently with, or shortly after, the implementation of the program of the Director of Production Coordination, as follows:

a. The duties of the Assistant Chief (Production) should parallel in every respect those of the Director of Production Coordination, with one important exception:

Instead of being responsible for methodology, the Assistant Chief should have line responsibility, by delegation from the

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division chief, for the actual application of work planning, requirements planning, scheduling, and progress reporting. There should be lodged under his direction the division NIS Coordinator and the Division Editor. He should also collaborate with the Consumer Relations Coordinator in preparing materials (kits, project lists) for consumer reaction surveys, and in following through on the findings of these studies.

b. The philosophy of operation employed by the Assistant Chief (Production) should be that of assisting the branch chiefs in accomplishing Control Management, rather than that of sitting in the position of a superior executive. In fact, this position should be viewed as being coordinate in rank with the position of branch chief. To firmly establish this fact, it should be the objective to rotate branch chiefs in the position of Assistant Chief (Production) at intervals of approximately 1 year*, except in those cases where an incumbent prefers a longer tour in this capacity. Furthermore, service as Assistant Chief should not be considered as preferred experience over branch chief service in selecting future division chiefs.

c. The Assistant Chief (Production) should be completely responsible to his division chief, and look to the Director of Production Coordination only for guidance in carrying out planning and control procedures which the division chief himself is obligated to apply at the direction of the Director of Intelligence Research.

* The practicability of rotation will, of course, depend upon the availability of an acting replacement for the branch chief during his tour as Assistant Chief. This rotation principle will offer an important technique of executive development both for the Assistant Chief and the acting branch chief.

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d. At the outset, the following actions are considered necessary to create the position of Assistant Chief (Production):

- In DRA designate a full-time Assistant Chief to fill this requirement.
- In DRF appoint an Assistant Chief (Production) to support the present Associate Chief who is performing most of the duties of a division chief.
- In DRN an authorized vacancy apparently does not exist for an Assistant Chief.
- In DRS it may be found necessary to create a new post since the present Assistant Chief shares substantially in the duties of the Chief. If this is found necessary, it is suggested that consideration be given to constituting a position which encompasses, under an Assistant Chief (Production), both the Control Management responsibilities of the Division and the Services Management responsibilities of its administrative Officer.*
- In DRW a revision in chiefship should be considered which would transfer the present Chief to the suggested role of Vice Chairman of the Estimates Group and replace him by a full-time Division Chief. When this is done the position of Assistant Chief should become that of Assistant Chief (Production).
- In DFI the present Staff Assistant, a GS-13 who likewise functions as Administrative Officer, is considered competent to assume the role of Assistant Chief (Production). This role in DFI may be of lesser complexity due to the heavy coordinating responsibilities of this division in contrast to research production.
- In BI the Chief of Functional Services Unit is performing most of the duties which in research divisions would be the responsibility of the Assistant Chief (Production).

*As suggested later, this device should be given consideration in any situation where the Assistant Chief is interested in and competent to give leadership to Services Management.

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4. Place Functional Coordinators in the Division of Functional Intelligence.

In realigning staff functions now directly responsible to the Director, OIR, it is proposed that those concerned with interdivisional coordination be lodged administratively in DFI. This move is believed to be in keeping with the essential role of DFI and would achieve a more realistic administrative arrangement, inasmuch as the Director, OIR, is unable to provide adequate supervision to these functions which in themselves are substantive producers. The following would be transferred to DFI: The CPI staff, the Special Assistant for Central Asia Committee, the Special Assistant for Sociological Affairs, the Geographer*, and such future staffs as may be established in connection with TCA and EDAC. It should be noted that, in the case of the CPI and of such others who may be designated as Intelligence Consultants, each will in addition hold membership on the Estimates Group.

5. Eliminate Divisional Coordinators of Current Intelligence and Support Programs by Designating Analysts with Primary Responsibility in Each Branch.

As discussed in Chapters VI and XVI, more effective participation by the Current Intelligence Officers can be achieved if their role is reconceived as carrying responsibility for document-flow control. It has already been proposed that the divisional Current Intelligence

*GE has the least important relation to the R Area of all of the components of the present organization. Its total removal from R would present no problems. However, the scope of this study does not permit us to propose a more suitable location for GE elsewhere in the Departmental structure.

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Officer be superseded by a designated senior analyst in each branch who will assume primary responsibility on behalf of the branch for the identification of current intelligence topics and the production of current intelligence papers under daily leadership from the Coordinator assigned to the Estimates Group Staff. It has also been suggested that this branch Current Intelligence Officer perform the initial substantive review of the total daily take of current documents, in order to minimize the review time of other analysts.

In addition to these two steps, it is suggested that a designated analyst assume coordinating responsibility, where this is desirable at the branch level, in connection with support programs. For example, in the case of present IIA support, it may be practicable for the proposed Current Intelligence Officer to serve as branch IIA support officer. (Or this task may justify a separate branch officer where the total program in connection with psychological intelligence is of such magnitude.) This is in keeping with the recommendation in Chapter IX that specialized tasks be concentrated, to the maximum possible extent, in order to prevent dispersing such efforts among all analysts, and to reduce further the interruptions which analysts now experience.

SECOND APPROACH:
STEPS TO STRENGTHEN SERVICES
MANAGEMENT

The second approach to improved utilization of top management talents comprises those steps which will achieve a more vital

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contribution of the services of IAD, LR, and R/ES to the end-producers in research branches. Three steps are proposed as follows:

1. Create an Integrated "Office of Intelligence Services" to Administer All Functions Which Provide Supporting Service to the Research Organization, to the State Department, and to Other IAC Agencies.

It is our conclusion that while the functions assigned to the Director, Executive Staff, and the Director, OLI, profit from the skill and competence possessed by present incumbents, still greater benefits to R would result from single administration of the entire group of functions by a strong management team. Either of the functions taken separately is obviously of lesser stature than that of the Director, OIR, who alone is responsible for two thirds of R's personnel and for all of its research production with the exception of BI. An amalgamation of OLI and R/ES would go far toward correcting this imbalance in respect to the general magnitude of management responsibilities.

It should be stressed that the practicability of this combination resides in the fact that the essential skill needed in both jobs is one of administering office-type operations, with special ability in those fields of administrative management which are concerned with matters of personnel administration, budget administration, methods and procedures, and general office management.

2. Establish Four Divisions Within the Office of Intelligence Services, Transferring BI to the Director of Intelligence Research.

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The components of the proposed office, as illustrated on page 67 of Volume I, should be as follows:

a. An integrated Publications Division to assume full responsibility for the procurement (by gift, exchange, or purchase), receipt, check-in, and distribution of all books and publications. This Division, described in Chapter XVII, will be composed of the present Civilian Agencies Branch of IAD and the Selection and Records Section of LR. The combination has been found desirable to secure closer control over procurement and faster completion of distribution, as well as to eliminate duplication equivalent to approximately 7 positions. A separate Division has been found advisable since both IAD and LR are served by its operations.

b. The Intelligence Acquisition and Distribution Division whose functions will remain the same as the present IAD except for the removal of CAB. It should be noted that the Requirements Planning Staff of IAD will remain intact, but that its effectiveness should be increased through the results produced by the planning procedures designed, and tested by the Requirements Planning Coordinator. Thus, IAD will continue to supervise the preparation and transmission of periodic reporting guides as well as the requirements coordination functions exercised through its CIA and Military Liaison Branches. It will assume the Contract Coordinating Function for the Department of State now lodged in ERS, and in the future will assume contract administration for such regular

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programs of external research as may be developed through the developmental efforts of the Requirements Planning Coordinator.

The distinction which should exist between the IAD acquisition planning responsibilities and the functions of the Requirements Planning Coordinator is:

The Requirements Planning Coordinator should pioneer and experiment with new programs and techniques, turning them over to IAD for administration if, and as soon as, they have proved successful as regular acquisition procedures. Use of external research as an established means of securing usable raw research product is still in the pioneering stage for the R Area. Thus, unless and until regular usage of a particular source or type of external research has been established, the full program should remain the responsibility of the Requirements Planning Coordinator.

c. The Division of Library and Reference Services will perform the functions of the present LR Division with the exception of the procurement and distribution function recommended for transfer to the new Publications Division. However, as recommended in Chapter III, LR should take the initiative in producing a more suitable bibliographic approach to R's products and principal holdings, through the medium of "tailored bibliographies." It is further suggested in Chapter III that the Chief of LR undertake firsthand study of the reference needs of Bureau offices, in order to identify means of expanding LR's reference services, with corresponding relief to those research analysts who are now called upon by the Bureaus for fact servicing of a character which LR is competent to handle. Finally, it has been concluded that the maintenance of the card index of external research projects, now lodged in ERS, could

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be as appropriately handled in LR, including correspondence related thereto.

d. The Division of Executive Services would perform all of the functions of the present Executive Staff, with the single exception of the Foreign Service Relations Program which is considered more closely allied with the functions of the proposed Requirements Planning Coordinator. Three additional efforts have been recommended for this Division:

- (1) The conduct of the "Personnel Requirements Analysis" outlined in Chapter IX, as a basis for the proper introduction of research aides;
- (2) The planning and administration of programs of professional development and executive development outlined in Chapter XI;
- (3) The planning and administration of a thorough-going records management program, outlined in Chapter XIX.

Implementation of these new efforts will require strengthening of the present management staff, the designation of a Training Coordinator, and the designation of a Records Management Officer.

Among these functions it appears illogical to include the Division of Biographic Intelligence since this Division is a primary producer of written products and services for the same customers served by the OIR Divisions. BI is likewise a recipient of the support services, just as are other research divisions, and should benefit from the application of planning, scheduling and reporting techniques similar in principle,

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if not in exact form, to those devised for the research divisions. It is felt that the tendency to maintain BI under the jurisdiction of OLI may be based more upon supporting the "office" status of OLI than upon the nature of the work performed. Significant opinion was found among analysts in both BI and OIR that organizational proximity to the research divisions would improve the status of BI, and perhaps open broader opportunities for the promotion of BI analyst personnel. We are firm in the belief, however, that any merger of BI functions with research branches would prove deleterious to biographic production, add a burden to present branch chiefs, and make more difficult the achievement of economies such as those discussed in Chapter XV.

3. Revise the Functions of the Administrative Officer in Each Division to Those of a Full Counterpart of the Office of Intelligence Services.

There now exists in the divisions a corps of staff officers who are primarily responsible for the range of functions performed or coordinated by R/ES. In OIR Divisions these positions are graded at GS-11, except in DFI where a position at GS-13 (Staff Assistant) has been established. In OLI Divisions the positions are graded at GS-7, except in LR where a GS-9 position is established.

As previously noted, the Administrative Officer in the research divisions has been restricted to a rather narrow sphere. With the establishment of the integrated Office of Intelligence Services, it is felt that an improvement in the scope and contribution of these positions

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should become possible, in the following respects:

a. The Administrative Office should, under the line supervision of the Division Chief, assume responsibility and initiative for seeing that all supporting services (Publications, IAD, LR and Executive) are provided effectively, and in accordance with the needs of individual branches and sections.

b. This will involve not only the conventional budget administration, personnel administration, filing, typing, record keeping and housekeeping services, but in addition:

- (1) The utilization of library and reference services,
- (2) The administration of the "Reference Service Unit" for the division,
- (3) The transmission and follow-up of publication orders and requests,
- (4) The collaboration with IAD in the development of work flow procedures affecting both the transmission of requests to IAD direct from the branches, and the physical receipt and transmission of materials within the division.

c. With respect to the expanded program of executive services within the division, the Administrative Officer should collaborate in:

- (1) The "Personnel Requirements Analysis" leading to the introduction of research aides, outlined in Chapter IX,
- (2) The training coordination effort outlined in Chapter XI,
- (3) The installation of improved office facilities and dictating equipment, outlined in Chapter XII,

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- (4) The records management program outlined in Chapter XIX.

As suggested in an earlier recommendation, the functions of the Administrative Officer may be placed under the Assistant Chief (Production) in any case where (1) the Assistant Chief has an interest in and competence to provide leadership to this function, or (2) the Administrative Officer, as in DFI, is in fact of a grade and calibre to provide leadership to the planning and control program.

THIRD APPROACH
STEPS REQUIRED TO SECURE MAXIMUM PARTICI-
PATION OF ALL MANAGEMENT ELEMENTS: POLICY,
PROFESSIONAL, CONTROL AND SERVICES.

As illustrated on page 65 of Volume I, the steps proposed to strengthen Control Management and Services Management can be taken without change in the present participation of the Special Assistant and the Deputy Special Assistant. Under the simplest concept, the Production Coordination Staff could be created under a Deputy to the Director, OIR. Similarly, the Office of Intelligence Services could be created as an arm of the Director, OIR. Neither of these arrangements is considered a sensible distribution of the top management load since (1) they might substantially impair the ability of the Director, OIR, to capitalize his highest skills which lie clearly in the realm of Professional Management as defined earlier; and (2) despite the best intentions of the Director, OIR, under such

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an arrangement, he would be unable to provide the time and leadership which these two major staff arms must have if they are to "pay their way" in the R Area. Recognition of this fact has led us to the conclusion that the following steps should be taken to perfect the organization of R's top management:

1. Establish the Deputy Special Assistant as a Fully Functioning Over-All Manager of the R Area.

If the present loose-knit character of top management is to be overcome and a "firm hand" be applied from the top echelon, regular personal participation by the Special Assistant or his Deputy is essential. It is therefore proposed that the arrangement of duties in the "front Office" be so revised that the Deputy Special Assistant can regularly spend an average of 50 percent of his time giving personal supervision to the work of the three Office Directors. To this end:

- a. The Deputy Special Assistant should have an office in SA-1 to be occupied by him for a regular period each day.
- b. He should plan to hold daily consultations with the Office Directors, and from time to time with their immediate staffs.
- c. He should be a regular participant at the EG meeting which considers branch work plans.
- d. He should exercise, on behalf of the Special Assistant, final approval of all work plans, as provided in Chapter XIII.

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e. He should make, as delegated by the Special Assistant, final determinations regarding the distribution of R's manpower and financial resources, taking into account approved work plans and recommendations of the Office Directors.

2. Revise the Present System of Meetings, Reports and Instructions to Reflect the Organization and Control Programs Previously Outlined.

With the full implementation of the proposals in this and the preceding chapter, the two weekly staff meetings of the Special Assistant, the biweekly and monthly reports and the Program Reporting Book should be replaced by the following recommended basic plan of communication:

a. The biweekly and monthly reports for the attention of the Special Assistant and his Deputy should be superseded by a consolidation and analysis of the status reports submitted to the Program Planning Coordinator (monthly and quarterly). This compilation should be accompanied by a clearly-worded, well-documented interpretation of strengths and weaknesses in the time and man-hour cost performance of each branch.

b. Quarterly, or twice yearly, each division chief should prepare for the record a narrative summary of production and accomplishments, to serve as an item of historical interest and to provide supporting material for budget justifications. At the same intervals, the EG should render a report of its production and a "hindsight" evaluation of the accuracy of current intelligence and estimates.

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c. Directives and instructions, other than special manuals and guides, should be integrated into a single "R Instruction Manual." Local division or branch instructions should be included as a supplement to this manual after clearance by the Division of Executive Services, which should have responsibility for the preparation and maintenance of the manual.

d. The regular weekly meetings should be superseded by the daily consultations between the Deputy Special Assistant and the Office Directors. This is considered desirable in order to provide a maximum delegation of authority-to-act to the Deputy Special Assistant, and to avoid the meaningless routine which sometimes sets in when regularly scheduled meetings, primarily informational in character, are provided. In lieu of this practice, the following suggestions are offered:

- (1) The Special Assistant should make frequent opportunities for joining the Deputy Special Assistant in his daily consultations, and no less often than monthly attend the weekly meeting of the EG at which a branch work plan is discussed.
- (2) At intervals of approximately once each month a dinner meeting of all branch and division chiefs with the Office Directors, the Special Assistant and his Deputy should prove a profitable means of bringing the entire management group together for fellowship and discussion of a topic of mutual interest.
- (3) The program of inspirational guidance to senior analysts, involving approximately 30 minutes each week of the time of top executives, should be instituted as proposed in Chapter XI.

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- (4) Individual ad hoc consultations between R executives and the Special Assistant should be continued as specific need dictates.

3. Renew Efforts to Strengthen the Teamwork on Intelligence Research Planning at the Top Policy Level in the Department and Among Leaders of the IAC Agencies.

Our study of the NSC Directives, supplemented by brief conversations with leaders in the Intelligence Community, has raised three basic questions regarding State Department's role in the Community:

- Should the Department take more active steps to exercise coordination and provide leadership in the fields of its dominant interests?
- Should the Department seek more guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence with particular emphasis upon assessing the adequacy of its production in relation to Departmental and national needs?
- Should more satisfactory means of securing guidance to R be provided by the Department's top officials including the Counsellor, the Deputy Under Secretary (G), the Director, Policy Planning Staff, and the Assistant Secretaries?

It is recognized that formalistic approaches to the cultivation of top level guidances often prove unproductive and possess the faults of routine committee-type activities. It is felt, however, that from time to time benefits would accrue, as discussed in Chapter II, from calling meetings of such groups for the purpose of discussing a well-prepared staff paper which (1) outlines the forward research program, and (2) poses a series of challenging questions to elicit guidance-thinking from such officials.

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Summary of Recommendations Concerning
Organization

1. Strengthen the Estimates Group as the top program and quality control arm of the Director of Intelligence Research.
2. Establish a new staff, supplanting PCS, to develop techniques for work planning and scheduling and to keep their functioning under continuing scrutiny.
3. Establish in each division an Assistant Chief (Production) to concentrate on all aspects of Control Management.
4. Place functional coordinators in the Division of Functional Intelligence.
5. Eliminate Divisional Coordinators of Current Intelligence and IIA support by designating a single analyst with primary responsibility for these functions in each branch.
6. Create an integrated Office of Intelligence Services to administer all functions which provide supporting service to the research organization, to the State Department, and to other IAC agencies.
7. Establish four divisions within the Office of Intelligence Services, transferring BI to the Director of Intelligence Research.
8. Revise the functions of the administrative officer in each division to those of a full counterpart of the Office of Intelligence Services.
9. Establish the Deputy Special Assistant as a fully-functioning, over-all manager of the R Area.
10. Revise the present system of meetings, reports, and instructions to reflect the organization and control proposals previously outlined.
11. Renew efforts to strengthen the teamwork on intelligence research planning at the top policy levels in the Department and among leaders of the IAC agencies.

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XV. PROCESSING OF BIOGRAPHIC DATA

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XV - THE PROCESSING OF BIOGRAPHIC DATA

BI's mission is to provide intelligence information on foreign personalities to meet the needs of the State Department and to fulfill its role in the Intelligence Community.

Two principal functions result in order to fulfill this basic objective. The first is to acquire, process, and maintain a collection of information on all foreigners of current or potential significance in political, cultural, and sociological fields. The second is to produce and disseminate evaluated biographic intelligence to the Department of State, Foreign Service, CIA, and other agencies of the Government.

1. Organization to Process Biographic Data.

To carry out its responsibility, BI is organized, as shown on Exhibit XV-1 on the following page, into seven geographic branches and one Functional Services Unit.

The seven branches, including two sections, have responsibilities which include:

- To review, select, and mark documents routed to their respective areas for items of biographic importance.
- To prepare 4x6 cards and maintain biographic files, including the BI Dossier files; and to prepare cards for post agreements.
- To provide biographic intelligence information about people from the files and from other sources in written and verbal form.

The functional Services Unit acts as a coordinating and directing unit for projects which cut across branch lines and:

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- Controls over-all projects in progress in the various branches and receives and distributes documents received by the Division.
- Edits written reports, prepares correspondence, and maintains certain central BI files.

2. Procedures Employed to Process Biographic Data.


The maintenance of biographic data is accomplished principally through the process of reviewing all incoming documents to identify items of biographic importance and the typing of this information for permanent record on 4x6 cards. These cards are then filed alphabetically by name, by country for future reference. Complete documents, on a selected basis, are also filed directly to individual dossier folders maintained in legal size file cabinets.

The basic steps in the present procedures is shown on pages 54 and 55 of Volume I. A detailed flow chart is shown in Appendix D of this Volume.

a. Routing at the Division Level. The Documents Clerk, assigned to the Functional Services Unit, receives about 600 documents and publications each day. This material is screened and routed to the geographic branches. All material is routed to the geographic branch chief, except for direct routing to the analyst in the case of the Near East and Africa, and American Republics Branches.

b. Analyst Review and Marking. The analyst reads each incoming document to identify pertinent biographic information. If the item is about a person as an individual, or expresses his views (and not just the

PRESENT ORGANIZATION OF THE BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION DIVISION



PERSONNEL SUMMARY

	CHIEF	ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER	SECRETARY	EDITOR	N.I.S.	BRANCH CHIEFS	ANALYSTS	CLERKS	TOTALS
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	1	2	1	1	1				6
FUNCTIONAL SERVICES UNIT						1		3	4
AMERICAN REPUBLICS BRANCH						1	5	3	9
NEAR EAST AND AFRICA BRANCH						1	5	3	9
CHINA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA BRANCH						1	4	2	7
NORTHEAST ASIA BRANCH						1	2	2	5
WESTERN EUROPE BRANCH						1	3	2	6
BRITISH COMMONWEALTH BRANCH							4	2	6
EASTERN EUROPE BRANCH						1	4	3	8
SATELLITES SECTION							5	2	7
CENTRAL EUROPE AND SCANDINAVIA BRANCH						1	5	3	9
TOTALS	1	2	1	1	1	8	37	25	76

NOTE: Personnel figures obtained from chart prepared by B.I. dated 12/12/51

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interpretation of a policy or the views of another) then the item is considered significant to BI.

The analyst marks the significant paragraphs to indicate to the typist the item to be typed on the card. If it is impossible, because of length, to type the item on one card, then the document is filed directly in the individual's dossier folder.

Usually the analyst personally maintains the category files covering incumbents of foreign government positions and other important offices. The analyst also participates personally in the preparation of cards. During one 20 man-day study, 5 analysts produced 279 cards, amounting to 33 percent of the total cards prepared. During this same period 5 clerks produced 561 cards.

c. Card Preparation and Filing by the Clerk-Typists. In accordance with the instructions on the marked documents, the typist either prepares a card or files the document directly to the BI dossier files.

Markings containing only one name will be typed on a plain card. To avoid re-typing the text, if more than one name is within the marking, the clerk will use either a 3-part carbon card or hectograph master to produce extra copies. The forms in use for 4x6 card filing are:

- Plain cards - one card
- 3-Part Carbon Cards - two to three cards
- Hectograph Masters - four or more cards
- Envelope Cards - for inserting clippings
- Cut and Paste Cards - plain cards for attaching clippings
- BF Cross Reference Blue Cards - for indicating folders in dossier files

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A.- EVIDENCE OF OPPORTUNITIES TO IMPROVE
PROCESSING OF BIOGRAPHIC DATA

Intensive study of the processing procedures employed, plus valuable comments offered by the analysts themselves, indicated opportunities to reduce cost and simplify procedures employed in maintaining biographic data. These points are worthy of consideration.

1. The Rate of File Growth is Considerable.

Last year 148,000 documents and publications were processed by the Documents Clerk to the analysts. From these documents 420,000 cards were added to the card files. In addition 35,000 dossier folders were added to the BF dossier files.

The 92 card cabinets contain about 2,700,000 cards. Last year's additions indicate an annual growth of about 15 percent. The 155,000 dossier folders, located in 217 file cabinets, experienced a growth of over 22% during the same period.

2. The Largest Proportion of Effort Involved is Directly Related to the Maintenance of the Files.

The equivalent time of 6.7 analysts and 15.4 clerks is devoted to typing and filing.

Ten BI analysts estimated they spent 63.5 percent of their time on files maintenance with 45.3 percent devoted to reading and processing, and 18 percent to typing and filing. There was a total of 37 analysts in BI at the time of the survey.

Five clerks estimated that 70 percent of their time is spent on BI file maintenance with 51 percent devoted to typing and 19 percent to

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filing. There are 22 clerks assigned to the branches.

On the basis of the time estimated by the analysts and clerks as being devoted to card typing and filing, it costs about 19 cents for each card added to the file. In addition to this cost factor, delays occur since the typist is not able to stay abreast of the current card typing workload. In the German Unit, the backlog of marked documents amounted to 3 file drawers and work had to be sent outside. Further, biographic data are not being recorded as evidenced by the fact that in BCR, the section was carding only what the typist could normally handle during one work day letting the rest of the biographic information go uncared.

3. The Method Employed to Prepare Cards is Completely Manual.

In terms of the total volume, four types of cards are now prepared by the clerk and analyst—all on a manual typing basis.

- Plain Cards - straight typing for one name cards. The volume of single cards typed last year amounted to about 222,000.
- Cut and Paste - paragraph-type markings which can be lifted and taped or glued to 4x6 cards after card headings are typed. Last year this volume amounted to 21,000 cards.
- Standard Carbon - used for 2 and 3 card requirements. In one study the average use was 2.2 carbons. These required about 10,000 original typings.
- Hectograph Masters - The liquid process is used where 4 or more cards are required. The same study indicated that about 6 cards are reproduced from each master. Of 156,000 cards reproduced from masters last year, these required about 26,000 original typings.

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4. Biographic Files are Basically Inactive Files.

The 2,700,000 cards in the files cover almost 900,000 names. Most of the cards are on names about whom very little biographic information is recorded. One sample, of over 2000 cards, indicated that 85 percent of the names contained 3 cards or less.

In contrast, a review of 90 completed Special Activity Reports revealed that 75 percent of the names requested had 4 cards or more. This indicates the large proportion of files maintenance effort which is devoted to persons who have a very low customer demand.

Furthermore, the ratio of names requested to names in the file was not over 4%. Roughly 35,000 names were supplied on Special Activities Requests and in Biographic Reports. The proportion of names requested to cards in the file was 1.3%.

In effect then, BI is devoting a large proportion of its total effort to maintaining files which are relatively inactive. This emphasizes the importance of reviewing the method employed for maintaining the files and processing biographic data.

B - THE CHALLENGE - THE EFFICIENT ORGANIZATION OF RECORDS


The costs encountered in the processing of biographic information from source documents to file cards is one that BI management has recognized for many years. The opportunity to simplify this process is a real challenge.

At one extreme, there is the system by which the files maintenance cost is at a minimum, but with which the files use cost, conversely, is high. At the other extreme, the exact opposite is true. The

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maintenance cost is high, but the use cost is at a minimum.



This system has several weaknesses - the most compelling being that the job of assembling all of the basic documents from a central source imposes such a time-consuming task that reference is cumbersome and timely service extremely difficult.

In contrast, the system employed by BI is at the other extreme. Here records are organized on the basis of the highest immediate use-ability. Each item of retention value is manually copied from the basic document to a separate card. The carded item is filed in as many places as necessary, after which the basic document is destroyed. This system involves a high files maintenance cost, as reflected by the large proportion of time devoted to the files task in BI.

Accordingly, our studies were directed to a realistic examination of the way in which effort is directed, in relation to the use of these records. Fundamental guide posts in our considerations were:

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The 59 analysts and clerks combined devote 65.5% of their total effort to the maintenance of the files, and 23.3% of their effort to producing information from these files, with the remainder spent on administrative matters. Thus, 2.8 times as much effort is used to maintain the file as is devoted to using the information. In terms of the huge volume of material stored in the files, the reference rate (or turnover) is less than 4%. From a records management viewpoint, the files are basically inactive files.

C - PROPOSED METHOD FOR PROCESSING BIOGRAPHIC DATA

The many alternative systems explored for processing of biographic data included: expanding to an 8 x 5 card to permit more complete cut and paste operations; the use of Photo-Clerk and/or Dexigraph photostat equipment for 4x6 reductions of the basic documents; additional copies of documents for more straight filing in dossier files; and the possibilities of cross-referencing to an expanded A-Z folder file on names with 3 cards or less, and carding after they become more active. Each of these was found to have specific limitations.


1. Adopt the Microfilm Unit Card Plan as a Rapid and Inexpensive Method for the Maintenance of Biographic Files.

The system found to have a desirable cost balance between files maintenance cost and files use cost (plus several by-product advantages) consists of microfilming the source page containing biographic information and inserting the film strip into a single card for filing. A picturization of the procedure recommended with illustration of cards and equipment appear on pages 56 and 57 of the Summary Report.

The procedure incorporates these principles

- The substitution of a microfilm image for manual copying of text.

PROPOSED PROCEDURES FOR PROCESSING BIOGRAPHIC DATA



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- The continuation of the 4x6 unit card system.
- The consolidation of files through the space-saving features of microfilm.

The procedures, as set forth in this section, require certain new operations. The most important of these would be handled through the creation of a Central Production Unit to perform the job of receiving the marked source document from the analyst and producing a finished card ready for filing.

The steps to be employed are presented in Exhibit XV-2 on the following page. The discussion to follow is presented in accordance with the steps outlined in this flow chart.

a. The Analyst. The analyst will continue to read and review incoming documents and publications. It is expected that certain documents will continue to be marked for dossier filing and other discarded as having no value. However, a large proportion of items formerly sent to the dossier files may be photographed and placed in the 4x6 card files.

When marking paragraphs and lists, the use of a black crayon to mark the boundaries on the page will speed up locating the item when later referred to in the microfilm reader. When extra prints will be required for exchange programs, the analyst should mark the document with a special code, i.e. "P-10," indicating that 10 copies of this item will be required for the field posts.

To record items in the Category File, the analyst would set these documents aside for typing by the branch clerk-typist. Documents

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awaiting microfilming processing would be picked up by a clerk from the Central Production Unit.

b. The Central Production Typists. The marked documents will be received by the typing pool in the Central Production Unit for indexing (i.e., typing name, etc.) on 4x6 microfilm aperture cards. The Film 'n File Corporation (represented by Filmsort Co. locally) offers a suitable aperture card with a 7/8" x 7/8" opening in the card. A sample aperture card is illustrated on page 57 of the Summary Report. For each name marked in the document, the clerk will index one card. To decrease locating time after the card is in the BI file, it is suggested that the name be placed in the upper left-hand corner of the card. In the center, on the same line, can be recorded the category code number as indicated by the analyst. In the right corner would be typed the country, and below that an abbreviation of the classification symbol and the date.

These cards would be typed in the order of the names marked in the document. The cards would be affixed to the document and forwarded to the Camera Operator.

c. The Camera Operator. Each page containing a marking and each name on the marking will be photographed once. That is, if five names are on the marking, the page would be photographed five times.


Before each page is microfilmed, the operator would place a small (1" x 1") serial identification number on the document. These would be pre-printed on card stock and re-used. After the document has been

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photographed, the camera operator would clip the serial number card to the aperture card for that name. These would be sequenced in the order in which the names were photographed to simplify the matching of the film strip to the cards during the mounting operation.

Since each 100-foot reel contains 1200-35 mm. exposures, it may be desirable to develop partial reels to keep material flowing into the files.



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d. The Film Mounters. After the film is processed and returned to the Central Production Unit, the film will be mounted on aperture cards.

The mounting machine, designed to take a full or partial reel of film, has an electric light encased in the frame to permit easy check of the identification number on the frame to the number on the card. Each aperture card has a glassine cover over the adhesive surface. This is removed and the card is inserted into the mounter. The handle bar on the mounter is lowered and automatically cuts and mounts the frame to the card.

Cards would then be sorted geographically (most would already be in geographic branch sequence) and delivered by Central Production to the branch file clerks for filing.

e. The Analysts - in Using the File. In order to read the microfilm card it will be necessary to place the card in a Microfilm Reader. The reader recommended for use in BI is the type which permits





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the card to be placed on a moveable bed-plate such as the model offered by the Diebold Corporation. This model speeds the locating of specific images when using the reader.

The completed aperture card will contain typed name, category, country, classification symbol, and date, but the microfilmed textual material itself will not be readable to the naked eye. Although insertion in the microfilm reader is rapid, it may be desirable to assist the analyst in his use of the cards, without magnification, by preprinting a columnar "identification list" on the blank space of the card. This list, which would be x-ed by the Central Production Unit when typing the aperture card based upon the analyst's designation, might include:

- | | |
|----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| _____ A. General | _____ 1. Biographic Report |
| _____ B. Political comment | _____ 2. Biographic Sketch |
| _____ C. Career | _____ 3. Article |
| _____ D. Offices | _____ 4. Who's Who |
| _____ E. Organizations | _____ 5.  |
| _____ F. Personality | _____ 6.  |
| _____ G. _____ | _____ 7.  |
| _____ H. _____ | _____ 8.  |

An analysis of the Special Activities Reports would assist in establishing the best "identification list."

Precise solution to the problem of identification cannot be presented without trial and error and without experience in the use of the microfilm reader. It is considered to be entirely possible that no identification list at all will be required, or that the analyst can best "key" the card when and if he uses it, or that the analyst will write a key word or two on the card as he uses it for report production or to answer a spot inquiry.

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2. Produce Field Exchange and Peripheral Biographic Cards as a By-Product of the Microfilm Unit Card Plan.

The unit microfilm card system offers a simple and inexpensive method for providing BI information to the posts.

This would be accomplished by microfilming peripheral and exchange documents on a separate camera, at the same time it is photographed for BI file purposes, and printing 4x6 photoprints on lightweight card stock in a rapid, roll type enlarger from this separate microfilm image.

- A second camera head may be provided for the flat bed camera. The two camera units may be quickly interchanged. Photograph all "non-exchange" documents with one camera and all exchange and peripheral documents with the second camera head.
- Microfilming all exchange and peripheral cards on one reel will permit low cost production of 4x6 facsimile prints on a roll enlarger. These prints, at a fifty percent reduction to 4x6 size could be indexed and forwarded to the posts. The 4x6 prints produced are easily read without magnification. V-mail roll printers exist in the Government. Arrangements may be made to obtain 4x6 prints on a reimbursable basis. Commercial firms, such as Recordak, provide prints at about 3 cents each.

3. Consolidated Existing Biographic Card and Dossier Files Through the Use of the Space-Saving Features of the Microfilm Window Jacket Card.

Page 57 of the Summary Report illustrates a microfilm window jacket or "multiple aperture card." These cards permit the consolidation of ten single aperture cards into a single card. If all names with 3 cards or more were microfilmed and inserted into window jacket cards, the present files could be condensed by 50 percent.

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A regular BI files consolidation procedure may be employed. It is visualized that whenever one individual has 10 single aperture cards these cards would be sent to the Central Production Unit where the microfilm frame in the individual cards will be inserted into one window jacket card. Consolidation can take place at an earlier stage, if found desirable.

Similarly, and with the further advantage of eliminating two separate files, the contents of the BF dossier files may be microfilmed and placed in 4x6 window jacket cards. Most of the 217 file cabinets now occupied by the dossier file could be eliminated.

D - ASSESSMENT OF COST AND SAVINGS

Estimates on the basis of anticipated material and labor costs indicate that each card produced under the new system would cost approximately 8 cents. On the basis of present payroll costs, the manually-prepared card now costs about 19 cents.

Because of limitations of time, completely detailed and verified cost comparisons were not computed. However, certain elements of cost can be set forth to aid in evaluation of the proposal.

1. Equipment Costs.

Quotations were obtained from the manufacturers as follows:

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<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Cost</u>
Readers	
35 Diebold Unit System Readers or Equivalent Card Reader at \$375 each	13,000
Microfilm Cameras	
Recordak Model D or equivalent	2,285
Second camera head for separate microfilming of exchange cards	900
Mounters	
Two Film 'n File Mounters	700
Enlarger	
Recordak or equivalent	<u>425</u>
Total Costs	\$17,310

On a conservative five-year amortization schedule, annual equipment costs would be \$3,462.

2. Estimated Labor and Material Costs.

The following estimated labor costs were obtained from two independent sources and reflect typing, filing, and other operating costs based upon actual office production figures. Material cost was secured from the supplier.

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<u>Operation</u>	<u>Costs per Year</u>
(1) Cost of Aperture cards 400,000 cards per year 4x6 card stock, 7/8" x 7/8" aperture, heavy weight glassine, in lots of 100,000 at \$15.00/M	\$6,000
(2) Cost to Index type name and country at 100/hr	6,600
(3) Cost to Photograph Cost of film for 400,000 frames- 1200-35mm frames per 100 ft. roll at \$5.72/roll	1,910
Labor to photograph on operating basis, 240/hr	2,750
Sequence cards to shots, 360/hr	1,830
(4) Cost to mount at 150/hr	4,400
(5) Sorting time at 180/hr	3,660
(6) Filing time at 100/hr	<u>6,600</u>
Total Costs	<u>\$33,750</u>

(Labor Costs - \$25,840)

(Material Costs - \$7,910)

Data on present materials costs were not secured nor were directly comparable labor costs secured.

3. Estimated Payroll Savings.

The payroll savings reflected in the table below were obtained by computing the time saved the analysts by eliminating the self-performed typing operations and through the savings in clerk-typist time by substituting microfilm processing for manual typings of biographic cards and forms. Clerical and production personnel salaries were computed from GS-4 beginning rate and analyst salaries from GS-9 beginning rate.

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<u>Staff</u>	<u>No. People</u>		<u>Proposed</u>	<u>Salary</u>	<u>Savings</u>
	<u>Proposed</u>	<u>Present</u>		<u>Present</u>	
Production	7	0	\$ 22,225	\$ 0	\$-22,225
Analyst	31	37	156,860	187,220	30,360
Clerical	<u>8</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>25,400</u>	<u>69,850</u>	<u>44,450</u>
	46	59	\$204,485	\$257,070	\$52,585

A savings of 13 people is estimated.

4. Estimated Net Savings.

As an indication of potential savings -

Estimated annual payroll saving		\$52,585
Less: Equipment costs	\$3,462	
Material costs	7,910	
Incidentals	<u>3,713</u>	
		<u>15,085</u>

Net annual saving (est.) - \$37,500

5. Costs for Conversion of Existing Files - on a Partial Basis.

In order to establish a uniform file and to take advantage of space saving features, a program of converting present files to the microfilm unit card plan is recommended. Conversion should take place for all or most of the 120,000 most active names. This cost can be estimated as follows:

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<u>Operation</u>	<u>Cost</u>
1. Cost of window jackets 140,000 4x6 jackets, 2 acetate windows, holding about 10 frames per card at \$96.35/M (includes 20,000 extra jackets)	\$13,500
2. Cost to Index Cards Type name and country on 140,000 jackets at 100/hr	2,310
3. Cost to photograph Cost of film for 1,500,000 frames 1200-35 mm frames per 100 ft. roll at \$5.72/roll	7,150
Labor to photograph Production basis at 350/hr	7,270
4. Cost to Mount Film strip inserted - about 190,000 manual insertions. Checking frames at 250/hr Cutting and matching at 250/hr Inserting at 120/hr	1,254 1,254 <u>2,612</u>
Total Costs	<u>\$35,350</u>

E - PLAN OF INSTALLATION

Due to the basic departure from the present typed card and the desirability to test costs, usage factors, etc., it is proposed that the unit microfilm card system be adopted in one branch for a trial period of several months, as experience is gained and procedures are further refined, a complete installation then could be undertaken.

1. The Pilot Study.

A small scale pilot study should be installed in one of the branches for a sufficient period of time (3 - 6 months) to permit an appraisal, both as to cost performance and adaptability. Imaginative

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and aggressive supervision of this Pilot Study will be necessary to identify and to develop any revisions that might be required and to guide the system through this initial stage.

The designated branch would be provided with a flat bed microfilm camera, film, 4x6 aperture cards, a mounter, and a microfilm reader for each analyst. One clerk would be selected to operate the camera and should be transferred to CS for several weeks of microfilm training.

The procedures described for the system as a whole would apply equally for the Pilot Study. During this period any exchange cards could be enlarged using CS facilities. An installation of this size would provide the experience necessary to locate production problems and to gain a sampling of analyst reaction to working with microfilm although initial reaction should be discounted until adequate practice is obtained.

The system may be installed with relatively little cost, since most equipment may be obtained on a rental basis and no conversion costs need be incurred. A three-months' trial period should cost not over \$5,000, including salaries, and is based on the following costs:

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1 Camera (rental)	\$75/first month, \$50/month thereafter	\$225
1 Mounter (rental)	\$20/first month, \$16/month thereafter	68
4 - 5 Readers (Purchase)	Procure, \$375 each	1,500
Film-20,000 frames at 1,200 frames per reel at \$5.72 per 100-foot reel		98
Cards - 20,000 aperture cards at \$17.50/M		344
Salaries - 3 people for 3 months at \$3,300/year		<u>2,500</u>
Total cost for Pilot Study		<u>\$4,735</u>

2. Method of Full Implementation.

For complete implementation, establish a Central Production Unit in the Functional Services Unit to produce the unit microfilm card. The Central Production Unit would require seven people.

Two typists would be required for indexing, one to operate the camera, two to mount the film and two clerks to assist as necessary in the above operations and for delivering documents and cards to the branches.

It is recommended that a partial conversion of the present files be accomplished to reduce the present files size by about 50 percent and to make the present files as uniform as practicable. There are about 120,000 names covered by 1,500,000 cards which are ideally suited for consolidation into the window jacket cards.

The daily workload on the microfilm camera would amount to about 6 hours per day for regular processing of incoming documents. Conversion would be obtained by using this camera on a part-time basis,

and renting another until the conversion job is completed.

The files, one country at a time, would be forwarded to Central Production for microfilming. The camera operator would photograph only those names having 3 cards or more.

The remaining 780,000 names and 1,200,000 cards, mostly marginal names, would remain in the files. Eventually, when 10 cards are obtained, they would be condensed into window jacket cards.

The steps in daily processing are described in paragraph C-1 above.

F - OTHER ADVANTAGES OFFERED

The discussions above have centered primarily upon the element of costs for files maintenance. However, other advantages present themselves which should not be ignored in an evaluation of the proposal.


1. Elimination of Transcription Errors.

The present system, because all card text is typed reading from the original document, is subject to typographical error. The microfilm image will present an error-free copy.

2. More Complete Information.

At present, only that portion of the document text which is marked by the analyst is typed on the card. With the system proposed, the entire document page appears although pertinent paragraphs are marked for ease in finding on the microfilm reader.

3. Copies of Carded Material, At Any Time.

Under the plan proposed, any size enlargement may be made photographically from the BI microfilm unit card. 

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4. Compact Data.

With the conversion of dossier file material to microfilm (consolidated in a window jacket) and the filing of this material with carded material, all available data on an individual will be in one place for ready use by the analyst.

5. Better, More Complete Information.

Some useful biographic data are not now captured for the file because it is contained in single copy books or periodicals which must be routed elsewhere and because transcription cost is prohibitive. This material could be referred to the camera operator and mounted in cards or included in window jackets.

6. Faster Processing and Better Utilization of Personnel.

The time now required to transcribe manually to 4x6 cards delays biographic data from getting into the files. The procedure proposed, because of its speed, can place material more quickly into the file. The proper staffing of the Central Production Unit concentrates processing effort, permits detailed review and control of workload, and should provide better over-all utilization of clerical personnel.

7. Biographic Reports and other Summaries may be Included in the File.

When Biographic Reports, Sketches, etc. are produced, one copy can be microfilmed for inclusion in the individual's card file. Later, photographic enlargements may be made if required. The analyst, in re-

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viewing the data or in answering spot inquiries can use such summaries or reports quickly.

8. Files Close to the Analyst.

With consolidation of file bulk, desk arrangements can be adjusted so that all biographic files are immediately adjacent for convenient and quick use by the analyst in handling spot inquiries.

9. Saving in Floor Space.

The card files consolidation permitted and the inclusion of dossier files material by microfilm will permit a reduction in filing cabinets and, thus, a reduction in floor space now occupied.

G - OTHER NOTES ON BIOGRAPHIC FILES

The advantages of rapid and automatic processing offered by the proposed procedure may result in more material being added to the biographic file, perhaps of marginal value. It is not felt that this factor can be controlled by a procedure or formula; nor should the procedure dictate what is to be considered pertinent and useful biographic data. Analysts must be trained in what is and what is not valuable biographic information and periodic audits of selections and files made to review compliance and to indicate when additional training is necessary.

The initial reaction of most non-users of microfilm is to object to expected difficulties in the use of microfilm readers. However, as experienced by CS and attested to by commercial firms in the microfilm field, these objections are overcome through time and use.

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A new development in the micro-image field may deserve investigation in connection with BI files maintenance and use. The system is not yet available on the market although it has been used successfully in several large companies in test installations. The procedure is the same as recommended above except that direct image readable paper prints in 16 mm size are glued to cards instead of mounting film in aperture cards. Costs are less since plain card stock is used. Enlargements of the microfilm may be made from the negative but not from the direct image print at a later date. New images would be added to a single card for each individual. Reading of text in the reduced size is not possible although specific documents can be identified with the naked eye. Reading is accomplished by means of a reader operating much on the same principle as a film reader. Hall and McChesney, Inc., P.O. Box 591, Syracuse, N.Y., can explain in more adequate detail. Equipment will be available within the next several months.

Summary of Recommendations

1. Adopt the microfilm unit card plan as a rapid and inexpensive method for the maintenance of biographic files.
2. Produce field exchange and peripheral biographic cards as a by-product of the microfilm unit card plan.
3. Test the proposed procedure and develop refinements through a pilot installation in one branch.
4. Consolidate existing biographic card files through the use of space-saving features of the microfilm "window jacket card."
5. Establish a Central Production Unit to fix responsibility for producing a finished card ready for filing.

XVI. THE RECEIPT AND DISTRIBUTION OF DOCUMENTS

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XVI. RECEIPT AND DISTRIBUTION OF DOCUMENTS

Over 16,000 separate documents are routed every day by IAD. These represent multiple copies of all documents for routing within R, and copies of CIA and Military Documents for routing elsewhere in the State Department. Of this volume, OLI and OIR divisions receive and process 11,800 pieces daily through division, branch, and section Documents Clerks to the research analysts.

The discussion to follow presents (1) the procedures employed and the weaknesses observed in the routing performed by IAD, and (2) similar observations of division and branch routing procedures. Following this, a series of organizational and procedural proposals are presented, which aim at improved documents flow.

A - DOCUMENTS ROUTING TO THE DIVISIONS

1. Present Organization for Document Flow.

Five organizations participate directly in documents distribution as shown in Exhibit XVI-1 on the following page. Three of these are located in IAD, one in IR, and one in PCS.

The largest volume is processed in the IAD Message Center, which divides this responsibility as follows:

- Chief, Message Center - Receives and routes all incoming top secret documents from DC, maintains top secret logs and transmittal records necessary to meet security regulations. R's copy is sent to the IR Sensitive Room.
- Action Control Readers - Record and route OLI action telegrams and despatches, as well as secret documents, on the basis of primary interest. Work of two people is divided between telegrams and despatches. Daily volume, 273 documents.

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- Reading Panel - Receives copies of despatches routed from DC/R, and prepares and presents them to Army, Navy, and Air Force readers for their selection; routes for other outside agencies; forwards remaining copies of despatches to Reading Room.
- Reading Room Readers - Distribute (1) all copies of telegrams marked for OLI information from DC, (2) all remaining copies of OLI action telegrams received from Action Control, and (3) all remaining copies of OLI information despatches received from the Reading Panel. Daily volume, 7,809 documents.

Two other organizations within IAD also route documents. These two units route to the entire State Department.

- Military Liaison Distributors - Distribute despatches selected for the State Department by MLB liaison personnel from reading panels at Army, Navy, and Air Force (ANA).*
- CIA Liaison Distributors - Route CIA documents received in fixed numbers through automatic distribution from CIA. Daily volume 1,482 documents.

In addition, two other units, one in PCS and the other in IR, are involved in documents routing.


- Ticker Room (PCS) - Routes messages received by wire (AP, UP, and FBIS) and selects items for daily briefing sessions. Receives the first copy of telegrams from the Message Center, reviews for immediate referrals or briefings, and then routes to the branches.
- Sensitive Room (IR) - Receives and records top secret and sensitive documents and charges out the former. These include State telegrams and despatches received through IAD, as well as CIA and other agency top secret material. Top secret documents from CIA and the Military are routed for the entire State Department.

* Army, Navy and Air Force, hereinafter referred to as ANA.

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Exhibit XVI-1

PRESENT ORGANIZATION FOR DOCUMENT FLOW



Note: Numbers in upper right corner of boxes indicate total personnel assigned.

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2. Procedures for Document Distribution in the Message Center.

Separate processing procedures are followed for routing telegrams and despatches. Whereas telegrams are routed direct to the military services by DC/T, despatches are screened and selected for the ANA by their respective representatives at the Reading Panel in IAD. Six copies of each despatch are made available to IAD by DC/R for selection by the ANA representatives.

3. Weaknesses Observed in Routing Documents to the Divisions.

a. There is no established systematized plan for routing to the Divisions. Documents are routed to them from seven separate sources, organizationally located in five different areas. Routing is not geared to effect continuity of routing methods. No organized routing guides are in use. Copies routed by the Ticker Room often duplicate later routing by the Message Center. None of the distributors are organized in terms of the geographic requirements in the OIR divisions. Despatches are processed through two units within the Message Center before they are routed to the Divisions.

All of this causes divisions, and analysts, to receive more material for review than should be necessary; and the magnitude of the volume to the divisions is such that better organized processing is essential to eliminate unnecessary reading effort on the part of the analyst.

- CLB processes SO's and OO's and other type documents to R and other State areas. Last year 225,750 separate pieces were routed to the R Organization, while 129,922 pieces were distributed to other parts of State Department.

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- MLB last year routed 456,000 despatches and reports from the Military. Of this figure, 215,000 went to the R Area.
- The Message Center routed over 2,560,000 copies of telegrams and despatches to the R Area.

Notwithstanding the volume being handled and the many different organizational units involved, a procedural device does not exist for providing routing guidance to IAD based on the particular area and subject interests of the analysts.

b. Excessive handling delays the receipt of the document by the analyst. Despatches are reviewed by the Military Reading Panel and the Reading Room routers before they are processed to the OIR and OLI divisions.

Despatches are held for the ANA Reading Panel daily review. This procedure delays release to the Reading Room and causes the work to flow in large batches to that room late in the day. At times, the "hold period" for the Reading Panel delays despatches as much as one full day.

A four- to five-day backlog of despatches in the Reading Room is considered excessive, and is attributed in part to assigning most personnel to route telegrams (only one person is assigned full-time to routing despatches) and in part to the procedures employed in the Reading Panel.

B - DOCUMENTS ROUTING BY THE DIVISIONS TO THE ANALYSTS

Interviews were conducted with all divisions and branch documents clerks and included a large sampling of the section and unit secretaries who process documents to the analyst.

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The OLI and OIR divisions route the 11,800 pieces received daily on an ad hoc basis. Almost every division and branch was observed routing incoming documents using techniques devised by the particular documents clerk, resulting in generally dissimilar processing procedures.

1. Procedures Employed for Documents Routing.

Routing occurs at the division, branch, and section level. In certain instances, minimum handling exists in routing direct from the point of initial receipt (division or branch) to the analyst. In others, documents are handled at all three levels before the analyst finally receives them.

At the Division Level:

- One division (DRA) routes documents from the Divisional Research Services Unit direct to the analyst.
- Two divisions (DRF and DRW) receive documents directly in the branches.
- One division (DRS) routes to sections.
- One division (DRN) routes to branches.

At the Branch and Section Level:

- In DRF: Two branches route to the analyst and the third routes to sections and then analyst.
- In DRN: One branch routes to two sections first and direct to the analysts in the third; another branch circulates everything in folders, which is especially time-consuming.
- In DRS: Documents of several different sections are combined and routed to all analysts. Other sections route direct to the analyst.
- In DRW: Three of the four branches route directly to the analyst, while the fourth routes to sections.
- In DFI: The units route directly to the analyst.

Fifty-eight various document records were observed which varied according to procedures employed in the branch and section. Over half the records are being maintained under the following conditions:

- On the assumption that the record might prove useful.
- On the basis of the clerks not having been told what records to maintain.
- As a defense mechanism for the clerk, who is between the analyst and IAD when failure to route properly occurs.

2. Number of People Involved.

A documents clerk or one of the branch or section secretaries is used to process documents to the analyst. At least 58 people were found involved in routing documents, most of them being clerks who perform documents functions on a part-time basis. The time involved for the clerks, when consolidated, is equivalent to at least 23 full-time people.

<u>Divisions</u>	<u>Number of Part-Time People</u>	<u>Equivalent Number of Full-Time People</u>
DRA	6	3.80
DRF	15	5.46
DRN	6	2.86
DRS	11	3.84
DRW	6	2.70
DFI	<u>14</u>	<u>4.69</u>
	58	23.35

3. Weaknesses Observed in Routing Documents from the Divisions to the Analyst.

a. Excessive Handling. The procedure in most divisions necessitates excessive handling of documents in the course of their distribution to the analyst, with consequent delay in their delivery.

b. Insufficient Screening. There is insufficient screening of the documents flow so as to bring to the analyst only items which might justify his scrutiny. The various methods employed are not conducive to controlling the volume processed to the analyst, nor to performing a more selective job of screening the incoming documents. The 11,800 documents routed to the analysts require each day almost 1,150 hours of reading on the part of about 480 analysts. The analyst spends as much as 30 percent of his time reading "daily take." Normally, the clerk merely identifies the document and forwards it to the analyst. Only 9 clerks of the 58 observed were found to be screening out documents which were clearly of no value to the analyst. Even then, the discarding is limited primarily to duplicate copies. Although this procedure tends to hold payroll costs for documents clerks to a minimum, it permits analysts' time to be unnecessarily lost in an excessive amount of document handling and reading.

c. Subordination of Routing Responsibility. Routing of documents is a subordinate responsibility of most of those doing it. The vast majority are carrying it out on a part-time basis. Since documents routing gets secondary treatment, there has been little tendency to develop any standard routing guides or uniform routing procedures.

d. Too Many Records. Almost 1/2 of the document records observed could be eliminated, since they either contribute little to the effectiveness of routing or merely duplicate a record maintained

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elsewhere. The following table lists the records identified in OIR and indicates the potentialities for reduction in clerical time through the establishment of uniform record-keeping procedures.

NUMBERS OF RECORDS

<u>Record of</u>	<u>Division</u>	<u>Branch</u>	<u>Section</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>May be Eliminated</u>
Action Copy	3	0	0	3	0
Telegrams	1	4	1	6	6
Despatches	2	3	1	6	6
Serials	2	2	2	6	6
Documents	1	2	0	3	3
Newspapers	1	2	1	4	0
IR Serials	5	5	2	12	7
Top Secret	3	2	1	6	0
Destruction	1	6	5	12	0
OIR Products	3	1	0	4	4
Other	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>
	23	28	13	64	34

C - RECOMMENDED ORGANIZATIONAL REVISIONS IN IAD

1. Combine in the Present Message Center the Routing Functions and Personnel Now in PCS, IR, MLB, AND CLB, to Form a Single "Documents Distribution Unit" in IAD.


This will centralize at one point the responsibility for distribution knowledge and the processing of all documents. It would eliminate the routing of documents from five separate organizational units. Transfer of the following functions and personnel thereof would be required: (See Exhibit XVI-2.)

- a. The Ticker Room Now Located in PCS. The practice of sending the first copy of each telegram to the Ticker Room should be eliminated. Each of the readers in the Distribution Unit should be assigned the responsibility of reviewing cables for urgent items, and telephoning the area responsible within R, or forwarding a copy

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Exhibit XVI-2

PROPOSED DOCUMENTS DISTRIBUTION UNIT IN IAD



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to the Ticker Room for briefing purposes. This activity should remain in its present location since the costs involved for relocation of the wiring would be prohibitive.

b. The Sensitive Room Now Located in IR. Assigning the Sensitive Room to the Distribution Unit would eliminate the duplicate logs maintained for top secret control, and provide for centralized responsibility for routing of top secret documents.

At the present time the analyst must go to the Sensitive Room in order to review top secret and sensitive material for any that might be of interest to him. To permit this material to reach him directly, it is proposed that the Sensitive Room be established as primarily a control unit for routing the major portion of top secret and sensitive material to the analyst.

Of the total material subject to routing by the Sensitive Room, sensitive documents would comprise the largest proportion, amounting to 1,000 items per month. Control records should be established which indicate the person or division receiving the document, and with respect to top secret documents, the procedure should require the document being returned to the Sensitive Room for destruction.

Since the files in the Sensitive Room are, in large part, a duplicate of records in DC/R, they may be weeded to the same degree as proposed for the Post files.

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c. The IAD/CLB and IAD/MLB Personnel Directly Involved in Routing Documents. It is recommended that the mail supervisors and mail clerks in the CIA and Military Liaison Branches be assigned to the proposed Distribution Unit.

A single reading unit would thus be routing all CIA and military reports, as well as State Department documents. These readers, as suggested later, should be supplied with uniform routing instructions which will establish an integrated system of pinpointed routing in the R Organization.

The 447,000 CIA and military documents routed to R out of a total of 812,000 received last year would be routed on the same basis as the 2,560,000 telegrams and despatches handled last year by the Message Center. The remaining 365,000 CIA and Military documents, routed to other parts of the State Department would be accomplished from the new Documents Distribution Unit.

It is understood that at one stage in the history of IAD, routing of all documents was performed from a central point. However, it is believed, that the system did not function satisfactorily primarily because there was inadequate knowledge of area requirements and because no routing guides employed.

2. Organize the Readers Assigned to the Documents Distribution Unit on an Area Basis.

It is recommended that the receipt and reading for distribution be organized by geographic areas being served rather than by type of incoming document. The proposed reassignment of responsibilities for documents routing will make available a total of 10 readers in the new Documents

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Distribution Unit. By dividing the responsibility for routing on a geographic basis, specialization of readers to match the requirements of the OIR research divisions can be achieved.

Organizing the Documents Distribution Unit to provide at least 2 readers for each geographic area should preclude interruption in flow by reason of normal personnel absences.

Since a large portion of the documents handled will be despatches, it is suggested that the area units established in DC/R, namely, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Far East and Near East, and American Republics, be utilized on a pilot basis in IAD. As workload statistics are developed, further divisions or area regroupings may prove desirable.

Assigning routers on an area basis will permit:

- Fixed responsibility for distribution to the branches.
- Branches to maintain liaison with a specific router.
- Readers to be assigned temporary duty in the branch to become familiar with document requirements.

The present workload statistics of the Message Center and of IAD/CLB and IAD/MLB indicate that the pooling of their distribution functions would permit a saving of from 2 to 3 full-time positions. These savings should be re-invested in guides for improved screening and routing to the branches, as discussed in the following paragraphs.

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D - RECOMMENDED PROCEDURAL REVISIONS IN IAD

To accomplish improved routing within the new organizational framework, the following procedural revisions are proposed.

1. Install and Maintain Routing Guides to Reflect the Requirements of the Research Divisions.

To accomplish more selective distribution, the respective requirements of the research divisions should be made known to the Documents Distribution Unit. It is anticipated that the Requirements Planning Staff recommended in Chapter XIV, Three Approaches to Stronger Organization, would establish the procedure by which the branches would identify to IAD their particular interests by area and country, and by subject. From this data it would be possible for the Documents Distribution Unit to develop routing guides, including priorities on enclosure material. The changing requirements of the branches should be made known to the Documents Distribution Unit by the branch documents clerks.

A routing reference guide, such as Remington Rand's Speedac Racks, having vertical fly-leaf cards, would serve as a fast reference device. The cards would be set up on the basis of various subject classifications. Those branches expressly interested in a subject would be recorded on the card of that subject.

2. Route Documents Directly to the Branch Level in R to Reduce Handling.

With routers assigned on an area basis and assisted by routing guides, documents can be routed directly from the IAD Distribution Unit to the branch documents clerk.

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As previously indicated, documents are at the present time routed directly to the branch levels in DRF and DRW. Hence, the suggested practice of routing directly to the branch level would require procedural changes principally in DRN, DRS, DFI, and BI, where documents are now initially received at the division level. Although DRA also receives at the division level, it routes directly to the analyst in lieu of having branch documents clerks do so.

Routing to the lowest practicable level from IAD will not only reduce the handling of documents, and hence cut costs, but will require the router to establish a more highly selective routing for the document.

3. Route Despatches to the Reading Panel After the Readers Have Indicated the Number of Copies and the Distribution for the R Area.

Plans are already under way to revise the present internal procedures of the Message Center. These represent, from our observations, a step toward the elimination of much of the backlog and delay now occurring in despatch routing.

The basic procedural change contemplates the review of despatches by the Military Reading Panel after distribution for the R Area has been established. Under this plan, one copy of each despatch will be routed first to the OLI distributors and thence to the Military Reading Panel; the remaining copies to be filed awaiting the eventual matching and distribution.

Certain suggestions are offered for further consideration as follows:

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a. Recording and Filing Distribution of Despatches. The distribution list can be stamped on the top of one despatch. This copy may then be read and routing designated. After distribution has been completed, the top 5 inches may be cut off providing an 8x5 card for filing. This would eliminate the manual preparation of the record card and provide a part of the document containing the title, etc., for reference purposes. DC/R uses this system.

b. Table Top Vertical Files. In connection with processing despatches through the Reading Panel and readers, it is suggested that a serial number be applied by numbering stamp to the first and second copies. The despatches should be filed numerically in vertical filing racks for later rapid matching for distribution.


E - RECOMMENDED PROCEDURAL REVISIONS IN THE DIVISION AND BRANCHES

In conjunction with the proposals set forth in Chapter VI, Current Intelligence Product, it is recommended that branch documents procedures be adapted to the proposed functional relationships between the Current Intelligence Officer, the documents clerk, the research analyst, and the research aide.

The relationships and functions of each of these positions with respect to documents flow is shown on Exhibit XVI-3 on the following page. The duties of each of these positions with respect to documents flow are identified below:

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OUTLINE OF PROPOSED BRANCH DOCUMENTS FLOW



Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81S00991R000100260002-3

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1. The Current Intelligence Officer.

In the process of accomplishing a close surveillance of incoming current intelligence material, the Current Intelligence Officer would perform a highly-selective routing of incoming documents to the research analyst. Chapter VI proposes a substantive review of incoming documents by the Current Intelligence Officer to minimize the time devoted to daily review by the research analyst.

Documents, including telegrams, despatches, CIA reports, military reports and others, received by the documents clerk, would be directed to the Current Intelligence Officer for review. This review would give suitable indication of its current intelligence value and provide guidance to the further processing of the document. A mark might be made to differentiate between documents which, in the opinion of the Current Intelligence Officer, (1) warrant analysts' direct attention, (2) might be reviewed or briefed for the analyst by a research aide, or (3) should be cataloged by research aide and routed to file. Items identified as being of no possible interest to the analyst could be discarded without further routing.

2. The Documents Clerk.

As reflected in Exhibit XVI-3, the documents clerk would sort out the documents, and then screen and route publications directly to the analyst. In addition, certain basic research information, such as newspapers and serials, economic annuals, etc., would generally be directed to the files without review by the analyst. This material

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should be cataloged by the documents clerk and then placed directly in the files.

Since in most branches the documents clerk's duties will not warrant a full-time position, the remaining time may be absorbed by filing functions.

3. The Analyst.

The use of research aides as set forth in Chapter IX, "Improved Use of the Time of the Analyst," proposes a flexible arrangement whereby the amount of time devoted by the analyst to daily review of incoming documents and publications may be conserved.

The analyst may choose, if he has time, to continue to read and screen all incoming documents and publications. After such review the material may be discarded or it may be cataloged for filing. Should the analyst's time be limited, he would be able to utilize a research aide to any one of the degrees suggested in the following paragraphs.

4. The Research Aide.

The extent to which the research aides would participate in documents processing would depend to a large degree upon the work methods employed by the respective research analysts. The most ideal relationship will exist when the research aide is used to the maximum extent in relieving the analyst of relatively routine, continuing functions.

The minimum utilization of a research aide would involve having the latter do the cataloging for file on all documents after the latter had been initially received and reviewed by the analyst. A greater de-

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gree of utilization would be achieved by having the research aide first receive the incoming material and perform both a cataloging and screening function. From the screening, and guided by any notations made by the Current Intelligence Officer, the research aide would (1) pass the material to the analyst concerned, (2) brief and summarize the material (especially if lengthy) for review by analyst, or (3) route to files as being of reference rather than present reading value.

5. Establish Routing Guides in Each of the Branches.

Routing guides should be developed by the branch documents clerk in order to facilitate this highly-selective routing to the analyst. These guides would be used to prepare and maintain the formal routing guides previously proposed for the IAD Documents Distribution Unit.

The branch guides should be based upon the requirements of the analysts. Each analyst should give indication to the documents clerk what subjects or area documents he is interested in obtaining. At the beginning of a new project either the analyst or his research aide should transmit to the documents clerk the type of information of special interest for the project.

To insure that these guides are current, they should be reviewed each month with the analyst. Formal guides, such as the Speedac records proposed for IAD, may be established or a loose-leaf notebook may be maintained.

6. Proposed Branch Records.

Only records of demonstrated value should be maintained by the branch documents clerk. These should include essential security records (i.e.,

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destruction and top secret).

Proposals set forth to improve IR circulation procedures recommend that all material issued to an analyst be charged to the branch documents control clerk. To this end a charge file should be established consisting of a copy of the circulation card accompanying the publication as it is delivered to the branch. Charges should be filed according to catalog number.

Recording of receipt of single-copy newspapers will be discontinued in the proposed new Publications Division of the Office of Intelligence Services. Branches desiring to maintain follow-up records on hard-to-obtain newspapers should check with the Publications Division to insure that the newspaper is received in single copy.

Summary of Recommendations Regarding Receipt
And Distribution of Documents

Six proposals have been made to establish more timely and accurate processing of documents:

1. Combine in the present Message Center the routing functions and personnel now in PCS, IR, MLB, and CLB, to form a single "Documents Distribution Center" in IAD.
2. Organize on an area basis the readers assigned to the Documents Distribution Center.
3. Install and maintain routing guides to reflect the requirements of the research division.
4. Route documents directly to the branch level in R to reduce handling.
5. Route despatches to the Reading Panel after the readers have indicated the number of copies and the distribution for the R Area.
6. Revise documents review and routing at the branch level in accordance with proposals governing the use of the Current Intelligence Officer and Research Aides. In this connection establish routing guides in each of the branches.

XVII. THE PROCUREMENT AND DISTRIBUTION
OF PUBLICATIONS

XVII - THE PROCUREMENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLICATIONS

OLI has two separate publications processing organizations employing a total of 41 people at an annual salary cost of \$159,000. These two are the Civilian Agencies Branch of IAD and the Selection and Records Section of IR.

Each of these units performs procurement and distribution functions and, as a consequence, a close correlation of organization and procedures is essential if conflict and duplication is to be avoided. For this reason special study has been devoted to their present operations.

A - PRESENT ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES

1. Organization

A comparative chart showing the organization of the Civilian Agencies Branch and the Selection and Records Section is shown on Exhibit XVII-1 on the following page. It should be noted that:

a. In IAD. The Civilian Agencies Branch contains 23 positions organized to accomplish two basic functions:

- Procurement. Here 12 positions are assigned, consisting of a Procurement Officer, Fiscal Clerk, four Procurement Aides and a Files and Correspondence unit of six people. Procurements are made in response to "nontitle" requests received from the R Area (that is, when the request specifies only the subject on which pertinent material is desired), and against specific title requests received from other agencies. Procurement is limited to foreign publications secured through foreign posts.
- Distribution. Ten positions are assigned to routing all incoming publications to IR, OIR, State and the Intelligence Community; to the maintenance of a record of receipts; and to the initiation of follow-up action in the case of nonreceipt.

b. In IR. The Selection and Records Section contains 18 positions organized to accomplish the two basic functions, as follows:

- Procurement. Eight positions consisting of the Selection Officer, Searcher, Chief of Operations, and the five people in the Order Unit perform the purchasing of all specific titles requested (books, serials, newspapers, etc.) by the R Area and the State Department at large. This group places orders either direct (in the case of commercial vendors) or through IAD (when foreign posts complete the procurement).
- Distribution. Nine positions are assigned to the routing of incoming IR-retention publications to R and the remainder of State. For these publications, records of receipt are maintained, and follow-up action is initiated in the case of nonreceipt.


Both IR and IAD participate in the administration of funds allotted for the procurement of publications. IR administers all State Department funds available to R for publications procurement, suballotting a small portion to IAD. IAD administers all funds allotted by other agencies for the procurement of materials on individual order for them. No service charge is made to other agencies for this function.

2. Procedures for Publications Procurement

A comparative chart showing the major elements of the procedures employed in IAD and IR is shown on Exhibit XVII-2 on the following page. It should be noted that:

- Both units process specific orders; IAD for free material and for material purchased for other agencies through the Publications Procurement Officers; IR for material purchased for the State Department.
- IR forwards purchase orders to the Foreign Posts via IAD. Thus IAD has a responsibility for transmission and follow-up of orders initiated by IR, as well as those initiated by itself.

PRESENT PUBLICATIONS PROCESSING ORGANIZATIONS IN OLI



NOTES: Numbers shown in upper right corner of boxes indicate number of personnel assigned.

REQUESTS FOR PUBLICATIONS

State Department requisition within R or other Sense, if for a specific title to be purchased, sent to LR. If general subject or free material, request is sent to IAD.

SPECIAL FUNDS

\$66,000 ('52)

LR - SUBALLOTTED
IAD/NF
JPRS
LC
DEPT. AGRICULTURE
DEPT. LABOR
OTHER WORKING FUNDS
SPECIAL DEPOSITS

PUBLICATION IS OBTAINABLE FREE

APPROVAL

Publications Procurement Aide establishes if the request can be procured free.

ESTABLISH TITLE AND SOURCE

Determines for subject requests what kinds of publications are available.
Determines where obtainable.

FISCAL

Records obligations for special funds only.

OPERATIONS MEMORANDA
OFFICIAL
INFORMALS
REPRODUCED BY CS/R

PUBLICATIONS PROCUREMENT OFFICERS AT THE FOREIGN POSTS

PURCHASE REGULATIONS

Purchase regulations for specific title publications from other agencies for which IAD administers funds.

OTHER FUNDS

\$74,000 ('51)

T.C.A.
F.S.I.
IE PROGRAM
LR/P
MISSION LITERARIES
MISCELLANEOUS

PUBLICATION MUST BE PURCHASED

APPROVAL

Requisition approved, bibliographic data prepared, item searched.

BOOK ORDER FORM

PERIODICAL ORDER FORM

ESTABLISH SOURCE AND PRICE

Checks bibliographic citation, determines vendor or source and price of publication.

FISCAL

Records obligations for LR, NS, and other funds.

OPERATIONS MEMORANDA REPRODUCED BY CS/R

Orders placed through the foreign posts.

COMMERCIAL PURCHASE ORDERS

DIRECT TO DOMESTIC AND COMMERCIAL VENDORS

PURCHASE REGULATIONS

Purchase regulations for specific title publications for other State Department funds.

ON transmitted to IAD for final preparation, transmission to field, and for order follow-up action where required.

3. Procedures for Distribution of Publications

A comparative chart showing the distribution procedures in IAD and IR appears as Exhibit XVII-3.

IAD routes all publications received from the posts to IR and to other agencies. IR routes, primarily on a loan basis, to R and the rest of the State Department. Both maintain records of items received as the basis for follow-up action in the case of nonreceipt. The basic procedures employed are thus almost identical.

B - PROBLEMS ARISING FROM SEPARATION

Our studies reveal that the separation of the two publications processing organizations is unnecessary and undesirable for the following reasons:

1. Separation is Costly.

Exclusive of the branch and section chief there are 20 positions devoted to procurement duties, and 21 positions assigned to distribution responsibilities. Waste of manpower results:

a. There are nine supervisory positions out of a total of forty-one positions. "Dual supervision" results in four cases:

Two Chiefs

Two Procurement Supervisors

Two Distribution Supervisors

Two Clerical Order Supervisors

b. Duplication exists in the recording of incoming serial publications. Eight to ten thousand of the serials received and recorded by CAB each month are subsequently recorded by the Serials

Records Unit of S&R. The duplication represents the equivalent of one full-time position.

2. Separation Causes Unnecessary Steps Which Slow Down Processing.

The existence of two publications processing organizations results in certain instances of interlocking procedural steps.


a. Publications procurement responsibilities are divided between CAB and S&R. Although it has been established that for the Department S&R procures specific titles, while CAB procures against category or subject requests, there are instances where this distinction is not possible in consummating the procurement. For example:

If the publication is thought to be procurable free, CAB will place the requisition on the field. If the field cannot procure the publication free, then it must refer the item back to CAB. CAB in turn refers the requisition to S&R for a purchase order. This order is then reprocessed through CAB to the post.

CAB, although it has nine full-time Publications Procurement Officers in the field, and a complete procurement organization, cannot initiate the purchase of specific items for the State Department since funds are held by IR.

b. The procedures employed create additional handling and filing operations. S&R orders destined for the posts are processed through CAB. CAB processes all orders from S&R, IC, CIA and all other agencies. It was observed that 52 percent of the Operations Memoranda processed during the month of December, 1951, originated in S&R. Only 20 percent originated in CAB.

PUBLICATIONS DISTRIBUTION PROCEDURES



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This division of functions increases clerical and filing efforts because S&R orders placed on the posts must be handled twice:

- Book orders. S&R prepares the OM, has it reproduced by CS/R and forwards copies to CAB.
- Serial orders. S&R prepares the OM and sends it to CAB, which has copies reproduced by CS/R, and forwards copies to S&R.
- For each order, S&R files two copies and CAB three copies.

3. Separation Militates Against Effective Follow-Up

Both CAB and S&R follow-up serial publications from the records maintained in their respective visible card files.

a. S&R prepares follow-up lists for foreign publications and forwards them to CAB. CAB reviews its record before processing the follow-up memoranda to the posts. (One recent list from S&R when checked against CAB records revealed that 50 percent of the items requiring follow-up were shown as received.)

b. CAB states that it is not reasonable to follow up gratis publications. One sampling indicated that 70 percent of the cards established in the files fall into this category. This indicates that less than one-third of the items recorded will receive follow-up action.

c. Study of CAB records revealed that:

- About one-half of the cards showed no receipt during the previous six months. Moreover, these cards do not completely reflect the frequency of the publication information required for timely follow-up.
- Observation of follow-up memoranda to the posts indicated that when action is taken it is sometimes too late to be effective.

4. Separation Impairs the Administration of Funds

Both S&R and CAB administer funds for the procurement of publications. (See Exhibit XVII-4.) Of the funds available, IR has control over monies spent for State Department requirements, and CAB expends monies required to purchase for other agencies. CAB has only \$1,900 suballotted by IR (\$1700 for NIS and \$200 for self-initiated procurement).

Thus the principal means by which CAB procures raw intelligence in the form of documents and publications is through the "beg" request (for gratis copies). Whereas CAB holds the authority for instructing and guiding the Publications Procurement Officers, and has general responsibility for acquisition and distribution of foreign publications, S&R holds the authority over funds for procuring this material. The distinction made between procurement of specific titles and subject categories is frequently arbitrary, confusing to the analyst, and wasteful of effort.

Finally, it should be noted that CAB is rendering a purchasing service for a number of outside agencies, in return for which it receives no reimbursement other than the cost of the material itself. Thus, the State Department is furnishing a portion of its payroll to provide a purchasing service for others.

C - ORGANIZATIONAL REVISIONS

The actions suggested to correct the above problems are both organizational and procedural in nature. Before procedural revisions can be considered, however, it is necessary to conceive of the proper organizational solution:

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FUNDS ALLOCATED FOR PUBLICATIONS PROCUREMENT IN FISCAL YEAR 1952

Administered by LR		Administered by IAD	
<u>FISCAL YEAR TO DATE-1952</u>		<u>FISCAL YEAR TO DATE-1952</u>	
LR Funds	\$21,330	Suballotted from LR	
NIS Funds	8,300	NIS	\$1,700
IAD (Suballotted)	1,700	Regular	<u>200</u> \$1,900
FSI	1,500		
Other Funds		Working Funds Appropriations	
IE Program	\$6,899	(Confidential, CIA-Special,	
LR/P	344	IAD/WF JPRS)	46,428
Mission Libraries	4,790		
TCA	6,139	Other Working Funds	
Miscellaneous	<u>2,826</u>	(Army Map Service, Army	
	20,998	Medical Lib., Treasury Dept.	
*Total	\$53,828	Library)	8,350
1. TCA orders expected to amount to \$34,000.		Procurement Under Foreign Service	
2. Mission Libraries orders expected to amount to \$35 - \$45,000.		Serial (Payment direct from	
3. LR funds received from S&R are earmarked for books (\$6,546) and periodicals (\$13,244).		agency funds - including Library	
4. NIS Funds are not earmarked. LR establishes the basic division of funds: Books (\$3,950) and periodicals (\$2,835).		of Congress, Department of Agriculture, Department of Labor)	8,000
LR-Funds last year approximated		Special Deposits (Reimbursable	
LR and NIS		Basis) (American Chemical Soc.,	
Books	\$ 28,000	Rand Corp., Stefausson Library,	
Newspapers	18,000	Johns Hopkins University)	<u>1,763</u>
Periodicals	15,000		\$ 66,441
	\$ 61,000		
Other (TCA, FSS)	74,000		
	<u>\$135,000</u>		

* These funds represent only partial allotments to date.

Exhibit XVII-4

1. Create an Integrated Publications Division to Reduce Supervision Expense and Lay the Foundation for Overcoming Duplication.

The structure of the proposed division should follow the principles illustrated in Exhibit XVII-5. To this division should be assigned all of the functions, responsibilities and personnel now lodged in the Selection and Records Section of LR and the Civilian Agencies Branch of IAD. In its combined form the organization should serve the needs of LR, IAD, State Department and other agencies.

The consolidation will produce several immediate advantages:

- a. One procurement organization can make the decision for each request as to the most suitable method of procurement, and control the follow-up of procurement requests.
- b. Receiving and distribution will be merged under single supervision.
- c. Administration of all funds will be placed under one jurisdiction.
- d. Only one over-all supervisor will be required. Thus, an immediate savings of one supervisory position should result.

2. Establish in the New Division a Distribution Section

This Section should comprise a Chief, 6 Publications Clerks, 6 Library Assistants and a Mail Clerk. An immediate reduction of one supervisory position should be possible.

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In accomplishing this amalgamation, two objectives should be sought:


a. Eliminate the duplication that exists in the recording of incoming serial publications. The eight Publications Clerks of CAB during the month of December recorded the receipt of 45,165 publications, an average of 5,650 per person. During this same period, four positions in the Selection and Records checked-in 16,570 publications, a monthly average of 4,140 items. The difference in production reflects the additional function in S&R of attaching circulation cards.

Workload statistics for the month of December (a reasonably representative month) were interpreted to determine the degree of duplicated effort. While statistics are not maintained as to the exact number of copies distributed by CAB to S&R, estimates made both by S&R and CAB indicate that duplicate recording now applies to 8,300 receipts per month. Based upon an average production rate of 5,650 pieces per month, this represents the equivalent of almost 1.5 full-time positions.

b. Organize the distributors on an area basis. At present the Distribution Unit of CAB is organized on an area basis, generally along the lines of the area divisions established in OIR. The Serial Records Unit (S&R) is organized on an alphabetical basis. It is recommended that the new Distribution Section be organized on an area basis to secure the benefits of area knowledge and to improve routing to the OIR branches. (The workload by area must be evaluated to determine the most practical personnel assignments. A domestic unit to check-in and distribute U. S. publications should be included.)

PROPOSED ORGANIZATION-PUBLICATIONS DIVISION

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE SERVICES



3. Establish In the New Organization a Procurement Section

A single section to select for purchase, process requisitions, issue purchase orders and beg requests, and maintain follow-up of procurement requests can be formed by the following actions:

- Transfer the Order Unit of S&R (consisting of a Chief of Operations, Selection Officer, Searcher, one Unit Chief, and four Clerical Assistants) to the new Procurement Section.
- Assign to this Section those people involved in CAB procurement functions, including the Procurement Officer, four Procurement Aides, and the Fiscal Assistant. Transfer also from CAB the Files and Correspondence Unit, consisting of six people.

This Section will require one chief. Internally its structure should be organized along area interests. An important benefit which should be sought is the elimination of duplicate filing and typing effort. Study of correspondence to the field recorded by CAB for the month of December, 1951, indicated that 44 percent of the items handled originated in S&R. Reduction in this duplicate handling should effect a savings of at least one position.

D - PROCEDURAL REVISIONS

The remaining recommendations cover a series of procedural revisions which should proceed following the amalgamation of the two organization units. See Exhibits XVII-6 and XVII-7 for proposed work flow.

1. Merge the Serial Record Files and Create A Uniformly Complete File Suitable for Distribution and Follow-Up

The first major procedural revision required is a merger of the two independent records of holdings. In this connection, it is recommended

that:

a. The two files be completely compared and, whenever a duplicate record is found, the basic cards be merged in the file, with the CAB check-in becoming the permanent record of holdings.


b. There be added to the CAB records such data as required to accomplish complete distribution and follow-up from one central record. Frequency of publication and the publisher's name and address are believed essential to timely and accurate follow-up. All material which is to be circulated must be so indicated in the basic record.

2. Assign Full Responsibility for Recording and Distribution to Area Distributors


In order to expedite the processing of materials upon receipt, it should be the objective to assign responsibility for completing both recording and distribution determination to the area distributors. This objective implies two changes in procedure, as follows:

a. For IR-retention items which are circulated upon receipt, the distributor who records the item should prepare and attach the circulation card, release the serial for delivery to the first recipient, and forward the remaining copies of the circulation card to IR for inclusion in the charge file.

b. For items on which distribution has not been established prior to receipt, it is recommended that the area distributor establish distribution to the fullest possible extent instead of referring such material to a supervisor for decision. To make this revision possible, it will be desirable to decentralize the order files to the distributors'



PROPOSED PROCUREMENT PROCEDURES
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desks, and to give these desks responsibility for marking receipt on the correspondence and searching, as necessary, the Post Order Files and the Monograph Order Book.

3. Eliminate the Present Receiving Unit in S&R and Reduce the Personnel Assigned.

The creation of a single point of receipt and distribution will eliminate the need for a subordinate routing point in IR to control the flow of materials to Cataloging Section and Ready Reference Subsection. Thus the functions now performed in the S&R Receiving Unit can be largely discontinued, and the remnant duties of sorting documents, marking catalog numbers on publications and routing to the Post Files assumed by the Cataloging Section itself. A savings of one to two positions is anticipated.

4. Simplify the Recording of Publications Having Multiple Distribution When all Copies Arrive in the Same Shipment.

Each copy of a publication received in CAB is checked in against each requesting agency. In those cases where two or more copies of the same publication are procured, CAB estimates that all copies are received in the same delivery in over 80 percent of the cases. It would appear possible to simplify posting in these cases by making a single entry to indicate receipt of all copies. Partial shipments would be recorded as at present.

A savings of 5 percent in posting effort should be realized from the above.

5. Discontinue the Recording of Single-Copy Newspapers, and Rely Upon the Ordering Division to Initiate Follow-Up Action.

Approximately 44 percent of the items recorded in CAB records are daily newspapers (35,000 pieces were received in December 1951). Most issues are received in one copy only (average 1.1 copies per issue). The principal purpose of the recording is to establish a record of receipt from which knowledge of nonreceipt can be obtained and timely follow-up action taken. However, the large volume and high frequency of receipt render this approach burdensome, and its necessity is doubtful as demonstrated by the current experience of CAB.

- For example, it was found that CAB finds it practicable to take follow-up action at present only after several weeks of missing issues are observed, or until a specific request for follow-up is initiated by the ordering division.
- Furthermore, the importance of regular receipt of such material is of such importance to the analysts that check-in records are likewise found within the research divisions.

It is therefore recommended that a new approach to receipts control be developed with the objective of reducing the posting effort in the central Distribution Section and relying upon receiving divisions to initiate follow-up requests in the case of missing numbers. A suggested procedure is as follows:

- a. Establish a consolidated "flexoline" type index of all newspaper titles showing the number of copies required and the points to which distribution is to be made.
- b. For all single-copy items, limit the function of the Distribution Section to referring to the index and noting the routing re-

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quired. In these cases advise the first recipient, or recipient with primary interest, that identification of the need for follow-up is his responsibility.

c. In the case of multiple-copy receipts, the present central record should be continued for follow-up control.

A savings of one position is anticipated as the result of the above revision.

6. Institute a Systematic Follow-Up Procedure, Employing Mechanical Aids, Both for Purchased and Gift Items.

The major functions of a central serial record are (1) to control distribution and (2) to follow-up delinquent items. The first purpose is properly served by present records, but the second does not now receive systematic and thorough attention (a problem which has been found in other large research libraries). Significant progress in solving this problem is being made, to our knowledge, at the Department of Agriculture, the New York Public Library and the Library of Congress. It is urged that the practices of these institutions be given careful study, and that the following principles be adopted:

a. A systematic plan of "reading the files" to identify items requiring follow-up should be inaugurated. This can be accomplished by assigning this duty to a person who will spend full-time on the task, or by requiring that each distributor spend regular time each week. One device, which is worthy of trial use to expedite files reading, is the use of a movable signal applied to each card for which follow-up action should be assured. The signal is moved upon receipt of the first issue. At intervals (such as monthly) a list is made of all titles

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against which no receipt occurred and all signals returned to the starting position. The follow-up clerk then reviews the delinquent cards and initiates follow-up action as required. While this is not a completely accurate basis of identifying delinquencies, it achieves a regular basis of follow-up on a selective basis at minimum cost.

b. Application of the "photo-clerk" now available in S&R for preparation of follow-up notices should be completed as quickly as possible. This application has been perfected by the Department of Agriculture and can be used with similar beneficial results by the State Department. The equipment is available in S&R, and the Chief of this Section has a plan in mind for its application as soon as materials are available.

c. Follow-up of gift items should be practiced. The major research libraries, which receive a high percent of their serial publications free, keep these titles under follow-up control just as they do purchased titles. It is urged that the State Department adopt the same practice. Use of preprinted form letters for follow-up of such material is recommended, following the successful practice now employed by New York Public Library.

7. Explore the Desirability of Suballotting Funds to the Field for the Initial Purchase of New Periodicals and Newspapers Having Intelligence Value.

Funds expended last year for periodicals and newspapers were limited to the renewal of subscriptions. It is believed that the Publications Procurement Officers located in the area are in the best position to learn of the availability of new publications of intelligence value.

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It therefore appears desirable to set aside specific funds for use by them in the purchase of new materials, subject to control by the Publications Division. To this end an appropriate working fund should be allotted to each PPO for the purchase of initial copies or for initial subscriptions. Subscription renewals should, of course, remain under the control of the Publications Division.

8. Determine the Desirability of Adding a Service Charge to Procurements for Other Agencies, to Cover Actual Administrative Costs.

In order to compensate the Department for its services and provide a more accurate knowledge of procurement costs to requesting agencies, it is proposed that the following steps be taken:

a. Conduct a study of the man-hours and payroll costs (both Washington and field) attributable to the servicing of requests from non-State agencies.

b. If this cost provides sizable, determine the average cost of providing procurement and distribution service per title.

c. Advise agencies being serviced that this fixed service charge will be added to all future orders to reimburse State Department for actual administrative costs.

d. Apply the revenue thus secured to improving the effort devoted to follow-up of delinquent items.

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Summary of Recommendations Regarding The
Procurement and Distribution of Publications

1. Create an integrated Publications Division to reduce supervisions expense and lay the foundation for overcoming duplication.
2. Establish in the new division a Distribution Section.
3. Establish in the new organization a Procurement Section.
4. Merge the serial record files and create a uniformly complete file suitable for distribution and follow-up.
5. Assign full responsibility for recording and distribution to area distributors.
6. Eliminate the present Receiving Unit in S&R and reduce the personnel assigned.
7. Simplify the recording of publications having multiple distribution when all copies arrive in the same shipment.
8. Discontinue the recording of single-copy newspapers, and rely upon the ordering division to initiate follow-up action.
9. Institute a systematic follow-up procedure, employing mechanical aids, for both purchased and gift items.
10. Explore the desirability of suballotting funds to the field for the initial purchase of new periodicals and newspapers having intelligence value.
11. Determine the desirability of adding a service charge to procurements for other agencies to cover actual administrative costs.

Flow charts depicting the revised flow of work appear as Exhibits XVII-6 and XVII-7.

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The above actions should make possible a savings of 7 to 8 positions as follows:

Elimination of one Section Chief	1
Eliminate Receiving Unit of S&R	1-2
Eliminate one of two Procurement Supervisors	1
Eliminate one of two Distribution Supervisors	1
Eliminate duplicate recording (8-10,000 items)	1
Eliminate one clerical due to duplicate filing of OM's and follow-up	1
Discontinue recording of newspapers at a central point by depending upon ultimate receiver to initiate follow-up in case item fails to arrive. Also simplify posting of multiple copy receipts by use of single posting.	<u>1</u>
Total	7-8

XVIII. LR CIRCULATION PROCEDURES

XVIII - IR CIRCULATION PROCEDURES

The Circulation Section of IR is organized primarily to provide for the maintenance of, and the servicing of requests on, the stacks and documents files.

The Circulation Section is organized into five units:

- An Inter-library Loan Unit - consisting of four people who arrange loans from other libraries, principally the Library of Congress. Borrowings are estimated at 900 publications per month.
- A Stack Unit - consisting of eight people, located in Old State and Old Post Office, who shelve new material; charge, discharge and recall circulating volumes; and maintain the name charge file to clear leaving employees.
- A Files Unit - consisting of five people who maintain, charge, discharge, and recall the documents stored in the Classified Documents Files and the Post File.
- A Jeep Service Unit - consisting of two people who make delivery by jeep to and from the stack areas.
- A Binding Unit - presently inactive, whose function is to bind newspapers and periodicals stored in IR stack areas.

The procedures employed by the Circulation Section are shown on Exhibit XVIII - 1 on the following page. These procedures have necessarily been adapted to the physical separation of the stack areas:

<u>Location</u>	<u>Spaces</u>	<u>Storage</u>
Old State	6	Law books, Congressional serials, bound newspapers and all J and K catalog series.
Old Post	1	All remaining books (A-Z catalog series except J and K) and all periodicals.
SA-1	2	Catalogued classified documents and uncatalogued documents.

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To service the State Department buildings from these locations two jeeps make regularly-scheduled hourly trips.

It should be noted at the outset that the present management of IR has been notably progressive in taking steps to overcome certain of the problems with which it has been faced. As a result of a recent self-survey the following actions are now being undertaken:

- Elimination of the Post file. On April 1, 1952 the Post file was discontinued. This file will be weeded to all but one or two percent of its contents. The small number of field reports of retention value will be merged into the classified documents file.
- Reliance upon DC/R as the basic file of field reports will eliminate duplication. In the future IR will rely on DC/R files and reduce the volume of documents catalogued in IR. In this connection DC/R will permit enclosures, after their return, to be screened by IR for cataloguing.
- Reduction in the classified documents file, and re-location of periodicals in SA-1. This file will be weeded about 50% by the elimination of field reports. Once the weeding process has been accomplished, the periodicals located in Old Post will be transferred to SA-1. Plans are also underway to re-activate the binding function and transfer this work to SA-1.


A - FURTHER OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT

The effectiveness of IR in the eyes of the Bureaus is to a large extent measured by the service rendered by the Circulation Section. Comment received during our consumer reaction study, supplemented by our observations, reveals the following problems:

1. Service is Slow.

One study of 90 circulation requests indicates that an average of four hours and 15 minutes is required to process a request and make it available in the Circulation Section. Approximately one hour more is consumed

CIRCULATION PROCEDURES



NOTES

1. Periodicals and documents circulated. After recording by Selection and Records, are received by circulation (SA-1) where cards are detached and publications are immediately forwarded.
2. Almost all periodicals and documents are received from cataloging and S and R with circulation slips attached. Cards sent to stacks for charging.
3. Systems employed in other stack areas similar to those shown for Old Post Office.
4. Two Jeeps, on prearranged schedule, serve 2 stack locations and deliver to all State buildings.
5. If publication charged out, new request is placed behind name card of possessor. Possessor telephoned for recall. Upon return, possessor's catalog number and name card destroyed. Next circulation card charged into catalog and name file.

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in delivering the publication to the requestor.

2. Break-up of Stacks is Costly and Contributes to Slow Service.

There are 13 people, plus two jeep drivers, required to service four basic areas from which holdings are circulated; Old Post, Old State, Catalogued Documents File, and the Post file.

One index of the cost of the separate stack locations is observed from the volume statistics for January 1952. These figures reveal that the Old State Location, with 6 spaces in poor operating areas, is the highest cost operation.

	<u>Stack or Storage Location</u>		
	<u>Old State</u>	<u>Old Post Office</u>	<u>Documents File</u>
Volume	700	9,596	8,245
People	2	4	4
Unit Production	350	2,399	2,061

3. Recall is Not Vigorously Applied, and Ability to Meet Requests is Thus Reduced.

A three-day study of 315 requests handled by the Stack Unit in Old Post Office revealed that 37.5% could not be filled until after recall action had been initiated. The present recall procedure is not systematic. As time permits, one telephone call is made to the possessor of the requested item. A second or third follow-up call is not made, nor is there provided an automatic date file for loan recalls.

4. The Jeep Service Contributes Much of the Time Lost in Filling a Request.

A study of 62 circulation requests revealed that it takes 56 minutes from the time the request is received by the Ready Reference Unit until

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it is delivered by jeep to the stack area. The same study of 35 completed requests filled by the stack area revealed that it takes 103 minutes from the time the stack area has finished the transaction and is awaiting jeep pick-up, until the publication is actually received in SA-1. Thus 62% of the time required is consumed by the process of transferring the request and book between SA-1 and the stack areas.

B - RECOMMENDATIONS

A series of steps can be taken to improve Circulation Service to the Department:

1. Press Efforts to Consolidate All Stacks in the Old Post Office.

It is reported that present negotiations indicate that additional space may be made available in the Old Post Office Building. Currently IR occupies almost one-half of the first floor area and has been attempting to obtain further space adjoining this location on the same floor. It is urged that the A Area of the Department give active attention to this move in the interest of improved Circulation Service and reduced operating costs. Savings of one to two positions should be possible, plus better supervision and improved utilization of jeep equipment.

2. Move Ready Reference Unit of the Reference Division to the Circulation Section.

Each circulation request is first received by the Ready Reference Subsection of the Reference Section, where a circulation card is prepared and the item is identified in the catalog. The catalog number is recorded, and the card is held awaiting pick-up by the jeep.

If the request is not available in IR's holdings, Ready Reference will review the holdings of other libraries, primarily the Library of

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Congress. If an outside source is located, the request is turned over to the Inter-Library Loan Unit of the Circulation Section for handling.

It is recommended that Ready Reference be assigned to the Circulation Section so that responsibility for the entire cycle of receiving and filling a request can be concentrated under single supervision.

The management of IR is aware of this problem and is planning steps to correct it.

3. Consider the Installation of Teletype Service between SA-1 and the Two Stack Areas.

In order to eliminate the 56-minute delay observed in delivering the circulation request to the stack area, it is recommended that a teletype system be installed between Ready Reference in SA-1 and the Old State and Old Post Office Buildings.

An important feature of this equipment is that the paper printing roll may be pre-printed with the circulation card form on both the sending and receiving machines. Thus the receipt of the request at the stack location will occur simultaneously with its preparation in SA-1.

The following procedure is recommended:

- a. Upon receipt of a request for circulation, the Ready Reference Assistant will identify the catalog number from the catalog.
- b. The Assistant will then type the book or document number, author, title, and requestor on the pre-printed form (only a single copy on the sending machine will be required).
- c. On the receiving machine the message will be recorded on a four-part set in the same form as it is being typed on the sending machine.

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d. The circulation copy will be removed, and the regular procedure of charging and issuing will proceed.

Under this procedure, analysts and documents clerks would be furnished a pad of requisition slips (size 3x5") in lieu of the four-part form sets which they are now asked to submit.

The cost of the teletype equipment will be approximately \$100 per month. Installation charges are \$25 per machine. Monthly rental charges are \$25, plus 25% tax, for each machine, plus a line service charge each month of \$.75/one-quarter mile.

4. Establish and Enforce a Reasonable Period of Loan for All IR Materials.

IR in the past has followed a policy of permitting unlimited retention of borrowed material which is not in demand. This has had an important bearing on the speed of circulation service, requiring recall action for about 1/3 of the items requested. In order to correct this situation, it is considered necessary to adopt a reasonable loan period and apply more aggressive measures in its administration. To this end, it is recommended that a period of one month be established for books and two weeks for periodicals, and that materials required beyond these limits be recharged. A regular date tickler file should be established to systematize the follow-up procedure.

5. Specialize One Jeep in Servicing the R Area, by the Introduction of a Dispatching System to Control Jeep Movements.

Since the R Area (SA-1) borrows 55 to 60 percent of the total loans from the stack areas, it is desirable that one jeep be scheduled so as to give first preference to IR's principal customer.

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In order to introduce this revision without a reduction in delivery service to other locations, it is recommended that a system of dispatching the two jeeps from the stack area be adopted in lieu of the present fixed itinerary. Dispatching would be based upon the volume of deliveries on hand for any particular area at the time a jeep is ready for departure. Thus, one jeep may be assigned by the stack chief to run between SA-1 and the stack areas for a good portion of a day if the current volume warrants. Then, if the volume drops off or shifts to other buildings, the stack chief would issue to the driver an itinerary covering other buildings from which calls had been received. Complete coverage of all locations would be necessary at less frequent intervals during each day.

To control jeep utilization under the dispatch system, the drivers should prepare a simple trip report showing: time of departure, destination, and time of arrival.

These proposals will become feasible with the consolidation of stacks in one location, as outlined above.

6. Charge All Material Circulated in OIR to the Branch Documents Clerks.

In order to relate circulation service to the proposed plan of documents flow control (Chapter XVI), it is recommended that all material issued to an analyst be charged to the branch documents control clerk. The documents control clerk will then be responsible for (1) delivering the material to the analyst and (2) maintaining a charge file from which recall action can be taken. The control clerk can in this manner relieve the analyst of all concern with recall and recharging, at the same time

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assisting IR in securing the prompt return of material which has served its purpose.

Summary of Recommendations Regarding Circulation Service

1. Press Efforts to Consolidate All Stacks in the Old Post Office.
2. Move Ready Reference to the Circulation Section.
3. Consider the Installation of Teletype Service between SA-1 and and the Two Stack Areas.
4. Establish and Enforce a Reasonable Period of Loan for All IR materials.
5. Specialize One Jeep in Servicing the R Area, by the Introduction of a Dispatching System to Control Jeep Movements.
6. Charge All Material Circulated In OIR to the Branch Documents Clerks.

XIX. RECORDS MANAGEMENT

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XIX - RECORDS MANAGEMENT

During the past three years records management has come to be recognized as one of the important speciality fields of administrative management in the Federal Government. Great impetus was given this subject by the report of the Hoover Commission, followed by the enactment of legislation on June 30, 1949, which gave responsibility to the General Services Administration for promoting this speciality. The State Department was quick to follow this lead, creating in 1950 a staff (DC/RM) to carry forward this program throughout the Department. As yet, however, the work of this staff has not reached the R Area.

During our interviews and observations throughout R, a number of conditions were noted which illustrate the need for active, specialized attention to the problems of indexing, filing, and disposition of materials retained for use by the divisions.

- When measured in terms of volume alone (see Exhibit XIX-1) filed materials present a large and ever-growing administrative problem. Today there are 1,867 filing cabinets of material in the R Area, an average of 2 1/2 cabinets for every employee.
- Space-wise these cabinets occupy 15,869 square feet, over 17 percent of the space occupied by the R Area. The significance of this figure becomes even more apparent when it is recognized that space occupied by cabinets would house 126 additional employees.
- But the accumulation has continued to mount each year. In the twelve months ended March 1952, 122 new cabinets were added, 100 in OIR. To date efforts to weed files or reduce the accumulation have been made only in isolated instances, but with substantial reduction in cabinets required.

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- More important to R's professional operations than the above is the importance of making files of maximum use for research purposes, by assuring proper indexing and the use of suitable filing aids (cabinets, guides, and folders). Here a profusion of practices now exist, most based upon "home-grown" systems. (A notable exception is the highly professional numeric classification system developed by the China Branch.)

PROPOSED RECORDS MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

Records Managements needs strong emphasis at this time because it is to the busy producer a housekeeping task which is easy to neglect. This tendency should be combatted, not only in the interest of economy of space and equipment, but also because of the greater convenience to the producer of systematically organized and uncongested files. To this end the following steps are suggested:

1. Establish in the Division of Executive Services a Full-Time "Records Management Officer" Chosen for Thorough Familiarity with Filing Systems and Equipment as well as Modern Record Retention Practices.

For a period of one to two years the accumulation of records management problems in R will justify the continuous efforts of a specialist. It is recommended that this officer be selected in cooperation with DC/RM (if practicable, on detail from this staff) with the possibility in view of his returning to DC/RM after a satisfactory program has been installed.

Organizational Unit	Cabinets		Space		Number of Cabinets Added in One Year
	Number	No. Per Person	Required for	% Total	
<u>TOTALS</u>					
<u>R Area</u>	<u>1,867</u>	<u>2.5</u>	<u>15,869</u>	<u>17.2</u>	<u>122</u>
R/ES	21	1.0	178	5.2	
OIR	870	1.8	7,395	12.9	100
OLI	976	4.2	8,296	26.4	
<u>OIR Divs.</u>					
OIR/OD	98	1.5	833	8.0	0
DRA	92	2.7	782	17.6	6
DRF	188	2.1	1,598	15.3	24
DRN	122	1.6	1,037	13.4	25
DRW	146	1.6	1,241	11.3	15
DRS	135	1.9	1,147	15.6	-17
DFI	89	1.9	756	13.0	47
<u>OLI Divs.</u>					
OLI/OD	4	1.0	34	11.8	0
BI*	309	4.6	2,626	26.4	22
IAD	63	1.0	535	7.2	<u>n a</u>
IR	600	6.1	5,100	39.2	<u>n a</u>

* Includes 92 five-and six-drawer 4"x6" card file cabinets.

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2. Inaugurate under the Guidance of this Officer a Comprehensive Attack on R's Filing and Records Management Problems.

The following efforts should occupy the attention of the Records Management Officer:

a. The establishment of record-retention schedules. This, as the first task, will necessitate a complete analysis of the categories of materials now in file and the rate at which their active reference value declines. It should be the objective to prepare in detail for each division an itemization of materials by classes showing, for example:

- (1) Those which should be held in active files permanently.
- (2) Those which can be transferred for storage to the Records Service Center (operated by DC/RM) after a specified time interval.
- (3) Those which can be destroyed after a specific time interval.
- (4) Those which due to bulk and lasting importance might better be maintained in microfilm form, thus permitting the destruction of the original.

The drawing of these schedules must, of course, be accomplished in collaboration with the professional staff. For this purpose, the Director, OIR, might wish to designate a "Committee on Records Management" to prepare recommended schedules for his approval, the Records Management Officer to serve as the secretary and staff officer to the Committee.

b. As quickly as retention schedules are approved, the program should move into a second phase of systematic weeding of files in

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accordance with the schedule. (Two self-conducted weeding projects have been noted - one in DRA and another in China Branch - which have produced significant results.)* As part of this step, regular file weeding procedures should be developed for continuing administration by the administrative officer of each division. For example, one procedural device sometimes employed is the segregation of material of temporary value on a current basis in order to facilitate its transfer or destruction at the agreed-upon intervals.

c. As his final major contribution, the Records Management Officer should provide direct assistance to each branch in (1) improvement and standardization of the indexing scheme and (2) the improvement in the physical arrangement and housing of materials, particularly with respect to the proper use of guides and folders.

3. Adopt the Plan of Replacing Non-Safe Files with Five-Drawer Units in the Interest of Space Savings.

If all present non-safe files equipment could be replaced with five-drawer units, a reduction of about 15% in floor space occupied by files would be achieved. This represents an addition to existing office space of 2,380 square feet or room for 19 more people.

Five-drawer file cabinets are designed so that very little additional is added to the over-all height. Many government departments have standardized on five-drawer cabinets exclusively. In the R Organization, the top drawer could be used for the night time lock-up in many cases.

* DRA's recent file clean-up reduced file space 16%; the China Branch saved 3 out of 38 cabinets (8%).

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It is proposed that all new file cabinet equipment be five-drawer and that five-drawer cabinets be substituted for four-drawer on a gradual basis.

Summary of Recommendations

1. Establish in the Division of Executive Services a full-time "Records Management Officer."
2. Inaugurate an aggressive records management program.
3. Adopt a plan of replacing present equipment with five-drawer units in the interest of space savings.

XX. CHECK LIST SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

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XX. CHECK-LIST SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

A condensed statement of the findings and proposals growing out of this survey of the R Area is presented following page 69 in the Summary Report (Volume I). Volume II has presented further detail relevant to installation and has thus brought out additional key points which should be reviewed by management, from time to time, in assessing installation progress.

A total of 110 detailed recommendations is contained in the nineteen chapters of Volume II. These are itemized below, with a reference to the page on which each is discussed:

1. Conduct "market studies" of R Area products and services for three main purposes. (See Page I-2):
 - a. To identify the composition and needs of R's various audiences.
 - b. To determine practical ways in which to develop the understanding, interest, and acceptance of self-initiated services by these audiences.
 - c. To assess, periodically, the specific interests and needs of the audiences, so that the portion of R's work which should be based on audience interest is properly performed.
2. At least once each year analyze, by personal interview, the reactions of those who constitute the target users. These interviews should be conducted by a team composed of a representative of the R Area and one from the A Area, based upon (see Page I-6):

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- a. A well-chosen cross section.
 - b. A preplanned and tested questionnaire.
 - c. Supplementary devices including sample kits of products and lists of projects in process.
3. On a more opportunistic basis, develop means of canvassing the views of by-product users, particularly those at foreign posts and those in the IAC agencies. (See Page I-9).
4. Conduct spot studies of consumer attitude from time to time to meet a particular need expressed by the EG or a division. These will be aimed at securing views regarding a specific product or category of products. (See Page I-10).
5. Following each survey of target users, conduct a discussion with the producing branch, followed by the preparation of a full report of findings and conclusions. (See Page I-11).
6. Delegate responsibility for action upon the findings of consumer reaction studies to line management, rather than to the interviewer, but keep the latter informed of actions taken and enlist his participation in their implementation when appropriate. (See Page I-12).
7. Create a new vehicle of substantive liaison with each Bureau, in the form of an "Intelligence Consultant" to each Assistant Secretary and the corresponding officer in charge of each functional area.

XX - 2

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A condensed statement of the findings and proposals growing out of this survey of the R Area is presented following page 69 in the Summary Report (Volume I). Volume III has presented further detail relevant to installation and has thus brought out additional key points which should be reviewed by management, from time to time, in assessing installation progress.

A total of 110 detailed recommendations is contained in the nineteen chapters of Volume II. These are itemized below, with a reference to the page on which each is discussed:

1. Conduct "market studies" of R Area products and services for three main purposes. (See Page I-2):
 - a. To identify the composition and needs of R's various audiences.
 - b. To determine practical ways in which to develop the understanding, interest, and acceptance of self-initiated services by these audiences.
 - c. To assess, periodically, the specific interests and needs of the audiences, so that the portion of R's work which should be based on audience interest is properly performed.
2. At least once each year analyze, by personal interview, the reactions of those who constitute the target users. These interviews should be conducted by a team composed of a representative of the R Area and one from the A Area, based upon (see Page I-6):

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- a. A well-chosen cross section.
 - b. A preplanned and tested questionnaire.
 - c. Supplementary devices including sample kits of products and lists of projects in process.
3. On a more opportunistic basis, develop means of canvassing the views of by-product users, particularly those at foreign posts and those in the IAC agencies. (See Page I-9).
4. Conduct spot studies of consumer attitude from time to time to meet a particular need expressed by the EG or a division. These will be aimed at securing views regarding a specific product or category of products. (See Page I-10).
5. Following each survey of target users, conduct a discussion with the producing branch, followed by the preparation of a full report of findings and conclusions. (See Page I-11).
6. Delegate responsibility for action upon the findings of consumer reaction studies to line management, rather than to the interviewer, but keep the latter informed of actions taken and enlist his participation in their implementation when appropriate. (See Page I-12).
7. Create a new vehicle of substantive liaison with each Bureau, in the form of an "Intelligence Consultant" to each Assistant Secretary and the corresponding officer in charge of each functional area.

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(See Page II-7).

8. Reinforce this revised approach to consumer relations by a clear policy regarding the participation of branch chiefs and senior analysts. (See Page II-9).

9. Appoint a "Consumer Relations Coordinator" to conduct the program of consumer reaction studies outlined. (See Page II-10).

10. Renew efforts to secure more interest in, and systematic guidance to, R's major program of estimates and research on the part of leaders in the Department. (See Page II-12).

11. Take similar steps to secure improvements in interdepartmental relationships. (See Page II-13).

12. Develop a visual-oral presentation designed to introduce the intelligence organization to new Bureau officials. (See Page III-4).

13. Plan a continuing indoctrination program. (See Page III-5).

14. Develop and maintain an Intelligence Bibliography for active use by Bureau desk officials. (See Page III-6).

15. Provide a personalized reference service for Bureau officials based upon a survey of reference needs. (See Page III-7).

16. Lodge responsibility for the development, coordination, and guidance of the above programs in the Consumer Relations Coordinator. (See Page III-8).

17. Base initial report distribution on a proper evaluation of the "audience factor" and the "need-to-know factor" for each report. In this connection, establish three principal distribution categories: limited, normal, and general. (See Page IV-4).

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18. Charge the Consumer Relations Coordinator with supervising distribution policies and assuring the most suitable basis of distribution within each Bureau. (See Page IV-7).

19. Supplant the weekly and monthly lists of projects in process and completed through the use of "tailored bibliographies" and abstracts. (See Page IV-8).

20. Conduct a periodic audit of mailing lists for serial publications. (See Page IV-9).

21. Establish a "Classification Control Officer" with individual authority (to be used when conditions warrant) to establish the security classification of reports. (See Page V-4).

22. Establish a systematic program of classification review and revision to be administered by the Classification Control Officer. (See Page V-4).

23. Permit the Classification Control Officer to work directly with classification control officers in other agencies to expedite classification revision actions. (See Page V-5).

24. Develop field instructions (and utilize other published media) to increase the usefulness of classified field reports as intelligence source materials. (See Page V-6).

25. Require each analyst to justify the security classification he assigns to his reports, and to provide other information helpful in classification revision actions. (See Page V-6).

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26. Institute a seminar-type analysts' training program in the proper application of security classification. (See Page V-7).

27. Establish a "Current Intelligence Coordinator" as a member of the Estimates Group. (See Page VI-12).

28. Designate Current Intelligence Officers at the branch level and eliminate the part-time officers at the division level. (See Page VI-13).

29. Give consideration to issuing single-topic IB's for "pin-pointed" distribution and to discontinuing the DIC series. (See Page VI-16).

30. Discontinue the Current Intelligence Committee as a formal instrument for the development and processing of written current intelligence products. (See Page VI-16).

31. Provide a plan for the periodic evaluation of the current intelligence production of OIR. (See Page VI-17).

32. Eliminate the requirement for the production of DDB's, except where pronounced benefit can be derived. (See Page VI-18).

33. Explore the relative roles of OIR and CIA/OCI with respect to the production of current intelligence in State Department's fields of dominant interest. (See Page VI-18).

34. Identify at once a set of simple techniques which will improve the textual display, pointedness of presentation, and ease of reference to reports. See Appendix A for actual illustrations. (See also Page VII-5).

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35. Publish these techniques immediately to all analysts, supervisors, and editors and supplement them with frequent bulletins illustrating current cases of good as well as undesirable practices. (See Page VII-6).

36. Appoint a well-qualified editor in each OIR division. (See Page VII-7).

37. Develop a "Report Preparation Manual" as a long-term project. (See Page VII-8).

38. When the Manual is completed, conduct systematic training in report preparation both for analysts and typists. (See Page VII-9).

39. Improve the readability and attention-getting value of R's reports by continuing attention to physical appearance. (See Page VII-10).

40. Retain a recognized figure in the field of social science research to conduct a systematic appraisal of R's professional staff at intervals of approximately two years. (See Page VIII-1).

41. As a continuing objective, provide Research Aides (GS-7) to support the work of the analysts and to permit the most productive use of professional time. (See Page IX-6).

42. Determine the proper placement of Research Aides in the organization by a regular program of "Personnel Requirements Analysis." (See Page IX-9).

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43. Concentrate special program and special project work in a small number of specialists in each branch. This suggestion is advanced in order to minimize interruptions to the regular production of timely research by the research analysts. (See Page IX-13).

44. Recognize the strong incentive provided by realistic man-hour estimates and project deadlines. (See Page IX-15).

45. Apply clearly defined elements of project management by first line supervision. (See Page IX-16).

46. Provide adequate supporting services to the analysts so as to eliminate the use of professional time for clerical or administrative functions; and improve LR service. (See Page IX-18).

47. Formally request the Foreign Service Institute to establish a reading rate improvement course as quickly as possible. Assist the FSI in establishing the course. (See Page X-8).

48. Schedule R's participation in the reading rate improvement course. (See Page X-8).

49. Establish a permanent Committee on Professional Development. (See Page XI-6).

50. Establish the position of "Training Coordinator" in the Division of Executive Services. (See Page XI-7).

51. Institute regular branch staff meetings throughout the R organization. (See Page XI-9).

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52. Establish an organized program of professional seminars, of three types. (See Page XI-10):

- General Interest
- International Relations
- Economic

53. Adopt a program of personalized and inspirational guidance for senior analysts. Do this on a scheduled basis. (See Page XI-12).

54. Adopt and use a "project performance rating" system for analysts to supplement the regular State Department performance rating. Use the proposed system to recognize and encourage good performance and to suggest specific performance factors subject to improvement by the analyst. (See Page XI-14).

55. Develop a program of field trips on a scheduled basis for senior analysts to improve country and area knowledge, as well as professional skill and research performance. (See Page XI-15).

56. Organize a program of Bureau assignments for analysts. (See Page XI-16).

57. Institute a program of executive development specifically "tailored" to the needs of senior analysts selected as potential supervisory candidates. (See Page XI-17).

58. Install the unit office plan of office layout in one branch of a research division as a test installation. Expand the use of this equipment following appraisal of the test installation. (See Page XII-6).

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59. Establish report writing rooms in several locations in SA-1 with unit office plan furniture and dictating equipment. (See Page XII-8).

60. Provide dictating equipment for those analysts who will demonstrate effective use. Establish a short training course for dictators and transcribers to assure proper operation and maximum use. Consider placing dictating equipment in LR for analyst use. (See Page XII-9).

61. Develop a space management plan for the R organization including (see Page XII-10):

- a. A statement of objectives and actions.
- b. A schedule of action.
- c. A vigorous housekeeping program.
- d. Regular assistance in developing efficient office layouts.

62. Expand the responsibilities and authorities of the Space Officer (Division of Executive Services). (See Page XII-11).

63. Devote attention to production planning and control which is as vigorous and competent as that now applied to the professional aspects of the work. (See page XIII-8).

64. Install, as quickly as pilot testing has been conducted, a complete production planning and scheduling procedure, as outlined in detail in Appendix G. (See page XIII-10).

65. Develop from the approved work plan a specific man-hour objective and time schedule for each project. (See Page XIII-12).

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66. Utilize work planning and control data in developing budget presentations and in allocating R's manpower and financial resources. (See Page XIII-14).

67. Utilize the approved work plan as a primary basis for the forward planning of raw intelligence requirements in each branch. (See Page XIII-15).

68. Delegate to the Requirements Planning Coordinator responsibility for continuing study of new and more productive devices for planning and procuring intelligence materials. (See Page XIII-17).

69. Strengthen the Estimates Group as the top program and quality control arm of the Director of Intelligence Research. (See Page XIV-11).

70. Establish a new staff, supplanting PCS, to develop techniques for work planning and scheduling and to keep their functioning under continuing scrutiny. (See Page XIV-14).

71. Establish in each division an Assistant Chief (Production) to concentrate on all aspects of control management. (See Page XIV-21).

72. Place functional coordinators in the Division of Functional Intelligence. (See Page XIV-24).

73. Eliminate divisional Coordinators of Current Intelligence and support programs by designating analysts with primary responsibility for these functions in each branch. (See Page XIV-24).

74. Create an integrated Office of Intelligence Services to administer all functions which provide supporting service to the research organization, to the State Department, and to other IAC agencies. (See Page XIV-26).

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75. Establish four divisions within the Office of Intelligence Services, transferring BI to the Director of Intelligence Research. (See Page XIV-26).

76. Revise the functions of the Administrative Officer in each division to those of a full counterpart of the Office of Intelligence Services. (See Page XIV-30).

77. Establish the Deputy Special Assistant as a fully-functioning, over-all manager of the R Area. (See Page XIV-33).

78. Revise the present system of meetings, reports, and instructions to reflect the organization and control proposals previously outlined. (See Page XIV-34).

79. Renew efforts to strengthen the teamwork on intelligence research planning at the top policy levels in the Department and among leaders of the IAC agencies. (See Page XIV-36).

80. Adopt the microfilm unit-card plan as a rapid and inexpensive method for the maintenance of biographic files. (See Page XV-7).

81. Produce field exchange and peripheral biographic cards as a by-product of the microfilm unit card plan. (See Page XV-12).

82. Test the proposed BI files maintenance procedure and develop refinements through a pilot installation in one branch. (See Page XV-17).

83. Consolidate existing biographic card files through the use of space-saving features of the microfilm "window jacket card." (See Page XV-12).

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84. Establish a Central Production Unit in BI to fix responsibility for producing a finished card ready for filing. (See Page XV-19).

85. Combine, in the present Message Center, the routing functions and personnel now in PCS, LR, MLB and CLB, to form a single "Documents Distribution Unit" in IAD. (See Page XVI-8).

86. Organize the readers assigned to the Documents Distribution Unit on an area basis. (See Page XVI-10).

87. Install and maintain routing guides to reflect the requirements of the research divisions. (See Page XVI-12).

88. Route documents directly to the branch level in R to reduce handling and delay. (See Page XVI-12).

89. Route despatches to the Reading Panel after the readers have indicated the number of copies and the distribution for the R Area. (See Page XVI-13).

90. Revise documents review and routing at the branch level in accordance with proposals governing the use of the Current Intelligence Officer and research Aides. (See Page XVI-14).

91. Create an integrated Publications Division to reduce supervision expense and lay the foundation for overcoming duplication. (See Page XVII-7).

92. Establish a Distribution Section in this Division. (See Page XVII-7).

93. Establish a Procurement Section in the new organization. (See Page XVII-9).

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94. Merge the serial publications record files and create a uniformly complete file suitable for distribution to designation and follow-up for receipt. (See Page XVII-9).

95. Assign full responsibility for recording and distribution to area distributors. (See Page XVII-10).

96. Eliminate the present Receiving Unit in S&R and reduce the personnel assigned. (See Page XVII-11).

97. Simplify the recording of publications having multiple distribution when all copies arrive in the same shipment. (See Page XVII-11).

98. Discontinue the recording of single-copy newspapers and rely upon the ordering division to initiate follow-up action when necessary. (See Page XVII-12).

99. Institute a systematic follow-up procedure, employing mechanical aids, for both purchased and gift items. (See Page XVII-13).

100. Explore the desirability of suballotting funds to the field for the initial purchase of new periodicals and newspapers having intelligence value. (See Page XVII-14).

101. Determine the desirability of adding a service charge to procurements for other agencies to cover actual administrative and handling costs. (See Page XVII-15).

102. Press efforts to consolidate all stacks in the Old Post Office. (See Page XVIII-4).

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103. Move Ready Reference to the Circulation Section. (See Page XVIII-4).

104. Consider the installation of teletype service between SA-1 and the two stack areas. (See Page XVIII-5).

105. Establish and enforce a reasonable period of loan for all LR materials. (See Page XVIII-6).

106. Specialize one jeep in servicing the R Area by the introduction of a dispatching system to control jeep movements. (See Page XVIII-6).

107. Charge all material circulated in OIR to the branch documents clerks. (See XVIII-7).

108. Establish in the Division of Executive Services a full-time "Records Management Officer." (See Page XIX-2).

109. Inaugurate an aggressive records management program. (See Page XIX-3).

110. Adopt a plan of replacing non-safe files with five-drawer units in the interest of space savings. (See Page XIX-4).

Summary of Cost and Savings

As a principle, we feel that the objective of the R Area should be to institute the improvements proposed in organization and control (Chapters XIII and XIV) within the framework of R's present budget and personnel ceiling, cutting back if necessary on present overhead

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staffing. These revisions are considered essential to securing proper use of R's products and services, and if vigorously implemented will materially improve the production capacity of the Area.

However, the potential recurring savings discussed in Chapters XV, XVII, and XVIII are of such magnitude as to offset* the net payroll increases recommended in all categories, except the use of Research Aides. (These cannot be introduced immediately unless R finds it possible to expand its research staff or unless the personnel requirements studies proposed in Chapter IX reveal the practicability of effecting replacements of analysts with aides as normal turnover occurs.) This conclusion is based upon the following:

1. Of the New Positions Proposed, Eleven Are, in Effect, Provided in the Present Organization of the Department:

- a. The Director of Production Coordination is the counterpart of the present head of PCS.
- b. The Program Planning Coordinator is a position currently provided for on the staff of PCS.
- c. The Reports Analyst, reporting to the Program Planning Coordinator, is currently (at least in part) in R/ES.
- d. The Consumer Relations Coordinator proposed in Chapter II will perform functions assignable in part to the present Intelligence Advisers. Thus if it can be assumed that advisers will be

*After full installation requiring one to two years.

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discontinued in one or more cases, the payroll savings will more than offset this new responsibility.

e. The positions of Distribution Review Officer and Editorial Standards Officer are, in effect, successors to positions now established in PCS.

f. The Requirements Planning Coordinator is, in large measure, a successor to the present head of ERS.

g. The Assistant for External Research is equivalent to the present assistant to the head of ERS.

h. The Assistant for Guides and Evaluation is considered equivalent to one of the staff members assigned to requirements planning in IAD.

i. The Assistant for Foreign Service Relations is currently provided for in the organization of R/ES.

j. The Current Intelligence Coordinator discussed in Chapter VI is the position now established in PCS.

It is assumed that existing clerical support to the above officers is now available from within the R Area.

2. There Are Seven New Functions Recommended Which Require Some Expansion in Present Personnel Resources (7-10 Positions).

If all the revisions suggested are carried into effect, some additional staff would be required. These functions in the order of their immediate importance, are as follows:

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a. Assistant Division Chiefs (Production). At least two divisions will require an additional position to fill the post of Assistant Division Chief (Production): DRA and DRN. DRW has recently requested such a position. DFI should not require a new position if the present Staff Assistant is assigned the production control responsibility. In DRF a special problem exists; if full use of the executive payroll were available to R, funds would be available to support an Assistant Chief (Production). DRS now has an Assistant Chief but a realignment of duties would be required if his time is to be devoted more fully to the production management responsibility.

The filling of these posts is the most essential of the additional positions required.

b. Division Editors. Second in order of importance to the major improvements proposed is the establishment of uniformly qualified Division Editors. Two divisions now lack such personnel: DRA and DFI. The latter may not require this position.

c. The Classification Control Officer is a new function, though perhaps not a full-time one. The most suitable arrangement might result from appointing such an officer to supplement and supervise the work of the Distribution Review Officer and the Editorial Standards Officer.

d. Two Senior Management Analysts are proposed to conduct studies, particularly those outlined in Chapter IX.

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e. The Training Coordinator is a new function proposed for the Division of Executive Services. This position should be full-time at the outset, it is believed.

f. The Intelligence Evaluation Officer is a new function of the Estimates Group. As discussed in Chapter XIV, it may be found that this effort can be accomplished as an additional duty of the EG Secretary and the Current Intelligence Officer.

g. The Records Management Officer is a new function of the Division of Executive Services. It is possible that an incumbent for this position could be furnished by DC/RM.

A rough estimate of payroll costs arising from the above steps indicates that between seven and ten new positions may be required, at a payroll cost of \$57,000 to \$84,000. From the priority listing, a decision can be made as to those functions to be deferred if funds are unavailable. The minimum and maximum additions are:

<u>Position</u>	<u>Minimum</u>	<u>Maximum</u>
Assistant Chief	2	4
Division Editor	1	1
Classification Control Officer	1 (part time)	1 (full time)
Management Analyst	2	2
Training Coordinator	1 (part time)	1 (full time)
Intelligence Evaluation Officer	(Additional Duty)	(Additional Duty)
Records Management Officer	=	<u>1</u>
	7	10

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3. Against This New Expense, Recurring Annual Savings of \$80,000 Appear Possible.

These savings are represented as follows:

- The merger of R/ES and OLI should result in savings of 1 supervisory position having a salary equivalent of approximately \$10,000.
- The introduction of microfilm unit card processing in BI should produce a net annual savings of approximately \$37,500. It is recognized that this saving will not be obtainable during the first two years due to the cost of experimentation and files conversion. The files consolidation offered by the plan presents additional equipment and office space savings not enumerated here.
- The merger of publications procurement and distribution functions should release between 7 and 8 positions having an estimated annual value of \$27,000.
- The savings which should accrue from the relocation of book stacks located in Old State Building should produce annual payroll savings of approximately \$6,000.

4. Savings Achieved, After Providing for New Payroll Costs, Might Cover a Portion of the New Furniture and Equipment Expense.

Three elements of furniture and equipment expense have been suggested:

- The installation of teletype equipment to expedite communication with the stack areas, estimated at \$1,200 per year in rental costs.
- The purchase of dictating machines, if carried to a maximum degree, should not exceed \$49,000 (based upon providing approximately one unit for each 4 analysts, and including transcribers). Since the useful life of such equipment is at least five to ten years, this investment would be on the order of \$10,000 per year.

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- The utilization of unit office plan furniture should be computed on the basis of the net increase in normal furniture replacement costs. One new and additional item of expense which would not be thus offset is the establishment of four report writing rooms each equipped with about five packaged units. This expenditure should not exceed \$9,000 and again should be prorated over several years. More extensive investment in such furniture should be preceded by a sufficient trial period to demonstrate the greater economy from the point of view of analyst utilization which might be achieved. It is our conclusion that one unit of 27 analysts might be provided with such furniture at a cost of \$12,000 (\$2,400 per year on the basis of five-year amortization).

The pro rata annual cost of the above items approximates a figure of \$15,000. If the new payroll cost is near the minimum figure cited above (\$57,000) ample savings would be available to cover furniture and equipment expense.

A - ILLUSTRATIONS OF IMPROVEMENTS
IN STYLE AND FORMAT

APPENDIX A
ILLUSTRATIONS OF IMPROVEMENTS
IN STYLE AND FORMAT

APPENDIX A
(Appendix to Chapter VII)

APPENDIX A

ILLUSTRATIONS OF IMPROVEMENTS

IN

STYLE AND FORMAT

By Improving Report Appearance

By Improving Readability

By Reducing Time Required to Read

By Assisting the Reader to Comprehend

PART I - IR 5769 - As Originally Issued

PART II - What Was Done to Improve IR 5769

PART III - IR 5769 - As Revised

APPENDIX A

(Appendix to Chapter VII)

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Intelligence Report

No. 5769

PROSPECTS OF JAPANESE TRADE WITH THE
REPUBLIC OF KOREA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Office of Intelligence Research

March 5, 1952

APPENDIX A - PART I

THIS IS AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT AND NOT A STATEMENT OF DEPARTMENTAL POLICY

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This paper was based on available materials covering the period January 1, 1952 to present, analysis of which was concluded on March 3, 1952 by Division of Research for Far East.

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PROSPECTS OF JAPANESE TRADE WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

ABSTRACT

Postwar trade between Japan and the Republic of Korea has been at abnormally low levels, amounting roughly to \$15 million each way. Prospects for an expansion of this trade in the immediate future are dependent on whether Korea obtains UN or other international financial assistance to meet its requirements for economic rehabilitation and reconstruction. Should such assistance become available, Japan could play a significant role in supplying capital equipment, manufactured consumer goods, coal and chemical fertilizer needed by Korea.

Apart from an assistance program financed by outside sources Korea-Japan trade will be governed largely by Korea's ability to expand production of rice for export. Exports to Japan of ores and minerals, marine products, and other commodities can be expanded but are of much smaller importance than potential rice exports, which would find a ready market in Japan. Trade between the two countries might also be expanded through the extension of long-term Japanese credits, both governmental and private, should Korea in the future overcome existing political and psychological blocks against dealing with Japan. At present, however, Japan does not have strong economic incentives to embark on a large trade-credit program to Korea.

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PROSPECTS OF JAPANESE TRADE WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

I. PATTERN OF TRADE BETWEEN JAPAN AND KOREA

From 1910 until 1945, more than 90 percent of Korea's total trade was with Japan proper. In the immediate pre-World War II period almost all Korean trade was within the Japanese Empire (including Manchuria). Total trade with Japan in 1938 and 1939 amounted to 370 and 457 million dollars respectively.

Broadly speaking, the prewar pattern of trade consisted of an exchange of Korean rice, marine products, minerals, and textile raw materials for Japanese textile manufactures, machinery, metal products, vehicles, processed foodstuffs and beverages, fertilizers, and sundry goods. Because of Japan's desire to industrialize Korea for the purpose of strengthening Japan's economic base, trade in the 1930's showed a consistent excess of Korean imports over exports to Japan. Machinery, metal manufactures, and vehicle imports from Japan showed a specially significant increase each year beginning in the mid 1930's.

As a result of World War II, Korea's economy, although not subjected to extensive physical damage, was disrupted by political and economic separation from Japan and by the division of the country into northern and southern political zones. With the partition of Korea and the tightening of the iron curtain at the 38th parallel, the southern zone became heavily dependent on economic aid from abroad.

The Republic of Korea (ROK), which was established in 1948 in the area south of the 38th parallel, is predominantly dependent on agriculture and fishing, and has only minor light and almost no heavy industries. US economic aid brought about a degree of recovery through reconstruction of industry and agriculture, but with the beginning of hostilities in June 1950, much of this progress was negated.

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About 90 to 95 percent of the value of ROK's foreign trade during the post-World War II period has been with the United States. This reflects the almost complete dependence of Korea on US appropriated aid imports during the period. Postwar trade with Japan, although second in importance to the US, was relatively as well as absolutely at low levels. The following table presents Japan's trade with the ROK in the years 1947-51:

	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951 ^a
	(in million US dollars)				
Japanese exports to the ROK (f.o.b.)	18.9	17.9	15.9	18.1	9.1
Japanese imports from the ROK (c.i.f.)	2.5	5.1	3.6	16.0	5.3
Balance	16.4	12.8	12.3	2.1	3.8

- a. Data are for the period January through August 1951; total Japanese exports to and imports from the ROK might be estimated to have amounted to about \$13 million and \$7 million respectively.

The commodity pattern of postwar trade between the ROK and Japan has been generally similar to prewar years, although the volume has been very much less. One significant difference, however, has been the fact that rice exports from Korea, which were most important in the prewar years, were not exported from the ROK, except in 1950. Even in that year, the ROK rice exports to Japan totalled only about 90,000 metric tons as compared to an annual average export of more than one million metric tons in the prewar years. The relatively low level of ROK rice exports even in 1950 and the absence of any rice exports in the earlier postwar years has been due to: (1) the estimated increase of more than one-third in the population of the ROK from the mid-1930's; (2) the low production of rice caused by decreased acreage in rice and the lower productivity per unit of land brought on by a shortage of artificial fertilizers; and (3) the considerable increase in per capita consumption of rice in the ROK, offsetting in part the deficiency in other grains which before 1945 were an

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important component of the Korean diet. Recent hostilities, of course, have once again reduced prospects of significant exports of rice in the immediate future. Other commodities which the ROK normally has for export have also been affected adversely.

Trade between the two countries is at present conducted under the terms of a trade agreement concluded in March 1949 and subsequently renewed in 1950 and 1951. It calls for the conduct of trade on an open account basis with imbalances settled in US dollars. The ROK deficits which have occurred each year from this trade have been met from US aid funds, chiefly through ECA.

II. KOREAN IMPORT REQUIREMENTS AND EXPORT POTENTIAL

A. Requirements

Based on ECA, UNKRA, and CRIK (Civilian Relief in Korea) programs as well as on commercial imports, Korean civilian import requirements on an annual basis during the present war emergency may be estimated at \$180 million. The major commodity import items are listed below:

	In millions of US dollars
Foodstuffs	\$35
Medical and sanitary supplies	15
Clothing, shoes, and textiles	40
Fertilizer and pesticides	50
Coal	8
Petroleum products	5
Transportation equipment	5
Miscellaneous raw materials	5
Raw cotton and yarn	10
Other manufactured goods	7
	<hr/> \$180

These estimated import requirements are based chiefly on relief considerations and do not provide for large scale reconstruction of the economy or for full employment of existing production facilities.

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Should a program of reconstruction and rehabilitation of the economy be instituted by UNKRA after the cessation of hostilities, import requirement for the first year, including relief import items, may be expected to be approximately \$250-\$300 million¹. In the subsequent two or three years, import requirements probably could be reduced gradually to between \$100 to \$150 million a year.² These rough estimates are based on the minimum imports of material and equipment (or parts) required to restore damaged industrial plants, coal mines, transport and public utilities necessary to the economic life of the country, and on minimum requirements of raw cotton, bituminous coal, fertilizer, lumber and cement. Furthermore in making these rough estimates consideration has been given, on the basis of past experience, to Korea's capacity to absorb economic aid at a rate which would not jeopardize internal economic stability by extraordinary demands on limited domestic resources.

B. Korea's Export Potential

Korea's export potential, even with the inclusion of rice which is by far the most important single item, is not significant and recent hostilities have reduced further the immediate export possibilities. It is estimated, however, that once an armistice is reached and rice production and collection is improved, Korea could export substantial quantities of rice,

-
1. The UNKRA program, which was prepared in October 1950, for US fiscal year 1952 roughly estimated reconstruction and rehabilitation requirements at \$250 million. Since this program was prepared, price increases have occurred which would make a comparable program more expensive.
 2. In the ECA budget estimate justification for US fiscal year 1951, it was estimated that Korea's import requirements, including invisibles, might be reduced to approximately \$80 million by 1954, a year in which US aid would no longer be required. It was projected that by that time ECA's industrialization and development program would have substantially raised the level of economic activities in the ROK.

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which would contribute toward reducing the need for foreign assistance. Though rice exports in the prewar years averaged more than one million metric tons annually, exports in the future cannot be expected at such a level. Because of a larger population and higher per capita consumption, Korea's ability to export rice may reach no more than 500,000 metric tons. Exports of this magnitude, of course, would be dependent upon the availability of adequate quantities of commercial fertilizer, weather conditions, and upon the government's determination to meet its balance of payments deficit out of its own trade resources. Other exports of Korea, in the order of their current importance include ores and minerals, marine products, scrap iron, fibers and products, and miscellaneous goods.

Currently Korea is in a slight food deficit position. In the absence of rice exports, Korea's export potential is very low. Excluding the possibility of rice exports,¹ Korea's total exports in 1952 are estimated as follows:

In millions of US dollars

Ores and minerals	\$5
Marine products	3
Scrap iron	3
Fibers and products	1
Others	1
Total	<u>\$13.</u>
	13

There are long-range possibilities of considerably expanding the volume of exports of some of these commodities, but a number of obstacles must be overcome. It should be noted, however, that even if exports of the above items should be increased appreciably in the future, their contribution to Korea's foreign exchange receipts would be relatively small compared to potential receipts from rice exports.

1. A recent estimate made by the United Nations Command, GHQ, G-4, Korean Economic Aid Division, in Civilian Relief and Economic Aid, Korea, February 13, 1952, states that with favorable conditions this Summer and Fall, Korea might have available for export after November, about 200-300,000 tons of rice. RESTRICTED

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Korea's ores and minerals exports include tungsten, amorphous and crystalline graphite, kaolin, manganese, molybdenum, fluorspar, mica, and bismuth. US financial and technical assistance has recently been instrumental in speedily restoring tungsten output because of the strategic importance of this metal, but mines producing other metals and minerals are in need of repair and are currently operating below capacity, if at all. In addition, inadequate financing, shortage of food in mining areas, inadequate supply of mining equipment and electric power and the threat of guerrillas have plagued the mining industry and retarded its recovery.

Korean marine production can be expanded considerably, and if markets can be developed, marine products could contribute significantly towards increasing Korea's foreign exchange receipts. Recently, marine landings have again reached the pre-1950 level.

Other commodities that Korea has for export are of relatively minor importance. Scrap iron exports may continue to be of some importance for the next few years in view of current world-wide shortage of scrap, but cannot be expected to be a recurring item. Similarly other Korean exports including hemp waste, hog bristles, raw silk, cow bristles, furs, honey wax, and cow bone would be small in value terms.

C. Export Markets in Japan

Rice, the most important single commodity that Korea will eventually be able to export, would find a ready market in Japan. The Japanese prefer Korean over Southeast Asian rice since they imported it in substantial quantities for many years before 1945. Furthermore, Japan's food import requirements are rising each year since the increase in population is not matched by an increase in domestic food production. Since the type of goods required by Korea can be met in large part by Japan, Korea's rice exports are likely to be marketed in Japan, as long as prices of other suppliers are not more attractive.

Other items that might be expected to have a ready market in Japan are of relatively small importance as earners of foreign exchange. Korea can export to Japan such items as manganese ore, kaolin, graphite, fluorspar, talc, hemp...

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waste and fish oil. Marine products exports of Korea on the other hand are not likely to find a ready market in Japan.

III. JAPAN'S ABILITY TO MEET KOREA'S IMPORT REQUIREMENTS

The development of Japan's industrial production and foreign trade has been accelerated since the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. Japan's present export potential could meet almost any demand that might be made for the supply of manufactured consumers' goods, cement and of equipment used in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the Republic of Korea's mines, industries and agriculture. Japan's industrial production index which stood at 142.8 in December 1951 (1932-36 equal 100) is continuing to rise while exports during 1951 were less than 50 percent of the prewar period, in real terms. Even with a substantial increase in exports to other areas in 1952, it is estimated that Japan would have no difficulty in meeting most of the potential import requirements of Korea, except for raw materials such as raw cotton and petroleum. At present, Japan can supply a portion of Korea's nitrogenous fertilizer requirements. Nitrogenous fertilizer production in Japan, however, is rapidly increasing and it is estimated that larger quantities could be supplied within the near future. Japan can supply the entire bituminous coal requirement of Korea. A further indication of Japan's ability to supply ROK import requirements can be obtained from the size of UN special procurement in Japan during the one year period following the outbreak of hostilities in June 1950. During that period contracts for supplies totaled 230 million, while services totaled about 98 million dollars. Commodities procured in Japan for Korea included textiles, clothing, rubber manufactures, machinery, metal products, and transportation and communication equipment. These commodities were supplied at a time when Japan was able to achieve a postwar record level of commercial exports elsewhere.

Japan's ability to supply, however, should be qualified. Although Japan's productive capacity is considerable, its utilization will depend, among other things, upon the availability of raw materials, especially those now in short-supply in the world, and the ability of Japanese manufactures to compete with other world market suppliers in terms of quality, price, and delivery. Although prices of Japan's

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exports of steel and steel products are presently somewhat above international levels, it is believed that modernization of present facilities, fuller utilization of capacity, together with larger procurement of raw materials in nearby areas will bring prices down to international levels. Other commodities that Japan produces are generally competitive at the present time.

V. CONCLUSION

Because of the generally complementary nature of the Korean and Japanese economies, trade with Japan may be expected to continue to be of primary importance to Korea. Prospects of a more active trade between Japan and Korea on a commercial basis will depend to a large extent on Korea's ability to expand production in agriculture, specifically rice, and on the maximization of rice exports. Prospects of expanding exports of other commodities are fairly good but their contribution to Korea's foreign exchange receipts would be relatively less important than that possible from rice exports. Should Korea, in the future, overcome currently still powerful political and psychological blocks against dealing with Japan, a long-range Japanese credit and investment program for purposes of development of Korea's resources might be possible, and thus make for increased trade between the two countries. Japan has already made a start in this direction with the establishment of an Export Bank which has as its purpose the extension of credit to purchasers of Japanese capital equipment. However, even though such a development might be desirable as a means of reducing Korea's dependence on US financed imports, at this time there appear to be no particularly strong economic incentives to induce the Japanese to embark on a large trade-credit-program to Korea.

On the other hand, under a UN or US-financed Korean Aid program, Japan is clearly in an excellent position to supply a substantial part of Korea's requirements.

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WHAT WAS DONE
(REDRAFT OF IR 5769)

IMPROVE APPEARANCE,

IMPROVE READABILITY,

REDUCE TIME REQUIRED TO READ,

ASSIST READER TO COMPREHEND -- BY

1. THE INTRODUCTION OF TEXT GRAPHICS:

- a. Expand the topic outline--thus, guide the reader through the text.

12 outline headings instead of 7.

- b. More main paragraphs, one for each principal thought--thus, assist in comprehension.

35 main paragraphs instead of 24, exclusive of footnotes.

4 concisely expressed principal findings in the conclusion instead of two paragraphs.

- c. More columnar text and more subparagraphing--thus, improve appearance and assist reader to comprehend.

1 additional tabulation.

10 subparagraphs instead of none.

- d. Follow paragraphing instructions of the OIR Analysts' Manual--thus, improve readability.

- e. Adopt the underlined sentence outline (key sentence first) for the report Abstract--thus, increase readability, reduce reading time, and assist in comprehension.

5 short paragraphs instead of 2 long ones..

APPENDIX A
PART II

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2. REDUCING SIZE AND COMPLEXITY:

- a. Use fewer words, when meaning will not be lost--thus, improve readability, reduce time required to read.

519 words were eliminated.

- b. Use simpler words and phrases, when meaning or shades of meaning will not be lost--thus, improve readability, reduce time required to read, and assist reader to comprehend.

Examples:

component	- part
negated	- lost
which has as its purpose	- to
outbreak of hostilities	- war
inadequate supply	- lack
extraordinary demands on	- taxing
a degree of	- some

- c. Construct tables so that comparable data is used--thus, assist in comprehension.

1 table (para. IB5 - revised text) revised so that a common annual basis is used. This also reduced the size of the table footnote.

3. REORGANIZING IDEAS AND FACTS IN THE TEXT.

- a. Make the principal fact or thought the first sentence of each main paragraph--thus, assist reader to comprehend. (NOTE: This is known as the "sentence outline" and not only assists the reader but also compels specific and accurate thinking on the part of the writer.)
- b. Construct tables so that data is listed in meaningful sequence--thus, assist in comprehension.

1 table (para. IIA2 - revised text) revised so that import requirements are listed by magnitude.

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- c. Remove new, factual material from the Conclusion and place in the body of report. This follows accepted practice and reduces size and complexity of the Conclusion--thus, assist in comprehension.

2 new facts removed from the Conclusion.

- d. Sequence facts and thoughts to strengthen presentation--thus, improve readability, assist in comprehension, and reduce number of introductory and explanatory phrases and words to speed reading time.

Throughout text, in several instances, facts were re-sequenced.

RESULTS:

Improve readability 165%

- A. Original report - Score of 10.081

Revised report - Score of 26.734

(Flesch Readability Test)

- B. Original report 39.65 words per sentence (average)

Revised report - 18.24 words per sentence (average)

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Intelligence Report

No. 5749

PROSPECTS OF JAPANESE TRADE WITH THE
REPUBLIC OF KOREA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SAME REPORT

Office of Intelligence Research

March 5, 1952

APPENDIX A - PART III

THIS IS AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT AND NOT A STATEMENT OF DEPARTMENTAL POLICY

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PROSPECTS OF JAPANESE TRADE WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

This paper was based on available materials covering the period January 1952 to present, analysis of which was concluded on March 3, 1952 by Division of Research for Far East.

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A. Japan's Ability	6
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PROSPECTS OF JAPANESE TRADE WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

ABSTRACT

Japan - Republic of Korea postwar trade at abnormally low levels - about \$15 million each way.

Expansion prospects depend upon UN or other international financial help; Korea needs this for economic rehabilitation. Japan could play an important role in supplying capital equipment, manufactured consumer goods, coal, and chemical fertilizer needed by Korea.

Korea's ability to expand production of rice for export is the key factor, assuming no outside help. Ores, minerals, marine products, etc., exports can be expanded but are much less important.

Korean political and psychological blocks exist against dealing with Japan. Overcoming these blocks might expand trade through the extension of governmental and private long-term Japanese credits.

However, Japan does not have strong economic incentives for a large trade - credit program to Korea.

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REPORT

PROSPECTS OF JAPANESE TRADE WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

I. PATTERN OF TRADE BETWEEN JAPAN AND KOREA

A. Prior to World War II

1. More than 90 percent of Korea's trade was with Japan proper from 1910 until 1945. Total trade with Japan in 1938 was 370 and in 1939 was 457 million dollars. The pre-war pattern of trade was -

<u>Korean</u>	<u>For Japanese</u>
Rice	Textile manufactures
Marine products	Machinery
Minerals	Metal products
Textile raw materials	Vehicles
	Processed foodstuffs and beverages
	Fertilizers
	Sundry goods

2. Korean imports in the 1930's consistently exceeded exports to Japan. This was due to Japan's desire to industrialize Korea for the purpose of strengthening Japan's economic base. Machinery, metal products, and vehicle imports from Japan increased significantly beginning in the mid-1930's.

B. After World War II

1. Korea's economy, although not subjected to extensive physical damage in World War II, was disrupted by --

a. Political and economic reparation from Japan and

b. The partition of Korea at the 38th parallel.

2. With the tightening of the iron curtain, the southern zone became heavily dependent upon economic aid from abroad.

3. The Republic of Korea (ROK) depends predominantly upon agriculture and fishing. It has only minor light and almost no heavy industries.

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US economic aid brought about some recovery through the reconstruction of industry and agriculture. With war in June 1950 much of this progress was lost.

4. About 90 to 95 percent of the value of ROK's foreign trade since World War II has been with the US (US appropriated aid imports).

5. Trade with Japan, although second in importance to the US, has been at low levels.

	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951 ^a
	(in million US dollars)				
Japanese exports to the ROK (f.o.b.)	18.9	17.9	15.9	18.1	13.0
Japanese imports from the ROK (c.i.f.)	2.5	5.1	3.6	16.0	7.0
Balance	16.4	12.8	12.3	2.1	6.0

a. Estimated from data for the period January through August 1951.

6. ROK annual deficits have been met from US aid funds, chiefly through the ECA. Trade between the two countries is conducted under the terms of a trade agreement concluded in March 1949 and renewed in 1950 and 1951. It calls for the conduct of trade on an open account basis with imbalances settled in US dollars.

7. Rice exports from Korea to Japan, which were most important in the prewar years, were not exported except in 1950. In 1950, only about 90,000 metric tons were exported as compared with an annual average of more than one million metric tons in the prewar years. This low level of export has been due to:

- a. One-third increase in population of the ROK from the mid-1930's;
- b. Low rice production caused by decreased acreage and lower land productivity per unit because of a shortage of artificial fertilizers;
- c. Increased per capita rice consumption in the ROK, offsetting in part the shortage in other grains which before 1945 were an important part of the Korean diet.

Recent hostilities, of course, have once again reduced prospects of rice (as well as other normal commodity exports) for the immediate future.

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II. KOREAN IMPORT REQUIREMENTS AND EXPORT POTENTIAL

A. Import Requirements

1. Korean annual civilian import requirements may be estimated at \$180 million, during the present war. This estimate is based upon ECA, UNKRA, and CRIK (Civilian Relief in Korea) programs as well as commercial imports.

2. Fertilizers and pesticides; clothing, shoes, and textiles; and foodstuffs lead the list of major commodity requirements. The following estimated import requirements are based chiefly upon relief considerations. They do not provide for large scale reconstruction of the economy or for full employment of existing production facilities.

In millions of US dollars

Fertilizer and pesticides	\$ 50
Clothing, shoes, and textiles	40
Foodstuffs	35
Medical and sanitary supplies	15
Raw cotton and yarn	10
Coal	8
Other manufactured goods	7
Petroleum products	5
Transportation equipment	5
Miscellaneous raw materials	5
	<u>\$180</u>

3. Import requirements may be expected to be about \$250 - \$300 million¹, including relief import items, should a program of reconstruction and rehabilitation be instituted by UNKRA after the hostilities cease. Import requirements probably could be reduced gradually to \$100 - \$150 million

1. The UNKRA program (prepared in October 1950 for US fiscal year 1952) roughly estimated reconstruction and rehabilitation requirements at \$250 million. Price increases have occurred since which would make a comparable program more expensive.
2. In the ECA budget estimate justification for US fiscal year 1951, it was estimated that Korea's import requirements, including invisibles, might be reduced to about \$80 million by 1954, a year in which US aid would no longer be required. It was projected that by that time ECA's industrialization and development program would have substantially raised the level of economic activities in the ROK.

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a year in the following two or three years.¹

B. Korea's Export Potential

1. Korea's export potential is not significant. Hostilities have reduced further the immediate export possibilities.

2. Korea could export substantial quantities of rice once an armistice is reached and rice production and collection is improved. This would reduce the need for foreign assistance. However, Korea may not be able to export more than 500,000 metric tons compared to the one million metric ton exports of prewar years. Even this quantity is dependent upon adequate quantities of fertilizer, weather conditions, and upon the government's determination to meet its balance of payments deficit out of its own trade resources. Currently, Korea is in a slight food deficit position.

3. Korea's total exports in 1952 are estimated at \$13 million, excluding the possibility of rice exports.²

In millions of US dollars

Ores and minerals	\$ 5
Marine products	3
Scrap iron	3
Fibers and products	1
Others	<u>1</u>
Total	\$13

1. These rough estimates are based on (a) The minimum imports of material and equipment (or parts) required to restore damaged industrial plants, coal mines, transport and public utilities necessary to the economic life of the country; (b) The minimum requirements of raw cotton, bituminous coal, fertilizer, lumber, and cement; (c) Korea's capacity, based upon past experience, to absorb economic aid at a rate which would not jeopardize internal economic stability by taxing limited domestic resources.
2. A recent estimate made by the United Nations Command, GHQ, G-4, Korean Economic Aid Division, in Civilian Relief and Economic Aid, Korea, February 13, 1952, states that with favorable conditions this Summer and Fall, Korea might have available for export after November, about 200 - 300,000 tons of rice.

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Even appreciable increase in these exports would make a relatively small contribution to Korea's foreign exchange receipts compared to potential receipts from rice exports.

4. Ores and Minerals: Mines, except tungsten, are operating below capacity, if at all. Ores and mineral exports include tungsten, amorphous and crystalline graphite, kaolin, manganese, molybdenum, fluorspar, mica, and bismuth.

a. Tungsten output, because of its strategic importance, has been speedily restored through US financial and technical assistance.

b. Inadequate financing, shortage of food in mining areas, lack of mining equipment and electric power, and the threat of guerrillas have plagued the mining industry and retarded its recovery.

5. Korean marine production can be expanded considerably. If markets can be developed, marine products could contribute significantly towards increasing Korea's foreign exchange receipts. Recently, marine landings have reached the pre-1950 level.

6. Other commodities that Korea has for export are of relatively minor importance. Scrap iron exports may continue to be of some importance for the next few years in view of current world-wide shortage of scrap, but cannot be expected to be a recurring item. Similarly other Korean exports including hemp waste, hog bristles, raw silk, cow bristles, furs, honey wax, and cow bone would be small in value terms.

C. Export Markets in Japan

1. Rice would find a ready market in Japan. This is the most important single commodity that Korea will eventually be able to export. The Japanese prefer Korean over Southeast Asian rice since they imported it in substantial quantities for many years before 1945. Furthermore, Japan's food import requirements are rising each year since domestic food production has not matched the increase in population. Since the type of goods required by Korea can be met in large part by Japan, Korea's rice exports are likely to be marketed in Japan as long as prices are competitive.

2. Other items that might be expected to have a ready market in Japan are of relatively small importance as earners of foreign exchange. Korea can export to Japan such items as manganese ore, kaolin, graphite, fluorspar, talc, hemp waste and fish oil. Marine products exports of Korea, however, are not likely to find a ready market in Japan.

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III. JAPAN'S ABILITY TO MEET KOREA'S IMPORT REQUIREMENTS

A. Japan's Ability

1. It is estimated that Japan would have no difficulty in meeting most of the potential import requirements of Korea, except for raw materials such as raw cotton and petroleum. This would be true even with a substantial increase in exports to other areas in 1952. At present, Japan can supply -

2. A portion of Korea's nitrogenous fertilizer requirements (probably an increase of 100,000 tons) and larger quantities can be supplied in the near future;

3. Korea's entire bituminous coal requirements;

4. Almost any demand that may be made for machinery, equipment, and equipment needed for the reconstruction of the country, and agriculture.

5. Japan's industrial production

Japan's industrial production has been accelerated since the war in Korea. Japan's industrial production index stood at 142.8 in December 1951 (1932-36 average = 100). Imports rose while exports during 1951 were less than 50 percent of the period in real terms.

2. The utilization of Japan's production capacity is high, and, among other things, upon the availability of raw materials. This is especially true for those materials in short supply in the world.

1. A further indication of Japan's ability to supply ROK import requirements can be obtained from the size of UN special procurements in Japan during the one year period following the outbreak of hostilities in June 1950. During that period contracts for supplies totaled 230 million, while services totaled about 98 million dollars. Commodities procured in Japan for Korea included textiles, clothing, rubber manufactures, machinery, metal products, and transportation and communication equipment. These commodities were supplied at a time when Japan was not able to export even a portion of her commercial exports elsewhere.

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C. Other Factors

1. Except for steel, the prices of Japanese commodities are generally competitive at the present time. Japan's present steel and steel products prices are somewhat above international levels. It is believed that prices will be brought down to international levels by modernization of present facilities, fuller utilization of capacity, and larger procurement of raw materials in nearby areas.

2. Powerful Korean political and psychological blocks exist against dealing with Japan. Overcoming these blocks might make possible a long-range Japanese credit and investment program to develop Korea's resources and increase trade.

3. Japan has established an Export Bank to extend credit to purchasers of Japanese capital equipment. However, at this time no strong incentives exist to induce the Japanese to embark on a large trade - credit program to Korea.

IV. CONCLUSION

A. Trade with Japan may be expected to be of primary importance to Korea because of the complementary nature of their economics.

B. The ability of Korea to export rice to Japan is the key to more active trade. The export of other commodities would be far less important.

C. Japan will probably not embark on a large trade - credit program to Korea.

D. Under a UN or US-financed Korean aid program, Japan is clearly in an excellent position to supply a substantial part of Korea's requirements.

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B - ILLUSTRATIONS OF DISTINCTIVE TYPEWRITER
TYPE FACES

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APPENDIX B - ILLUSTRATIONS OF USE OF
DISTINCTIVE TYPEWRITER TYPE FACE

APPENDIX B
(Appendix to Chapter VII)

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APPENDIX B - ILLUSTRATIONS OF USE OF DISTINCTIVE TYPEWRITER
TYPE FACE

Chapter VII - Style and Format of Written Products - includes the recommendation that immediate experimentation begin with new typewriter faces.

The following two pages illustrate a sample report page typed with typewriter type face which we recommend for consideration. These sample pages were prepared by IBM executive model typewriters.

Page B-2 (Larger style) - Code 26, Secretarial type.

Page B-3 (Smaller style) - Code 47, Text type.

Other typewriter type faces should receive consideration in the experimentation recommended.

The potential improvements which should present themselves through this work are -

- Improved appearance;
- Greater readability;
- The "attention - getting" value of distinctive presentation;
- Space savings features through the use of smaller type face for the larger reference - type reports. Page B-3 (text type) illustrates space savings of about 25% with attendant savings in paper, processing time, and filing space.

PROSPECTS OF ONEDONESE TRADE WITH THE REPUBLIC OF TWODON

1. PATTERN OF TRADE BETWEEN ONEDON AND TWODON

A. Prior to World War 11

1. More than 90 percent of Twodon trade was with Onedon proper from 1910 until 1954. Total trade with Onedon in 1938 was 370 and in 1939 was 457 million dollars. The pre-war pattern of trade was -

Twodon

Rice
Marine products
Minerals
Textile raw materials

Textile manufacturers
Machinery
Metal products
Vehicles
Processed foodstuffs and beverages
Fertilizers
Sundry goods

2. Twodon imports in the 1930's consistently exceeded exports to Onedon. This was due to Onedon's desire to industrialize Twodon for the purpose of strengthening Onedon's economic base. Machinery, metal products, and vehicle imports from Onedon increased significantly beginning in the mid-1930's.

B. After World War 11

1. Twodon's economy, although not subjected to extensive physical damage in World War 11, was disrupted by -

- a. Political and economic reparation from Onedon and
- b. The partition of Twodon.

2. With the tightening of the iron curtain, the southern zone became heavily dependent upon economic aid from abroad.

3. The Republic of Twodon depends predominantly upon agriculture and fishing. It has only minor light and almost no heavy industries. U. S. economic aid brought about some recovery through the reconstruction of industry and agriculture. With war in June 1950 much of this progress was lost.

REPORT

PROSPECTS OF ONEDONESE TRADE WITH THE REPUBLIC OF TWODON

I. PATTERN OF TRADE BETWEEN ONEDON AND TWODON

A. Prior to World War II

1. More than 90 percent of Twodon trade was with Onedon proper from 1910 until 1945. Total trade with Onedon in 1938 was 370 and in 1939 was 457 million dollars. The pre-war pattern of trade was -

<u>Twodon</u>	<u>For Onedonese</u>
Rice	Textile manufactures
Marine products	Machinery
Minerals	Metal products
Textile raw materials	Vehicles
	Processed foodstuffs and beverages
	Fertilizers
	Sundry goods

2. Twodon imports in the 1930's consistently exceeded exports to Onedon. This was due to Onedon's desire to industrialize Twodon for the purpose of strengthening Onedon's economic base. Machinery, metal products, and vehicle imports from Onedon increased significantly beginning in the mid-1930's.

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- a. Political and economic reparation from Onedon and
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3. The Republic of Twodon depends predominantly upon agriculture and fishing. It has only minor light and almost no heavy industries. US economic aid brought about some recovery through the reconstruction of industry and agriculture. With war in June 1950 much of this progress was lost.

C - INTELLIGENCE BIBLIOGRAPHY

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APPENDIX C - INTELLIGENCE BIBLIOGRAPHY

APPENDIX C
(Appendix to Chapter III)

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INTELLIGENCE BIBLIOGRAPHY

NOTE: This appendix illustrates, in sample form, the principal ingredients and organization intended for the Intelligence Bibliography. In final form, the Intelligence Bibliography should

- Be bound in 1/2" three ring binder or soft cover binder (depending upon size)
- Have index tabs for each part, properly labeled
- Include a brief of each report in Part III
- Correctly underline in the Index the new items added to Parts II and III

APPENDIX C

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and

Division of Research for
Near East and Africa

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INTELLIGENCE BIBLIOGRAPHY

Introduction

To the Desk Officer for Ethiopia

This Intelligence Bibliography has been compiled for your specific use. It will be picked up periodically by a representative of the Intelligence Organization, revised and brought up to date, and returned to you promptly.

This is not a typical bibliography. It not only lists pertinent reference material you will find useful (and how to get it), but also the intelligence research reports that have been completed and those now in process (and who to contact for information).

An important part of this bibliography is the Index, Part II. It permits a handy and comprehensive finding device when you are in need of facts or evaluated opinion.

It is hoped that you will find this to be a valuable working tool in the conduct of your affairs. Your suggestions for the improvement of this Intelligence Bibliography will be welcome.

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INTELLIGENCE BIBLIOGRAPHY

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PART I

INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH PROJECTS IN PROCESS

(Include here a list of current projects. The monthly Project Report and Schedule may be used for this purpose. Show number, title, requestor, starting date, estimated completion date, and a brief of project scope and objectives.)

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PART III

INTELLIGENCE REPORTS

(Each of these intelligence reports was prepared by
the Division of Research for the Near East and Africa)

ITEM 1. Estimated national incomes of selected Near Eastern, Middle Eastern, and African countries. Washington, D.C., February 7, 1947. 5p. (Intelligence memorandum, OCL-3523.9)

ITEM 2. Views of the Egyptian and Ethiopian governments on the economic relationship of Eritrea to the Sudan and Ethiopia. Washington, D.C. January 21, 1948. 6p. (DRN information note 144) Secret. 382.62 AB-3162S.

ITEM 3. Affinities of the western province of Eritrea with adjacent areas. Washington, September 6, 1949. 23p. map. (OIR report 4996) Confidential. 916.35 AW8564C.

ITEM 4. Unsettled boundary problems of the former Italian colonies. Washington, January 10, 1950. 48p. (DRN division report no. 44) Secret. 914.5 BA76298.

ITEM 5. Technical cooperation (Point IV): Ethiopia. Washington, March 15, 1950. 26p. (DRN Divisional report no. 47.2) Confidential. 330.94 BE7611C.

ITEM 6. The capacity of Eritrea for independence. Washington, July 25, 1950. 22p. (OIR report 5311) Confidential. 323.2635 BHL225C.

ITEM 7. Foreign trade of most African territories. November 28, 1951. 147p. (OIR no. 5583) Unclassified. Eritrea p. 125, Ethiopia 135.

ITEM 8. Data book. Near East and independent Africa. Washington, 1951. 154p. (OIR no. 5531) Ethiopia, p. 13-22.

ITEM 9. Implications of federation for Ethiopia and Eritrea. Washington, February 18, 1952. 41p. (Intelligence report no. 5595) Confidential. 354.63 CCL825C.

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PART IV

INTELLIGENCE REFERENCE MATERIALS

(Each of these items may be secured from the individual named in the Table of Contents. Intelligence reports prepared by agencies other than the State Department are included.)

ITEM 100 The situation in Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somaliland. OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES. Research and analysis branch. Washington, November 30, 1941. 41p. (R & A report 175) Unclassified. 940.53 AE5680.

ITEM 101 Primary products and their manufactures in certain strategic areas: Ethiopia (Abyssinia) TARIFF COMMISSION Washington, June 1942. 11p. maps, tables. Confidential. 338.4 AY9027C. (Preliminary).

ITEM 102 Section III, IV and V of M.I.S.'s. forthcoming strategic survey; Ethiopia. OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES. Washington, D.C., July 16, 1942. 95p. (R & A report no. 765) Restricted. 916.3 AN177R.

ITEM 103 The current situation in Ethiopia. OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES. Research and analysis branch. Washington, D.C., October 15, 1943. 4p. Secret. (R & A report 1380) 963 AL6464S.

ITEM 104 Mineral investigation memorandum no. 1-39 U.S. TECHNICAL PROJECT IN ETHIOPIA. Washington, August 29, 1944-46. 39pts. 338.2 BHL341. Issued as separate reports and in Commerce Department, Development of Ethiopia, listed above.

ITEM 105 Mineral intelligence reports, no. 1-83. U.S. TECHNICAL PROJECT IN ETHIOPIA. Washington, 1944-46. 83 pts. Issued as separate reports and in Commerce Department.

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ITEM 107 Somali tribes of Ogaden Ethiopia in relation to East African sovereignty questions. OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES. Research and analysis branch. Washington, D.C. September 18, 1944. 4p. (R & A report 2505A) 963.AH3465R Restricted.

ITEM 108 Ethiopia: handbook of economic information. COMMERCE DEPT. Office of foreign economic development. June 1946. Washington, 1946. 228p. Pt. 1 The people. - pt. 2. The economy, - p. 3. Transportation and communications. -pt. 4. Finance and foreign trade. -pt. 5. Ethiopia in relation to Middle East supply and requirements.

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ITEM 109 Agreement between the Imperial government of Ethiopia and Export-import bank of Washington on granting of credit. EXPORT-IMPORT BANK, Washington, Washington, D.C. 23 July 1946. 16p. Confidential. 336.3 K206C.

ITEM 110 Development of Ethiopia. COMMERCE DEPT. Office of international trade. Washington, 1946. 3v. in 5.
Contents. v.1. General. -v.2. Industrial. -v.3. Public works and services. Referred to as Fellows report. Compiled in cooperation with the U.S. Technical project in Ethiopia.

ITEM 111 Undemarcated boundaries of the Italian colonies and their cartographic presentation. STATE DEPT. Office of intelligence collection and dissemination. Map intelligence division. Washington, 11 April 1947. maps (OIR report no. 4288) 27p. Restricted. e325.345 Q443R.

ITEM 112 Italian colonies, possessions, and areas under military control in Africa and the Dodecanese. STATE DEPT. Office of intelligence collection and dissemination. Reference division. Washington, D.C., July 17, 1947. 31p. (Bibliography no. 23) Secret. 016.3253 T1741S.

ITEM 113 Geographic basis for the division of Eritrea between Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and Ethiopia. STATE DEPT. Office of intelligence collection and dissemination. Map intelligence division. Washington, D.C., October 13, 1947. 22p. maps. (OIR report 4493) Secret. 916.35 AE4729S.

ITEM 114 Mineral investigation memorandum and Mineral intelligence reports, Index. U.S. TECHNICAL PROJECT IN ETHIOPIA. Washington, 1947. 7p. 338.2 BK1274.

ITEM 115 Increased Soviet influence in Ethiopia, Somaliland, Eritrea. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. B-2619. Washington, D.C., April 7, 1948. 1p. Confidential. 335.4 AD4857C.

ITEM 116 Note on the boundary between Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. M-6. Washington, July 1948. 8p. maps. Confidential. 916.3 AH426C.

ITEM 117 Strategic intelligence digest: Ethiopia. WAR DEPT. GENERAL STAFF. Intelligence division. Washington, 1948. 4pts.
Contents: Pt. 2 Sociological. -pt.3 Political. -pt.4 Economic - pt.6 Armed forces.

ITEM 118 Economic studies of underdeveloped countries: Ethiopia. STATE DEPT. Office of libraries and intelligence acquisition. Division of library and reference services. Washington, December 19, 1949. 2p. (Bibliographic list no. 30.12) Confidential. 016.3396 AZ7703C.

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ITEM 119 National intelligence survey: Ethiopia, Eritrea, and the Somalilands. Section 25: towns. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. Washington, March 1950. 16p. illus. maps. (NIS 55/C/Ar Army March 1950) Secret. 916.3 BJ8531S Sec. 25.

ITEM 120 Soviet activities and agents in French Equatorial Africa. STATE DEPT. Office of libraries and intelligence acquisition. Division of acquisition and distribution. Washington, March 21, 1950. 3p. (Dept. of State. Report no. IAD-A-85) Secret. 335.4 BD7642S.

ITEM 121 National intelligence survey. Ethiopia, Eritrea and the Somalilands. Chapter II: Oceanography. Section 21. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. Washington, 1950. 32p. maps. (NIS 55-Navy 4/50) Secret. 916.3 BJ8531S Sec. 21.

ITEM 122 National intelligence survey. Preliminary NIS gazeteers: Ethiopia, Eritrea and the Somalilands. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. Official standard names approved by the US board on geographic names. Prepared in the Division of geography, Department of the Interior. Washington, August 1950. 498p. (NIS 55 R Interior-8/50) Secret. 916.3 JB8531S Gaz. (pr.)

ITEM 123 National intelligence survey. Ethiopia, Eritrea and the Somalilands. Chapter II: Military geography. Section 22. Coasts and landing beaches. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. Washington, D.C. 1950. 73p. illus. maps (NIS 55-Navy 33/50) Secret. 916.3 BJ8531S Sec. 22.

ITEM 124 National intelligence survey: Ethiopia, Eritrea, and the Somalilands. Section 23. Weather and climate. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. Washington, 1950. 79p. maps. (NIS 55/C/Air Force 5/50) Secret. 916.3 BJ8531S Sec. 23.

ITEM 125 Point four, Near East and Africa. A selected bibliography of studies on economically underdeveloped countries. January 2, 1951. STATE DEPT. Office of libraries and intelligence acquisition. Division of library and reference services. Washington, 1951. 136p. (Bibliography no. 56) Ethiopia 49 Eritrea, p. 46-48.

ITEM 126 Ethiopia. INTERNATIONAL BANK for reconstruction and development. Washington, 1951. 109p. (Studies in economic development no. 1).

ITEM 127 ETHIOPIA. Treaties, agreements, etc. Some translated texts, international treaties binding Ethiopia. Addis Ababa, 1952. JX1106.86.

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
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
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
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APPENDIX D
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E - CONSUMER REACTION QUESTIONNAIRE

APPENDIX E

BUREAU DESK OFFICERS
Consumer Reaction Interview

Date _____ Name _____ Time _____
Office _____ Desk _____ on Desk _____

1. With whom do you work in OIR?

<u>Name</u>	<u>Division</u>	<u>Regular</u>	<u>Irregular</u>

2. What kind of services do you request or receive? (Spot information, briefings, discussions, research)

3. How do you work with the Intelligence Adviser?

4. List all projects now in process in which you are interested.

<u>No.</u>	<u>Requested On</u>	<u>Needed By</u>	<u>Importance</u>

5. Could OIR be of greater service to you? If so, how?

6. What products do you regularly see and use (see Kit)?

Briefs and DIC's _____

NIE's and IE's _____

NIS _____

IR's _____

7. What is your estimate of these products?

Timeliness _____

Quality _____

Readability _____

8. What is your attitude toward centralized versus decentralized research?

9. Comments on BI.

11. Other Comments

12. Kit.

Seen

Comment

13. What arrangements exist to provide formal liaison with OIR research division (attendance at staff meeting, service in bureau, etc.).

14. What is the clearance procedure for products distributed outside of the Bureau?

F - PRESENT TECHNIQUES OF PLANNING AND CONTROL

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APPENDIX F

PRESENT TECHNIQUES OF PLANNING AND CONTROL

Administration within the R Area may be considered in three principal categories:

1. Techniques of management communication.
2. Techniques of "Production" planning and control.
3. Techniques of requirements planning and acquisition planning.

The procedures and devices utilized as techniques of planning and control in each category are discussed in the following sections.

A - TECHNIQUES OF MANAGEMENT COMMUNICATION

Meetings, reports, and written instructions are used as instruments of communication for administrative planning and control purposes. They are summarized below:

1. Meetings.

The following meetings deal largely with general administration rather than intelligence production:

- R's Senior Staff meeting, weekly.
- R's Divisional Staff meeting, weekly.
- Weekly meeting of OIR, OLI, and R/ES Directors.
- OLI Staff meeting, daily.
- R/ES meeting, weekly.
- OIR Staff meeting, on irregular and infrequent basis.
- Monthly meeting of administrative Officers.

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2. Reports.

To varying degrees each of the following reports to R cover subjects of administrative as well as substantive nature:

- Monthly OIR Report to R, regularly encompassing such subjects as (1) current intelligence, (2) CENIS, (3) Psychological Warfare Program, (4) NIS developments, (5) external distribution of IRs, and (6) field trips by OIR personnel.
- Monthly OLI Report to R, regularly under the headings of (1) projects in progress, (2) projects temporarily dormant, (3) continuing projects, and (4) projects completed.
- Monthly R/ES Report to R, regularly including such subjects as (1) budget and fiscal, (2) personnel, (3) Foreign Service Relations Program, (4) Management Improvement Program, (5) projects temporarily dormant, and (6) continuing projects.
- Biweekly Special Work Report to R, listing in some detail the majority of special activities performed by personnel of OIR, OLI, and R/ES in the period covered. It is "not intended as a complete or detailed study, but a working paper for the use of the Special Assistant, Intelligence, and all principal officers of the area." It reports on both substantive and administrative activities, and to a degree overlaps and duplicates subjects covered in the monthly reports to R.
- Program Reporting Book, a monthly loose-leaf book maintained for "presentation to and use by the Special Assistant." It includes general administrative data in chapters related to (1) organization and functions, (2) personnel and fiscal aspects, (3) personnel utilization, and (4) security.

R/ES prepares, or has prepared by the divisional Administrative Officers, several routine reports of a general administrative nature (personnel, etc.).

3. Written Instructions.

The following different forms of written instructions are among the devices of general administration in use from time to time:

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- Special Instructions, from the Special Assistant.
- R Office Instructions, coordinated by R/ES.
- Memos to All Employees, issued by R/ES.
- OIR and OLI Office Instructions or memoranda, issued on an infrequent and irregular basis by the respective Office Directors.
- Divisional Instructions, BI.
- Division Orders, Instructions, or formal memoranda (DRN, DRS).
- Informal memoranda to personnel (DRF, DRA, DRW, LR and IAD).
- OIR Analysts' Manual, coordinated by PCS.

4. Weaknesses Observed.

Essentially suitable techniques are being employed throughout R for the planning and control of general administrative functions. However, the following observations are made with respect to what might be considered significant, though not serious, weaknesses in the implementation of those techniques:

a. The NIS Coordinator is not included in either of the principal weekly staff meetings of R, although the NIS Coordinator is the senior position giving full-time attention to all the administrative aspects of a program involving a major portion of R's total personnel and a significant external budgetary support relationship.

b. The necessity of both the Monthly Report to R and the Biweekly Special Work Report to R can be questioned. There is duplication and information is reported in widely-varying detail. Both reports are less effective by reason of mixing, by office, subjects of general

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administrative nature with those of substantive concern.

c. Written instructions on general administrative matters are issued in a wide variety of forms, from several sources, and without a clear definition of jurisdiction with respect to subject. At least seven different approaches to this device are in use, varying between Offices. Even within OIR itself there is no uniform pattern in regard to subject or form, governing the issuance of written instructions or formal memoranda at the division level. This situation is confusing to the recipients and complicates filing. More significantly, it is conducive to overlap or duplication of subject, and possible conflict, between these written instructions.

B - TECHNIQUES OF PRODUCTION PLANNING
AND CONTROL

The techniques for administration of intelligence production in R relate both to intelligence production itself and to requirements planning and acquisition planning done in connection therewith. A variety of different devices and procedures are presently employed in an effort to effect a measure of planning and to provide control information at several levels in the OIR organization. They are summarized as follows:

1. At the Level of the Special Assistant.

R's weekly senior staff and divisional staff meetings encompass some consideration of production planning and control aspects. The

NIS Coordinator, however, is not normally included in either meeting. The Program Reporting Book, prepared essentially for the use of the Special Assistant, provides a monthly historical record of statistics with respect to OIR intelligence product output, including NIS, as well as volume records of OLI activities. Additional after-the-fact information with respect to intelligence production is provided in the weekly list and the monthly summary of intelligence research in progress and completed which is issued by OIR/PCS.

2. At the OIR Level.

The Estimates Group (EG) and the NIS Coordinator are the focal points of the principal program planning and control accomplished in OIR. Programming and follow-up with respect to NIE's, SE's, IE's and other EG papers receive the close attention of the EG Secretary and are undertaken by the EG itself in its daily meetings. The EG sets forth most of the subjects from which an annual Program Planning Guide is developed. This Guide is not prepared as an all-inclusive program for the work of each OIR division, but simply as an indication of the major subjects and problems that are of particular interest to the EG. The EG Secretary issues a weekly list of future EG Papers, progress on EG Papers is reviewed regularly in meetings of the EG, and a Fortnightly Summary of Actions is issued by the EG Secretary. In addition, the EG periodically reviews its production for coverage comparison with the Program Planning Guide.

The production of NIS sections is planned and scheduled in OIR under the direction of the NIS Coordinator, governed by basic priorities

set by the IAC and within the framework of master planning and scheduling established by the NIS Permanent Committee. A NIS Production Schedule, issued monthly, plans completion of specific NIS sections by month for the fiscal year. A Monthly Report of NIS Progress provides in graphic form a cumulative indication of production progress by month for each NIS section. Another tabular report records production of NIS sections by OIR division, monthly and cumulative year-to-date. A monthly tabular report records man-hours expended on NIS by both NIS and non-NIS personnel within each Office and Division of R. The OIR/NIS Coordinator holds a monthly meeting of all divisional NIS Coordinators for both administrative and production planning purposes.

Very little exists in the nature of techniques of planning and control for the intelligence output not falling within the purview of the EG or the NIS Program. The few devices and procedures employed stem from the Production Control Staff (PCS).

The Current Intelligence Officer of the PCS plans a minor portion of the program of daily and weekly briefings given by OIR personnel and the Current Intelligence Committee has a part in the planning and control of the production of IBs, including DICs. PCS maintains project records through the device of Work Jackets, and man-hours distribution statistics through the monthly Time Use Reports submitted by the analysts. It compiles and issues status reports in the form of weekly lists of projects initiated, modified and completed, and monthly surveys of

intelligence research in progress and completed. Much historical reference information is accumulated and reported, but no forward planning is accomplished, and hence no measure of progress or performance is reported.

3. At the Division and Branch Levels.

Except for the NIS activities, all program planning at the division and branch levels is done on an ad hoc basis, governed primarily by informal arrangements and expediency. The Work Jacket and Time Use Report procedures are found distasteful and given only token compliance.

Reports of projects completed and/or in progress are issued periodically by each of the geographic research divisions, almost wholly as a device of internal value, with little or no distribution outside of OIR. These reports vary widely in almost all respects; namely, as to period, issuing date, format, title, and content. For example, only one shows date project initiated; most are indefinite about estimated completion dates; only one indicates estimated man-hours involved; and only half state report security classification.

These reports do not contribute to planning and are of very limited value as control devices. They are often issued too late for any purpose but record and reader reference. Investigation reveals that they do not coincide with the project records as maintained by PCS/IDR from the Work Jackets. Interviews with branch and division chiefs revealed that these reports are not generally being used as a tool for either

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the planning or control of intelligence production. Also, the techniques of scheduling and control established in the NIS program have not been utilized by the effective application of corrective action from an authoritative management level.

None of the reports of projects completed and/or in progress that are issued periodically by each of the geographic research divisions provide any realistic scheduling; nor are they an effective tool of control.

C - TECHNIQUES FOR REQUIREMENTS PLANNING
AND ACQUISITION PLANNING

The conduct of intelligence research must be fed by acquisition of information of both a specific and general nature and by materials from which pertinent subject information is likely to be obtained. This acquisition of information and materials requires that there be (1) requirements planning, or a determination and specification of the required information and materials, and (2) acquisition planning, or the selection and development of sources and methods from which acquisition can be accomplished.

The burden of responsibility for requirements planning falls essentially on those who have and know the requirements, namely, the OIR divisions. Nevertheless, for either the research divisions or IAD to have maximum effectiveness in the discharge of their respective responsibilities, mutual assistance and collaboration is required. The acquisition

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agency is often in a better position than the production group to know what can be obtained, and therefore, what might be made a feasible requirement. The research analysts, on the other hand, may for a number of reasons (including knowledge derived from their own contacts and research) be in an excellent position to indicate to IAD the most likely sources of most fruitful methodology for acquisition of desired information. The Biographic Intelligence Division, being both a production and acquisition activity, carries responsibility for identification of its needs and for development of many of the sources and methodology through which they are met.

OIR's requirements for intelligence information can be classified in each of two categories as follows:

1. By the particular field of the social sciences to which they apply, as political, economic or sociological; it being recognized that some information overlaps more than one field and that the requirements for biographic information applies in all fields.
2. By the nature of the need, in terms of whether it represents:
 - a. Standard information which should be maintained up-to-date on basic subjects that are normally common to all reporting posts, and for which there can be standing specifications.
 - b. Specific information and/or comments on special or basic subjects with respect to which there is a known or near-term need unmet by intelligence at hand.

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c. Specific information and/or comments on special or basic subjects for which there exists an immediate need.

The following observations are made with respect to the second category:

- There is a limit to how specific the requirements under a. can be and still have general application to all posts.
- To the degree that needs defined by a. are not met, those under b. and c. will be increased.
- To the extent that needs classed under a. are met, those identified under b. and c. will not reflect gaps in coverage as much as gaps in depth and detail.
- To the degree that specific needs are anticipated and reflected in b., those in class c. will be held at a minimum.

At the present time, several R activities are involved in the planning of requirements and guidance or cultivation of sources. The accent, however, is heavy on acquisition and somewhat light on requirements planning. This stems from the absence of an established program of production planning.

Relatively little requirements planning is being done by OIR. Few needs are anticipated. There is no plan, scheme, or established technique by which the OIR analysts are required to think out their needs of the near and more distant future in terms of program objectives, and to list these needs in order of relative importance. Great reliance is placed upon the routine flow of foreign reporting and publications procurement from the field.

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IAD is engaged in both the stimulation of requirements planning and the carrying out of acquisition planning. IAD has had to use its own initiative and a great deal of independent thinking in determining requirements, in lieu of any planned activity in this regard by OIR branches.

Aside from taking the initiative with respect to the identification of needs (requirements planning) and planning of the methodology by which these needs will be satisfied, IAD functions to search out new sources and to determine what use R can make of a possible new source. The Requirements Staff, Civilian Agencies Branch, CIA Liaison Branch and, to a lesser extent, the Military Liaison Branch participate in this. IAD takes the lead in spelling out for inclusion in the Foreign Service Manual the specifications of standard information which should be maintained up-to-date on basic subjects that are normally common to all reporting posts. It collaborates with the division in preparing a comprehensive annual statement by posts of all known requirements for foreign reporting. In addition, it has in the past year developed and tested a vehicle for conveying R's political reporting requirements of near-term need to individual foreign service posts. This vehicle is the Periodic Reporting Guide, preparation and issuance of which at regular intervals is a joint IAD-OIR effort, with the former taking the initiative. These guides list specific information and/or comments on special or basic subjects with respect to which there is

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a known or anticipated near-term need unmet by intelligence at hand. The program is not yet completely established and has been put into action for only a limited number of posts. The initiative with respect to the preparation of the Periodic Reporting Guides has had to rest with the Requirements Staff of IAD. Its maintenance, too, depends largely on the ability of IAD to sell the research divisions on the value of this sort of requirements planning.

The Foreign Service Program Officer in R/ES supervises a program which, in recognition of the fact that the foreign posts are the major source of R's intelligence data, aims to cultivate the Foreign Service as a source and to train its personnel to appreciate their intelligence role more fully and to discharge this role more ably. Specific weaknesses attributable to reporting from most posts include the following:

- Information too much from capital city sources and higher government and social levels. Reporting on provinces considered to be generally weak.
- Insufficient and weak reporting on popular attitudes and reactions.
- Inconsistency and lack of continuity in reporting are engendered by frequent shifting of Foreign Service personnel.
- Inadequate reporting in depth due to lack of interest and appreciation of its importance.

Measures designed to correct these weaknesses have taken through arrangements for (1) briefing Foreign Service Officers prior to their going to the field, (2) briefing Foreign Service Inspectors prior to inspection trips, and (3) liaison with the Foreign Service Institute for

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the purpose of interjecting information with respect to the intelligence function and its needs in the courses given at the Foreign Service Institute. In addition, the Foreign Service Program Officer plans and supervises arrangements with respect to interchange of Foreign Service officers with R personnel, and the assignment of R personnel specifically to accomplish intelligence reporting at Foreign Service posts.

The External Research Staff (ERS) is inventorying by subject and country the social science research being done in the universities, foundations, and other private institutions in this country and abroad. In addition, they are indexing similar research being conducted under the auspices of other government agencies. ERS also attempts to exploit contracted research of other agencies so as to satisfy needs which R may have. The weakness in this effort stems from the fact that absence of forward planning by OIR and inadequate planning liaison between OIR and ERS causes there to be little direct utilization of external research in meeting the requirements of OIR divisions. In the opinion of most of the analysts of the OIR research divisions, the External Research Staff is not meeting a direct need as a source of data.

Requirements planning, in terms of the identification of needs for raw or semi-raw intelligence data, has suffered by reason of being given so little attention and time in the OIR branches. The lack of a recorded work plan in OIR branches has been a fundamental factor.

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Under the circumstances, IAD and ERS in particular have been seriously handicapped in their efforts to render support service through sound acquisition planning. The limited coverage of the Periodic Reporting Guide Program at the present time is a further limitation on the inflow of desired material to the research divisions. To date only 16 posts are being covered of the estimated 60 to 70 which it would be advantageous to cover. Additional limitations on the inflow of desired material are:

- Lack of a definite or comprehensive evaluation program for political and sociological reporting both as regards individual posts and specific reports.
- The fact that some information of significance received by bureau officials and the S/S-R in conversations or official informals does not reach OIR. This is recognized by bureau officials and personnel of the S/S-R.
- The present Sensitive Room procedure which deprives analysts of some material.
- The fact that publications procurement at various Foreign Service posts requires more specific representation and improved coordination of efforts, so as to provide better follow-up on standing procurement requirements and more diligent procurement of general publications (phone books, book lists, official gazettes, etc.) on a self-initiative basis.

In the absence of a sound program of advance planning in connection with acquisition of research material requirements, whether general or specific, the analyst has his project at hand, or may be well into it, before gaps in desired information are identified. It is then necessary to rush telegrams or cables requesting the missing data, or

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to do without it when there is insufficient time available for acquisition. When the latter is the case, the analyst is obliged to compromise the depth, scope, or accuracy (and hence the quality) of his report.

With respect to the NIS in particular, opportunities exist to review basic data available against scheduled projects and to indicate gaps, dates by which gaps should be filled, and methods to be employed.

Furthermore, several analysts are of the opinion that a great deal of research, particularly with respect to NIS, could be farmed out to the universities. This would be particularly true if R were (unable to suitably appraise the qualifications of the staff that would do the work and, in addition, have the contract work subject to its guidance and control.

G - DETAILED TECHNIQUES PROPOSED FOR PRODUCTION
PLANNING AND CONTROL

APPENDIX G

DETAILED TECHNIQUES PROPOSED FOR PRODUCTION

PLANNING AND CONTROL

The following discussion supplements and illustrates in detail the techniques of production planning and control discussed in Chapter XIII. As outlined in some detail in Chapter XIV, the proposed Program Planning Coordinator would have continuing responsibility for methodology of production planning, scheduling, and progress reporting. Recommended procedures, forms, and instructions governing these functions are described hereinafter.

1. The Development of a Semi-annual Work Plan

It is proposed that at intervals of once every six months each branch chief be responsible for projecting, by program (regular, IIA, NIS, etc.) and in summary, his anticipated resources in terms of net analyst man-hours available in the six-months' period ahead, together with his projected man-hour expenditure in each of the following categories:

- a. NIE's, IE's, and SE's
- b. NIS Production
- c. IR's - In Progress
 - Anticipated
- d. Periodic Publications
- e. IB's and Other Written Current Intelligence
- f. Briefings
- g. Spot Inquiry Handling
- h. Committees, Debriefing, etc.

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- i. Background Reading, Marking for File, etc.
- j. Administration, including Evaluations

Form 1 portrays the suggested Work Plan Summary. For each branch there would be such a summary for each program identified within it, plus another for the branch as a whole. The projected man-hour expenditure would encompass consideration of work in process at the initiation of the period, together with anticipated new workloads to be applied within the period ahead. The Work Plan Summary would be compiled from detailed schedules applying to each of the subject categories listed above.

A proposed semi-annual work plan was developed in the course of this survey with the collaboration of the chiefs of the Northeast Asia Branch and Africa Branch in OIR. For both of these branches, as well as one each in DRW and DRS, a six months' work plan of this nature was prepared and reviewed with the responsible Division Chief, IIA and NIS Coordinators, EG Secretary, Director and Deputy Director of OIR, and cognizant officers in the bureaus concerned. Almost without exception these reviews were found both enlightening and useful.

The sequence and manner in which the proposed work plan summaries and supporting schedules should be developed are outlined in the following paragraphs:

- a. Estimated Net Man-Hours Available. The first step in the development of the work plan would be to forecast (using Form 1A) the net man-hours available in the 6-month period ahead, by program

WORK PLAN SUMMARY

FORM 1

PROGRAM		PERIOD	BRANCH	
SUBJECT		PROJECTED MANHOUR EXPENDITURE		PERCENT OF TOTAL
		INITIAL ESTIMATE	ADJUSTED ESTIMATE	
NIE s, IE s AND SE s				
NIS PRODUCTION				
IRs	In Progress			
	Anticipated			
PERIODICAL PUBLICATIONS				
IBs AND OTHER WRITTEN CURRENT INTELLIGENCE				
BRIEFINGS				
SPOT INQUIRY HANDLING				
SUB-TOTAL OUTPUT MANHOURS				
COMMITTEES, DEBRIEFING, ETC.				
BACKGROUND READING, MARKING FOR FILE, ETC.				
SUB-TOTAL INTAKE MANHOURS				
ADMINISTRATION INCLUDING EVALUATIONS				
TOTAL				
ESTIMATED MANHOURS AVAILABLE (From Form 1A) * <div style="text-align: right;"> _____ </div>				
NET OPEN TIME OR DEFICIT <div style="text-align: right;"> _____ </div>				
REMARKS:				

* An Individual Work Plan is prepared for each program and supported as appropriate by detailed lists of projects showing estimated manhours required for each.

FORM 1A

BRANCH

SCHEDULE OF ESTIMATED MAN-HOURS AVAILABLE

PERIOD _____ WORKING DAYS _____ WORKING HOURS _____

PERSONNEL AND MAN-HOUR ESTIMATE:	MARCH	APRIL	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUGUST	MAN-HOURS	
							SUBTOTAL	TOTAL
REGULAR PROGRAM (persons)	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	X	_____
REGULAR PROGRAM (man-hours)	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	
				ESTIMATED ANNUAL LEAVE (man-hours)	_____	_____	_____	
				ESTIMATED SICK LEAVE (man-hours)	_____	_____	_____	
NIS SUPPORT (persons)	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	X	_____
NIS SUPPORT (man-hours)	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	
				ESTIMATED ANNUAL LEAVE (man-hours)	_____	_____	_____	
				ESTIMATED SICK LEAVE (man-hours)	_____	_____	_____	
IIA SUPPORT (persons)	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	X	_____
IIA SUPPORT (man-hours)	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	
				ESTIMATED ANNUAL LEAVE (man-hours)	_____	_____	_____	
				ESTIMATED SICK LEAVE (man-hours)	_____	_____	_____	
TCA SUPPORT (persons)	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	X	_____
TCA SUPPORT (man-hours)	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	
				ESTIMATED ANNUAL LEAVE (man-hours)	_____	_____	_____	
				ESTIMATED SICK LEAVE (man-hours)	_____	_____	_____	
EDAC SUPPORT (persons)	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	X	_____
EDAC SUPPORT (man-hours)	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	
				ESTIMATED ANNUAL LEAVE (man-hours)	_____	_____	_____	
				ESTIMATED SICK LEAVE (man-hours)	_____	_____	_____	

GRAND TOTAL ESTIMATED MAN-HOURS AVAILABLE

and in total. This forecast should take into account allowance for anticipated annual leave and an allowance for sick leave based on historical record. It should include in its count all analysts, including the branch chief.

b. Initial Estimate of Projected Man-Hour Expenditure. In carrying out this second step, the branch chief would be assisted and guided by the proposed Assistant Division Chief (Production), as recommended in Chapter XIV, Three Approaches to Stronger Organization. The following program guidance would normally be available:

- (1) Directives from the Special Assistant providing broad or specific outlines of guidance to intelligence production requirements in the period ahead, based on his contact and liaison with the top policy level of the State Department and in the IAC.
- (2) The compendium of intelligence problems of major interest to the Estimates Group provided by the annual Program Planning Guide, issued by the Director of OIR.
- (3) Specific current anticipations and assumptions of the Estimates Group with respect to the number and subject of NIE's, IE's, SE's and top priority IR's that a given OIR branch might expect in the period ahead. The close liaison of the EG with the S/P, PSB, and CIA, in addition to its periodic review of the Program Planning Guide, should provide the basis for giving this guidance to the planning efforts of each branch chief.
- (4) It should be anticipated that the special program agencies (IIA, NIS, etc.) would indicate, through the Coordinators of their respective activities in the R Area, the basic nature and relative priority of their various intelligence needs in the period ahead.

With the above guidance and assistance provided, the branch chief should develop his initial estimate of the projected man-hour

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expenditures by subject, as covered by the schedules described below and illustrated by examples at the end of this appendix.

- (1) Schedule A - NIE's, IE's, and SE's. For each type of paper: Identification of work in progress at the start of the period and estimated man-hours required for completion; similarly, stated anticipations or assumptions with respect to the papers the branch is likely to participate in during the six-month period; and, based on reasonable assumptions with respect to the nature and scope or depth, estimates of the total man-hours that would have to be expended thereon.
- (2) Schedule B - NIS Production. Identification of sections in progress and an estimated total man-hours required to be expended on such sections, together with indication of percent completion to be attained in each case; identification of sections expected to be started within the period, together with an estimated total man-hours to be expended on these sections in the period, and anticipated percent completion to be attained.
- (3) Schedule C - IR's in progress and anticipated. Identification of the IR projects in progress at the start of the period; estimation of the man-hours expected to be applied to each in the period, and the percentage completion to be attained. Listing of subjects for IR's expected to be essential, and others expected to be desirable but postponable in the period ahead, together with estimated man-hours for each; estimation of man-hours required for collaboration on non-branch IR's; and, the totalization of projected IR's in progress and anticipated workloads in man-hours by program.
- (4) Schedule D - Periodic Publications. Identification by program of the periodic publications produced or contributed to by the branch on a regular basis; projection of the number of issues and estimate of man-hours acquired per issue, together with total estimated man-hour requirements for the period.
- (5) Schedule E - IB's and other written Current Intelligence. By program, as applicable, identification

of reasonable assumptions or experience factors as to the number of IB's, special papers or memoranda, and other forms of written current intelligence expected to be required, and a projected estimate of the total man-hours involved.

- (6) Schedule F - Briefings. By program, where applicable, listing of appropriate premises or assumptions with respect to anticipated requirements for briefings (regular and special) by week or month, and projection of the estimated man-hours required over the period.
- (7) Schedule G - Spot Inquiry Handling. By program, as applicable, identification of assumptions or past experience as regards the spot inquiry load imposed on the branch; estimation of the anticipated man-hour load per day or week of the entire branch over the period ahead; projection for the six-month period.
- (8) Schedule H - Committees, Debriefings, and Liaison. By program, as applicable, projection of the estimated man-hours to be spent on substantive committee and liaison work unrelated to any specific one of the intelligence products referred to in the preceding schedules. Time allowance for preparation of instructions for data acquisition to be included in this category only when not related to acquisition for a specific product. Allowance to be made for time requirements with respect to debriefings of Foreign Service Officers and others.
- (9) Schedule I - Background Reading, Marking for File, etc. By program, as applicable, projection of the estimated total man-hours to be required for the routine background work of analysts. This allowance to cover the time for current and basic intake of intelligence and other reference information, the regular review of which is basic and routine to the function of the analyst.
- (10) Schedule J - Administration, including Evaluations. By program, as applicable, projection of the time required of the branch chief and subordinate personnel in discharge of the various administrative functions relative to general supervision, branch and section planning, recruiting, performance rating, personnel counseling, time use records, non-substantive meetings and liaison, etc.

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During the course of preparing these schedules, the proposed Assistant Division Chief (Production) should assist the branch chief in referring to DFI for indication of projects anticipated to originate in or through DFI, support program and otherwise, and requiring participation from the geographic division. Likewise contact must be established with the CPI, whose liaison with P and other agencies should enable him to identify requirements for intelligence primarily serving psychological warfare purposes other than those of the IIA. It would be the responsibility of the CPI to refer these requirements to the proposed Assistant Division Chief (Production) and branch chiefs concerned.

The summation of the man-hour figures derived from the above schedules, by program, when compared with the estimated man-hours available, will indicate the net open time or deficit in time available in the projected period of 6 months.

c. Review of Work Plan - Initial Estimates. Each branch chief would develop his initial estimate of projected man-hour expenditures and compare it with the estimated man-hours available. With the collaboration of the proposed Assistant Division Chief (Production), he would review this work plan estimate with the principal customers for the intelligence products of the particular branch. Discussion of the Work Plan Summary and supporting schedules with (1) the cognizant desk officers and Officer Directors in the bureau concerned, (2) the EG Secretary, and (3) with the special program Coordinators, should provoke comment with respect to content and priorities which can be used as guidance to the branch chief in adjusting his initial estimate to eliminate any open time or deficit.

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It is not implied that the Bureau consumers should stipulate the adjustments, but that their views should be known to and considered by the branch chief in making his decisions with respect man-power allocations. Thus, the EG Secretary might make some suggestions with respect to the initial estimates in Schedule A and the special program Coordinators might offer comment with respect to adjustments in their respective areas of interest. Likewise, the cognizant desk officers or Office Director in the Bureau concerned might assist in developing priority (at least in so far as their needs are concerned), as regards IR's in progress and those anticipated by the branch chief as being (1) essential or (2) desirable but postponable, in the period ahead.

d. Development and Approval of Adjusted Work Plan. The branch chief, guided in so far as possible by consideration of the review comments received, would adjust the elements of the original estimate to bring the projected work plan within the anticipated capacity in man-hours. No allowance should be made for overtime hours in this planning. It would be unwise to plan the availability of overtime hours, notwithstanding the fact that some are normally available from every analyst. Such a practice would place a very arbitrary limit on the number of man-hours considered available for normal performance of work. The potential overtime hours, therefore, should merely offer a degree of flexibility and a safeguard to the branch.

After the adjusted work plan has been developed, the division chief would review and approve the plan, and then submit it for manage-

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ment review at a meeting of the EG. The Director of Production Coordination, the Chief of IAD, and the Deputy Special Assistant would participate in the EG meeting. This review at the EG level would expose the plan to the consideration of interested activities within R. This management review would clear the branch work plan for the Director of OIR to submit to the Special Assistant and/or his Deputy, for final top management approval. The work plan, when approved, would be returned to the branch chief, and an information copy be provided to the Director of Production Coordination.

The total elapsed time allowed for accomplishment of the foregoing steps (from a through d) should not exceed two weeks. The proposed Assistant Division Chief (Production) and the proposed Program Planning Coordinator would each be responsible for assisting in and expediting the development and clearance of the branch work plan.

A sample branch Work Plan Summary with all supporting schedules follows the text of this Appendix.

2. Administration of the Plan

Obvious benefits will be derived merely from the process of developing the branch work plan. However, the greatest value lies in its being the basis for control techniques through which, in the face of frequently shifting world circumstances and consumer demands, the management in OIR can have meaningful information on which to act to achieve timely production and a desired distribution of analyst man-hours. Circumstances inevitably will cause variations from plan, but the proposed control

techniques will (1) clearly identify the variations, (2) permit them to be analyzed as to cause and effect, and (3) equip responsible chiefs or directors to take necessary management action.

Production control procedures recommended for use in implementation of the approved branch work plan are discussed in paragraphs below. These procedures should facilitate continuing effort toward (1) completing work on time in relation to need, and (2) avoiding any unnecessary expenditure of analyst man-hours. As stated previously, the proposed Program Planning Coordinator would be responsible for the planning and control techniques. However, the entire scheme recommended herein is based on the periodic generation of control information at the branches, rather than at some staff position at a higher level in the organization. The principal tools are illustrated on the following sheets as Forms 1B, 2, 2A, 3, 4 and 5; and the use of each is discussed in detail in the following pages.

a. Project and Analyst Scheduling. Written projects (NIE's, IE's, IR's, etc.) in progress at the start of the period should be scheduled to an expected deadline or completion date. Planned new projects which are expected to be undertaken in the first three months of the period should be given starting and estimated completion dates. In both instances, the scheduling must take into account the following factors:

- (1) The target user's requirements,
- (2) The estimated man-hours required,

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- (3) The availability of the appropriate analyst(s) for the assignment, and
- (4) The average time that the assigned analyst(s) will have available per week for work on this project.

Consideration of all these factors may necessitate adjustments in some. For example, the target user's requirements with respect to deadline, when considered in the light of analyst's time availability, may make it necessary to reduce the estimated man-hours required by curtailing the intended depth or scope of the study. ~~Consideration of the study's~~ necessary adjustments in some. For example, Factor (4) listed above is particularly significant in the scheduling procedure, and is related directly to the distribution of the individual analyst's time between the tasks specified in the Work Plan Summary (Form 1). Study has indicated that the particular use of each analyst in a branch is such that his time distribution pattern, on a weekly average, will not vary to a significant degree from month to month. On the other hand, however, the time distribution patterns vary considerably between analysts by reason of the fact that one may be handling a large volume of spot inquiries and other doing more briefing, another involved in more branch administration, etc. As a means for achieving more realistic scheduling of completion dates, the branch chief should periodically reexamine the time distribution pattern of his analysts. Form 1B is the recommended device for this purpose. It is recommended that this be prepared and duplicate twice a year, at the times of preparing the Work Plan Summary

FORM 3A / 8

BASIC SCHEDULE OF ANALYST TIME

DATE _____

BRANCH _____

ANALYST NAME	PROGRAM	AVERAGE HOURS PER 40-HOUR WEEK								AVERAGE TIME AVAILABLE PER 40-HOUR WEEK FOR NIEs, IEs, NIS, IRs, ETC.
		PERIODIC PUBS.	IBs AND OTHER WRITTEN CI	BRIEFINGS	SPOT INQUIRY HANDLING	COMMITTEES, DEBRIEFING, ETC.	BACKGROUND & MARKING FOR FILE	ADMIN. & EVAL.	REVIEW OF OTHERS WORK	

FORM 2		OIR WORK JACKET		1. JACKET CLASSIFICATION																																	
2A. PROJECT NUMBER		2B. PROJECT TITLE			2C. PROGRAM																																
3A. REQUESTER (NAME AND OFFICE OR AGENCY)		3B. PRODUCING DIVISION/BRANCH		3C. COLLABORATING DIVISIONS (BRANCHES)																																	
4A. PERTINENT INFORMATION WITH RESPECT TO NATURE AND TARGET USE OF PROJECT					4B. PRIMARY SUBJECT TYPE <input type="checkbox"/> POLITICAL <input type="checkbox"/> ECONOMIC <input type="checkbox"/> SOCIOLOGICAL <input type="checkbox"/>																																
5. ANALYST MANHOURS REQUIRED <table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr> <td style="width: 33%; border: none;">A. ORIGINAL ESTIMATE</td> <td style="width: 33%; border: none;">B. REVISED ESTIMATE</td> <td style="width: 33%; border: none;">C. ACTUAL</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="height: 30px; border: none;"></td> <td style="border: none;"></td> <td style="border: none;"></td> </tr> </table>				A. ORIGINAL ESTIMATE	B. REVISED ESTIMATE	C. ACTUAL				5D. PROGRESS RECORD <table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr> <th style="width: 80%;"></th> <th style="width: 20%; text-align: center;">DATES</th> </tr> <tr><td>(1) DATE REQUESTED</td><td style="text-align: center;">_____</td></tr> <tr><td>(2) ORIGINAL DEADLINE DATE</td><td style="text-align: center;">_____</td></tr> <tr><td>(3) REVISION</td><td style="text-align: center;">_____</td></tr> <tr><td>(4)</td><td style="text-align: center;">_____</td></tr> <tr><td>(5)</td><td style="text-align: center;">_____</td></tr> <tr><td>(6) PROJECT INITIATED</td><td style="text-align: center;">_____</td></tr> <tr><td>(7)</td><td style="text-align: center;">_____</td></tr> <tr><td>(8)</td><td style="text-align: center;">_____</td></tr> <tr><td>(9) DRAFT TO REPRODUCTION</td><td style="text-align: center;">_____</td></tr> <tr><td>(10) DATE TO REQUESTER</td><td style="text-align: center;">_____</td></tr> <tr><td>(11) DATE DISTRIBUTED</td><td style="text-align: center;">_____</td></tr> <tr><td>(12) REMARKS:</td><td style="text-align: center;">_____</td></tr> </table>			DATES	(1) DATE REQUESTED	_____	(2) ORIGINAL DEADLINE DATE	_____	(3) REVISION	_____	(4)	_____	(5)	_____	(6) PROJECT INITIATED	_____	(7)	_____	(8)	_____	(9) DRAFT TO REPRODUCTION	_____	(10) DATE TO REQUESTER	_____	(11) DATE DISTRIBUTED	_____	(12) REMARKS:	_____
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6A. PROJECT CLASSIFICATION		6B. DATE OF POSSIBLE REVISION																																			
7. REASONS FOR CLASSIFICATION																																					
8. PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION <table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr> <td style="width: 20%;"></td> <td style="width: 10%;">LIST</td> <td style="width: 10%;">1 <input type="checkbox"/></td> <td style="width: 10%;">2 <input type="checkbox"/></td> <td style="width: 10%;">3 <input type="checkbox"/></td> <td style="width: 10%;">4 <input type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> </table>							LIST	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>																										
	LIST	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>																																
ADDITIONS OR REVISIONS:																																					
9A. LEAD ANALYST'S NAME		9B. BRANCH APPROVAL		9C. DIVISION APPROVAL																																	
PROJECT NO.		PROJECT TITLE																																			

(Actual size 8" x 5")

FORM 2A

PROJECT MAN-HOURS RECORD SHEET

1. RECORD SHEET CLASSIFICATION

2A. PROJECT NUMBER

2B. PROJECT TITLE

2C. PROGRAM

ANALYSTS ASSIGNED	PROGRAM	GRADE	JAN.	FEB.	MAR.	APRIL	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUG.	SEPT.	OCT.	NOV.	DEC.	TOTAL
LEAD ANALYST															
ANALYSTS															
MANHOUR SUBTOTALS															
BRANCH CHIEF AND DIVISION REVIEWERS															
MANHOUR TOTALS															
PROJECT NO.	PROJECT TITLE											PROJECT CLASSIFICATION			

(Actual size 8" x 5")

FORM 3

PROJECT REPORT AND SCHEDULE

DIVISION _____

BRANCH _____

PROGRAM _____

STATUS DATE _____

PROJECT NO. REQUESTER	TITLE	DATE BE- GUN	COMPLETION DATE		MANHOURS			APRIL	MAY	JUNE	FUTURE
			EST.	ACTUAL	ESTIMATED		ACTUAL				
					ORIG.	REV.					
IR 5813 S/P	ULTRANATIONALISTS, ETC.	2/26	5/14	4/22	150	120	115				
IR 55665 NA/J	OCCUPATION MEASURES, ETC.	2/20	3/24		90		32				
IR 5812 E	REVIEW OF THE LABOR SITUATION	3/29	4/9	4/20	30	-	35				
IR 5724 R	XYZ ISSUE	3/25	5/11		75		20				
IR 5817 NA	POLITICAL PARTY DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH KOREA SINCE 1935				150						JULY 22
IE - 71	VULNERABILITY ESTIMATE	4/10	5/1		80	100	60				
NIE - 97	CONTRIBUTION - URGENT	4/16	4/26	4/26	50		56				
NIE - 98	CONTRIBUTION - HIGH				140						

LEGEND: Scheduled Completion Actual Completion Cancelled projects are so
 Deferred or Cut Back Extension marked on next report.

NET TOTAL ANALYSTS' MANHOURS AVAILABLE FOR ABOVE PROJECTS THIS PROGRAM

IN MONTH PAST: Anticipated manhours _____

Actual manhours _____

Excess or Deficit _____

IN MONTH AHEAD: Anticipated manhours _____

NOTE: If the anticipated available manhours are insufficient to meet urgent project needs in month ahead, a memorandum should be attached hereto outlining the problem and requesting management's consideration.

QUARTERLY ANALYSIS OF PERFORMANCE

PROGRAM	PERIOD			BRANCH
A. COMPARISON OF PLANNED VERSUS ACTUAL APPLICATION OF ANALYST MANHOURS				
SUBJECT	MANHOURS EXPENDED THIS PERIOD	% OF TOTAL	PROJECTED % BY WORK PLAN	REMARKS
NIEs, IEs and SEs				
NIS PRODUCTION				
IRs				
PERIODIC PUBLICATIONS				
IBs and other written current intelligence				
BRIEFINGS				
SPOT INQUIRY HANDLING				
SUB-TOTAL OUTPUT HOURS				
COMMITTEES, DEBRIEFING, ETC.				
BACKGROUND READING and marking for file				
SUB-TOTAL INTAKE MANHOURS				
ADMINISTRATION including evaluations				
TOTAL				

B. COMPARISON OF ESTIMATED VERSUS ACTUAL TIME ALLOWANCES

FACTORS	PROJECTS COMPLETED IN THIS PERIOD	PROJECTS IN PROGRESS AT END OF PERIOD
NUMBER OF PROJECTS		
TOTAL MANHOURS EXPENDED ORIGINAL ESTIMATE		
TOTAL MANHOURS EXPENDED ACTUAL		
RATIO ESTIMATE/ACTUAL		
TOTAL ELAPSED CALENDAR DAYS ORIGINAL ESTIMATE		
TOTAL ELAPSED CALENDAR DAYS ACTUAL		
RATIO ESTIMATE/ACTUAL		

NOTE: All hours are for Analysts only.

FORM 5

ANALYST WEEKLY TIME REPORT

NAME _____ WEEK ENDING _____ DIVISION & BRANCH _____
 PROGRAM _____ (Time spent on other programs should be indicated by symbol alongside of entries made below)

SUBJECT	SU	MO	TU	WE	TH	FR	SA	WEEK TOTAL*
PERIODIC PUBLICATIONS								
IBs AND OTHER WRITTEN CI (Indicate IB number)								
BRIEFINGS								
SPOT INQUIRY HANDLING								
COMMITTEES, DEBRIEFING, ETC.								
BACKGROUND READING, ETC.								
ADMINISTRATION & EVALUATION								
WRITTEN PRODUCTS - BY NO.								
NIE -								
IE -								
IR -								
NIS -								
DAY TOTAL *								

* Analyst need not compute

for the branch. The original should remain in the branch and the copy accompany the copy of approved work plan for the Director of Production Coordination. The latter would make available to the CPI, NIS Coordinator, etc. the Work Plan Summary sheets and analyst's time scheduling data pertinent to their respective support programs.

The semiannual preparation of this Basic Schedule of Analyst Time, as a step coincidental with developing an approved branch Work Plan Summary, will materially aid the branch chief in scheduling the written projects to more accurate completion date estimates than are now possible. As may be seen, the right-hand column of Form 1B indicates the man-hours of the analyst's 40-hour week available for productive effort on written projects, after due allowance has been made for the rest of his regular activities. This is a key figure for project scheduling purposes. If it indicates too little time for scheduled written projects of high priority, three alternatives are open:

- (1) Work in excess of the standard 40 hours per week will make available added hours for the priority project.
- (2) Temporary curtailment or elimination of time used for other subjects such as periodic publications, briefings, etc., will make available more time for the desired project. Obviously, regularly resorting to this practice will vary the analyst's basic pattern and, in turn, the work plan itself on a permanent basis unless otherwise compensated.
- (3) Assignment of more analysts to the priority project, if that be feasible, would increase the man-hours available for it.

The analyst time scheduling entered in Form 1B should be correlated with the approved branch work plan so as to insure the allocation

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of necessary man-hours to the various subjects covered by the plan. To facilitate its use by a support program coordinator, in conjunction with the subsidiary branch Work Plan Summary dealing with the particular program, the analysts should be listed on Form 1B in groups, by program, and their time figures subtotaled accordingly.

b. Performance Recording. Forms 2 and 2A, are recommended as a simplified substitute for the existing OIR project Work Jacket. They are designed for use in visible filing equipment and for recording all essential information with respect to the identification, scheduling, and progress of a project. In contrast with the existing form, no provision is made for using this Work Jacket as a record and control sheet for such operations as final typing, stencil cutting, reproduction, and distribution. It is suggested that the latter be served by separate control procedure suitable for the purposes of IDR and the proposed Office of Intelligence Services.

Form 5 is recommended in lieu of the present Time Use Report required monthly of the analysts. This proposed Analyst Weekly Time Report is both simpler and more meaningful than the latter. Its subject headings correspond to those employed in the Work Plan Summary (Form 1) and the Basic Schedule of Analyst Time (Form 1B). These headings should facilitate the analyst's recording of time use. A simple weekly report will be more accurately executed than was the more complex monthly report. Furthermore, to minimize the attention required of the analyst, it is

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proposed that the branch secretary or clerk be made responsible for a weekly visit and assistance to each analyst in connection with the execution of this report. The same individual would post from the weekly time reports (Form 5) to the Project Man-Hours Record Sheet (Form 2A) of the Work Jackets; and would assemble monthly and quarterly, from these same time reports, the figures necessary for the Project Report and Schedule (Form 3) and the Quarterly Analysis of Performance (Form 4) discussed in the paragraphs following.

c. Monthly Report to Management. It is proposed that each branch prepare and issue monthly to management levels in R, the special program Coordinators, and the principal consumers or target users of R products, the Project Report and Schedule illustrated by Form 3. This report, a separate sheet for each program, would portray by table and graphics (1) the action of the month past in terms of projects initiated, deferred, cancelled, or completed, (2) estimated and actual status with regard to man-hours expended by project, (3) anticipated commencement of new projects, and (4) revised completion dates anticipated for projects in progress.

At the bottom of this report there should be recorded a comparison between the anticipated man-hours available in the month past, as derived from the Basic Schedule of Analyst Time (Form 1B), and the actual man-hours available, as derived from the Analyst Weekly Time Report (Form 5). Hence, either from there being (1) a deficit in

analyst time available, or (2) the cutback or extension of man-hours estimated for a project, or (3) the interjection of unanticipated new projects, it should be possible to explain variations from schedule in the month past.

A combined report and schedule of this sort would reflect accurately the dynamics of the workloads imposed on the branch, provide sound basis for management analysis, and indicate realistically the status of each project.

d. Quarterly Report to Management. It is recommended that branch chiefs have prepared, for their own review and that of the division chief and R top management, a Quarterly Analysis of Performance (Form 4). This proposed report form provides a comparison between the planned application of analyst man-hours, as projected in the approved Work Plan Summary, and the actual application of such time, as computed from the weekly time reports. Secondly, it provides a comparison of estimated versus actual time allowances on projects completed in the period and in progress, both with respect to man-hours expended and elapsed calendar days.

The Quarterly Analysis of Performance for each branch should be distributed to the division chief, Director of OIR, Director of Production Coordination, Director of Intelligence Services, and the Deputy Special Assistant. Additional copies of the subsidiary sheets relating to special programs (IIA, NIS, etc.) should be distributed to the respective Coordinators, for review with the support agencies, as desired.

SAMPLE

WORK PLAN SUMMARY

<u>ALL PROGRAMS</u> Program	<u>March 1 - August 31, 1952</u> Period	<u>SOUTHWEST ASIA</u> Branch
<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>PROJECTED MAN-HOUR EXPENDITURE</u> <u>Initial Est. Adjusted Est.</u>	<u>PER CENT</u> <u>OF TOTAL</u>
*A. NIE's, IE's, and SE's	- 1,000	7
B. NIS Production	- 5,000	34
C. IR's - In progress	- 865	6
Anticipated	- 1,005	7
D. Periodical Publications	- 460	3
E. IB's and other written CI	- 1,250	9
F. Briefings	- 365	2
G. Spot Inquiry Handling	- 800	5
	10,745	73
H. Committees, Debriefings, etc.	- 700	5
I. Background, Reading, Marking, etc.	- 2,530	17
	3,230	22
J. Administration, incl. Evaluations	- 805	5
	<u>14,780</u>	<u>100 %</u>

Estimated Man-Hours
Available (From Form 1A)

Net Open or Deficit

*See attached Schedules A through J for details

SAMPLE

WORK PLAN SUMMARY

<u>REGULAR</u>	<u>March 1 - August 31, 1952</u>	<u>SOUTHWEST ASIA</u>
Program	Period	Branch

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>PROJECTED MANHOUR</u> <u>Initial Est.</u>	<u>EXPENDITURE</u> <u>Adjusted Est.</u>	<u>PER CENT</u> <u>OF TOTAL</u>
*A. NIE's, IE's, and SE's	1,200	1,000	18
B. NIS Production	-		
C. IR's - In progress	520	420	7
Anticipated	655	355	6
D. Periodical Publications	280	230	4
E. IB's and other written CI	720	620	11
F. Briefings	215	215	4
G. Spot Inquiry Handling	<u>700</u>	<u>590</u>	<u>11</u>
Subtotal	4,290	3,430	61
H. Committees, Debriefings, etc.	520	470	8
I. Background Reading, Marking, etc.	<u>1,380</u>	<u>1,220</u>	<u>22</u>
Subtotal	1,900	1,690	30
J. Administration, incl. Evaluations	<u>520</u>	<u>520</u>	<u>9</u>
Total	<u>6,710</u>	<u>5,640</u>	100
Estimated Manhours Available (From Form 1A)	<u>5,640</u>		
Net Open or Deficit	<u>1,070</u>		

*See Attached Schedules A through J for details.

FORM 1

SAMPLE

WORK PLAN SUMMARY

IIA
ProgramMarch 1 - August 31, 1952
PeriodSOUTHWEST ASIA
Branch

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>PROJECTED MANHOURLY EXPENDITURE</u> <u>Initial Est.</u>	<u>Adjusted Est.</u>	<u>PER CENT</u> <u>OF TOTAL</u>
*A. NIE's, IE's, and SE's	-	-	-
B. NIS Production	-	-	-
C. IR's - In progress	95	95	4
Anticipated	400	350	15
D. Periodical Publications	260	230	10
E. IB's and other written CI	750	630	27
F. Briefings	150	150	6
G. Spot Inquiry Handling	<u>210</u>	<u>210</u>	<u>9</u>
Subtotal	1,865	1,665	71
H. Committees, Debriefings, etc.	130	130	6
I. Background Reading, Marking, etc.	<u>540</u>	<u>460</u>	<u>19</u>
Subtotal	670	590	25
J. Administration, incl. Evaluations	<u>105</u>	<u>105</u>	<u>4</u>
Total	<u>2,640</u>	<u>2,360</u>	100
Estimated Manhours Available (From Form 1A)	<u>2,360</u>		
Net Open or Deficit	<u>280</u>		

*See Attached Schedules A through J for details.

FORM 1

SAMPLE

WORK PLAN SUMMARY

<u>NIS</u> Program	<u>March 1 - August 31, 1952</u> Period	<u>SOUTHWEST ASIA</u> Branch
<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>PROJECTED MANHOOR EXPENDITURE</u> <u>Initial Est.</u>	<u>PERCENT</u> <u>OF TOTAL</u>
*A. NIE's, IE's, and SE's	-	-
B. NIS Production	5500	5000 74%
C. IR's - In progress	350	350 5
Anticipated	400	300 4
D. Periodical Publications	-	-
E. IB's and other written CI	-	-
F. Briefings	-	-
G. Spot Inquiry Handling	-	-
Subtotal	6250	5650 83
H. Committees, Debriefings, etc.	100	100 1
I. Background Reading, Marking, etc.	<u>850</u>	<u>850</u> <u>13</u>
Subtotal	950	950 14
J. Administration, incl. Evaluations	<u>180</u>	<u>180</u> <u>3</u>
TOTAL	<u>7380</u>	<u>6780</u> 100%
Estimated Manhours Available (From Form 1A)	<u>6780</u>	<u>6780</u>
Net Open or Deficit	<u>600</u>	

Remarks:

*See attached schedules A through J for details.

Form 1A

SAMPLE

SOUTHWEST ASIA
BranchSCHEDULE OF ESTIMATES MAN HOURS AVAILABLE

1 March - 31 August 1952

	March	April	May	June	July	Aug.	Total
Working days	21	22	21	21	22	22	129
Working hours	168	176	168	168	176	176	<u>1032</u>
Personnel Complement:							
Regular (persons)	6	6	5	6	6	6	-
Regular (man-hours)	1008	1056	840	1008	1056	1056	6024
						Estimated annual leave	320
						Estimated sick leave	<u>60</u>
							<u>380</u>
NIS (persons)	6	7	7	7	8	8	-
NIS (man-hours)	1008	1232	1176	1176	1408	1408	7408
						Estimated annual leave	480
						Estimated sick leave	<u>150</u>
							<u>630</u>
							<u>6778</u>
IIA (persons)	2	3	3	3	3	3	-
IIA (man-hours)	336	528	504	504	528	528	2576
						Estimated annual leave	160
						Estimated sick leave	<u>60</u>
							<u>220</u>
							<u>2356</u>

NET AVAILABLE MAN HOURS - 6-MONTH PERIOD

14778

SAMPLE

WORK PLAN SUMMARY

Schedule A. - NIE's, IE's, and SE's

NIE's

Manhours in this Period

Sub-Total

Total

Work in Progress

NIE - 27

150

NIE - 32

50

Projects Anticipated

At least one more NIE
involving work on Baltonia

~~125~~
150

At least one on Whatland, either
a review of NIE 22 in the light
of the abdication, or a more
limited study of special problems

~~100~~
325

Contributions to possibly 2 or 3
NIE's of broad nature, involving
other areas

~~100~~
125

~~625~~
800

IE's and SE's

Work in Progress

SE - 81

~~125~~
150

Projects Anticipated

Within six months will probably be
involved in one IE on Doorland in
view of critical political situation
and its strategic importance;
possibly one the new status of
Foolia, in view of its present in-
stability and vital interest to the
Red powers.

Approximate manhours

~~200~~
200

~~325~~
400

Total Hours Projected for NIE's,
IE's and SE's

~~1000~~
1200

SAMPLE

WORK PLAN SUMMARY

Schedule B. - NIS Production

		<u>Manhours</u>	<u>Projected Completion Percentage</u>
<u>In Progress</u>			
Baldonia	Section 65 (maint.)	300	100%
	" 63	200	100
	" 52	600 500	100
	" 44	400 350	100
	" 43	1500 1300	100
Whatland	Section 57	200	75
	" 53	150	75
	" 43	350 300	50
		3700 3300	
<u>To be Started</u>			
Baldonia	Section 57	700 600	100%
	46	350 300	100
	40	250	50
Whatland	Section 65	300	75
	64	150	50
	51	50	25
	42	50	25
		1700 1550	
Total Hours Projected		5550 5000	

SAMPLE

WORK PLAN SUMMARY

Schedule C. - IR's

Regular Program

	<u>Manhours</u>	<u>Projected Completion Percentage</u>
<u>In Progress</u>		
4222 (Title)	180	100%
5279 (Title)	200 250 150	75 60
5742 (Title)	60	100
5730 (Title)	<u>30</u>	100
	520 420	
<u>Anticipated</u>		
(Probable Title)	50	100
(Probable Title)	180 180	100
(Probable Title)	75 100	100
(Probable Title)	100 125	100
(Probably Title)	200	50
	355 655 1110 375	
Total Hours Projected	<u>1110</u>	

SAMPLE

WORK PLAN SUMMARY

Schedule C. - IR's

IIA Program

	<u>Manhours</u>	<u>Projected Completion Percentage</u>
<u>In Progress</u>		
5667 Propaganda in Baldonia	<u>95</u>	100
	95	
<u>Anticipated</u>		
Ethnic Group Studies	<u>175</u> <u>200</u>	100
Country plan contributions	50	100
Public opinion survey studies on Baldonia	<u>125</u> <u>150</u>	<u>90</u> <u>100</u>
	<u>350</u> <u>400</u>	
Total Hours Projected	<u>445</u> <u>495</u>	

SAMPLE

WORK PLAN SUMMARY

Schedule C. - IR's

NIS Program

	<u>Manhours</u>	<u>Projected Completion Percentage</u>
<u>In Progress</u>		
6524 (Title)	<u>350</u> 350	100
<u>Anticipated</u>		
Possibly a basic paper on Whatland economy.	<u>300</u> <u>400</u> 300 <u>400</u>	100
Total Hours Projected	<u>750</u> 650	

SAMPLE

WORK PLAN SUMMARY

Schedule D. - Periodic Publications

Regular Program

		<u>Manhours</u>
6111	International Whig Monthly (probably four short and two long contributions)	100 150
4080	Trends in X (Estimated 5 hours per week in producing or reviewing items)	130 — 230 280

IIA Program

5666	Weekly Developments of Significance (Estimated average 10 ₉ hours per week)	230 260 460 540
------	---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----------------------------------------------------------------------

SAMPLE

WORK PLAN SUMMARY

Schedule E. - IB's and Other

Regular Program

Manhours

IB's — Estimated ⁴/₅ per week,
1 long averaging 13 hours, 3
short averaging 4 hours.

~~550~~
~~650~~

Special Papers and Memos -
Expect about 10 averaging
from 2 to 12 hours.

70

~~720~~
~~620~~

IIA Program

Daily Developments of
Significance
(average ⁵/₄ hours per day)

~~530~~
~~650~~

Short memos or review
work for IIA

100

~~750~~
~~630~~

~~1470~~
1350

SAMPLE

WORK PLAN SUMMARY

Schedule F. - Briefings

Regular Program

Manhours

1. Armstrong Morning Briefing
Roughly 2 hours per day in 10 of
the 26 weeks this period 100
2. Division Briefing (5 o'clock)
1/2 to 3/4 hour per day total
for two persons this branch 80
3. Special Afternoon Briefings of R
about 1 per month - 6 hours each
for preparation and delivery 35

215

IIA Program

Consultations and briefings for
VOA, INS, and other operating
units

150

365

SAMPLE

WORK PLAN SUMMARY

Schedule G. - Spot Inquiry Handling

Regular Program

Estimated that about six hours per day are devoted to servicing spot inquiries in this Branch

590
~~700~~

IIA Program

Approximately 8 hours per week

210

—
~~210~~
800

SAMPLE

WORK PLAN SUMMARY

Schedule H. - Committees, Debriefings, etc.

Regular Program

Branch Chief about ⁹~~10~~ hours per week;
another ~~10~~⁹ for section chiefs and
analysts combined

~~470~~
~~520~~

IIA Program

Approximately 5 hours per week

130

NIS Program

Committee meetings approximately
total 4 hours per week for 2
analysts

100

~~750~~
~~700~~

SAMPLE

WORK PLAN SUMMARY

Schedule I. - Background Reading, Marking, etc.

Regular Program

Manhours

Allowing 1-1/~~4~~ hours per day for
Branch Chief, ^{1 1/4}~~3/4~~ hours per day for
Assistant Branch Chief (C.I.O),
and 1-1/2 hours per day for the
average analyst.

1220
~~1270~~
1280

TIA Program

Allowing about ^{1 1/4}~~1 1/2~~ hours per day per
analyst for intake unrelated to specific
research projects

460
~~540~~

NIS Program

From 3/4 to 1 hour per analyst per day
in background or current intelligence
intake unrelated to immediate NIS task.

850
—

2530
~~2770~~

SAMPLE
WORK PLAN SUMMARY

Schedule J. - Administration, including Evaluations

Regular Program

Manhours

Branch Chief 2 hours per day
about 1-1/2 hours for rest of
analysts combined. Evaluations
about 3 hours per week for branch.

520

IIA Program

About 2-1/2 hours per week on administration,
including portion of Branch Chief's and
C.I.O.'s time; 3/4 hour per week on
evaluations.

105

NIS Program

About 4 hours per week on administration,
including portion of Branch Chief's time.
Approx. 2 hours per week on evaluations.

180

—
805
=

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